摘要:

SummaryHempel's Deductive‐Nomological model of explanation is compared to Sellars' brand of essentialism. The source of their differences is shown to lie in their views on the explanatory role of inductively based generalizations. An adequate explanation requires a reasoned account of why an empirical generalization fails. On Sellars' view this entails concentrating on the nature of the things whose behavior is in question. We thereby remove ourselves from the misleading positivist methodology in which one counterinstance renders a generalization uninteresting. It is suggested instead that “disconfirmed” generalizations are of crucial positive methodological importance for purposes of theory development.RésuméLe modèle déductif‐nomologique de Hempel est comparéà l'essentialisme dans la version qu'en propose Sellars. L'auteur montre que leurs différences proviennent de ce qu'ils jugent différemment le rôle explicatif des généralisations inductives et les raisons de l'échec d'une généralisation empirique. D'après Sellars, il faut par conséquent se concentrer sur la nature des choses dont on observe le comportement; on évite ainsi les problèmes méthodologiques soulevés par les théories positivistes standard de la confirmation. L'auteur conclut en montrant que des généralisations infirmées ont une importance positive capitale pou

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1980.tb00767.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1980

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

SummaryAfter presumably cleaning science of induction, Karl Popper claims to offer a purely noninductivist theory of science. In critically evaluating this theory, I focus on the allegedly noninductive character of this theory. First, I defend and expand Wesley Salmon's charge that Popper's dismissal of induction renders science useless for practical purposes. Without induction practitioners have no grounds for believing that the predicted event will actually take place. Second, despite Popper's demands to the contrary, his theory of science is shown to rest on induction. In particular, the function he attributes to background knowledge in testing a scientific hypothesis requires induction.

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1980.tb00768.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1980

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

SummaryThe conspicuous role of taxonomy and debates about taxonomy in the well‐established physical science of pedology throws into question the Popperian rejection of definition and classificatio

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1980.tb00769.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1980

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

The explanation [of scientific change and problem solving] must, in the final analysis, be psychological or sociological. It must, that is, be a description of a value system, an ideology, together with an analysis of the institutions through which that system is transmitted and enforced. Thomas Kuhn (1)Traditional epistemology with its concentration… on knowledge in the subjective sense, is irrelevant to the study of scientific knowledge. Karl Popper (

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1980.tb00770.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1980

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1980.tb00771.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1980

数据来源: WILEY