ISSN:1040-6026    

DOI:10.1080/10406020009355110

出版商:Taylor & Francis Group    

年代:1999

数据来源: Taylor

摘要:

The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) recently sought comment on proposed changes to its approach to estimating the economic benefit a violator derives from noncompliance.1Under EPA policy, civil penalties comprise two components: the economic benefit component, designed to neutralize the economic benefit a violator derives from noncompliance, and the gravity component, designed to make a violator worse off than if it had complied on time. EPA's economic benefit (BEN) model has been used since 1984 to estimate the economic benefit component of a civil penalty by calculating the net present value of the cost savings when expenditures are delayed or avoided. To date, this model has been the primary method by which private gains from noncompliance have been estimated for civil penalty purposes.2In a June 18, 1999, Federal Register notice, EPA requested comments on modifying certain aspects of this model, and expanding its approach to estimating economic benefit beyond the avoided‐cost approach embodied in the BEN model.

ISSN:1040-6026    

DOI:10.1080/10406020009355111

出版商:Taylor & Francis Group    

年代:1999

数据来源: Taylor

摘要:

Tort liability contributes significantly to the cost of doing business in the United States. For companies that manufacture and distribute products that pose certain inherent hazards arising from the nature or purpose of their products, it is essential to keep such costs under control. These industries are typically subject to extensive government regulation. If a business violates statutes and regulations controlling the manufacture, labeling, sale, and distribution of regulated products or in providing regulated services, it increases its risk of tort claims and weakens its legal position for defending against those claims. Companies that employ effective programs for regulatory compliance reap substantial indirect benefits from those programs in the form of reduced tort liability. To achieve that, the regulatory compliance program should be integrated fully into the life‐cycle for highly regulated products—such as pesticides and consumer chemical products—from the design stage through post‐sale consumer or customer response.

ISSN:1040-6026    

DOI:10.1080/10406020009355112

出版商:Taylor & Francis Group    

年代:1999

数据来源: Taylor

摘要:

Environmental liabilities often give rise to corporate disclosure obligations by directors and officers in 10‐Ks, 10‐Qs, annual reports, and other financial reporting documents. What happens if an environmental disclosure ultimately proves to be wrong? Where litigation results from an inadequate or misleading disclosure, directors and officers will turn to their director‐ and officer‐liability insurance policies for defense and indemnity. After all, the very purpose of D&O liability insurance is to provide this sort of protection. Fraud, of course, is not covered; it is excluded under the express provisions of the insurance contract and is subject to a public policy bar of coverage under the law of most states. But what about negligent misrepresentation by corporate directors or officers in reporting on environmental liabilities? Negligent misrepresentation is not fraud. Surely coverage exists for negligence in the disclosure context, directors and officers may think, but they may be in for an unpleasant surprise. Numerous cases have held that no coverage exists.

ISSN:1040-6026    

DOI:10.1080/10406020009355113

出版商:Taylor & Francis Group    

年代:1999

数据来源: Taylor

摘要:

InSpartan Petroleum Co., Inc. v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co.,162 F.3d 805 (4th Cir. 1998), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit addressed two important issues in the law of insurance coverage for progressive environmental‐damage claims. First, the fourth circuit reinforced a straightforward principle of law that it is theproperty damage of the third‐party claimant that triggers coverage under a general‐liability insurance policy, not the insured's own property damage. Second, the fourth circuit held that the liability is allocated pro rata over the period of the progressive damage, and for those periods where the insured has no insurance, the insured must bear the loss.

ISSN:1040-6026    

DOI:10.1080/10406020009355114

出版商:Taylor & Francis Group    

年代:1999

数据来源: Taylor

摘要:

Business transactions come in three forms: simple, complex or impossible. Impossible equates to a transaction that has been abandoned because one or both parties sees no potential gain—financial or otherwise—in completing the transaction. Providing such a compact definition for complex transactions is not as simple.

ISSN:1040-6026    

DOI:10.1080/10406020009355115

出版商:Taylor & Francis Group    

年代:1999

数据来源: Taylor

ISSN:1040-6026    

DOI:10.1080/10406020009355116

出版商:Taylor & Francis Group    

年代:1999

数据来源: Taylor

ISSN:1040-6026    

DOI:10.1080/10406020009355117

出版商:Taylor & Francis Group    

年代:1999

数据来源: Taylor

ISSN:1040-6026    

DOI:10.1080/10406020009355118

出版商:Taylor & Francis Group    

年代:1999

数据来源: Taylor

ISSN:1040-6026    

DOI:10.1080/10406020009355119

出版商:Taylor & Francis Group    

年代:1999

数据来源: Taylor