摘要:

summaryMartin and Pfeifer (1986) have claimed“that the most typical characterizations of intentionality… all fail to distinguish … mental states from …dispositional physical states.”The evidence they present in support of this thesis is examined in the light of the possibility that what it shows is that intentionality is the mark, not of the mental, but of the dispositional. Of the five marks of intentionality they discuss a critical examination shows that three of them, Brentano's (1874)inexistenceof the intentional object, Searle's (1983)directednessand Anscombe's (1965)indeterminacy, are features which distinguish T‐inten Tional/dispositional The other two are either, as in the case of Chisholm's (1957)permissible falsityof a propositional attitude ascription, a feature of linguistic utterances too restricted in its scope to be of interest, or, as in the case of Frege's (1892)indirect reference/Quine's (1953)referential opacity, evidence that the S‐intenSional locution is a quotation either of what someonehas saidin the past ormight be expected to say, if the question were to arise at some time

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1996.tb00001.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractThe question of whether an «understanding» of quantum phenomena is possible, as raised by Cushing (1991), is considered in terms of a possible revision of basic ontological assumptions which would make rational the pursuit of such an understanding. It is argued that the quantum theory imposes new constraints on ontology which force us to revise classical presuppositions about attributing properties to physical systems, about locality and individuality, and about interaction and space‐like separability. Through such ontological revision, it is argued, one may still rationally hope to satisfy the typically realist thirst for an understanding of quantum phenom

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1996.tb00002.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

SummaryThis article discusses whether a naturalistic philosopher (e. g., Quine) should endorse the epistemological version of the “is/ought gap” thesis. Quine thinks that there is an epistemological gap between normative epistemology and normative ethics, but I claim that anybody holding his naturalistic and holistic views has good reasons to deny the existence of a gap separating either epistemology from ethics or descriptive discourse from nonnative discourse. I maintain that both gaps can be bridged if one adopts, like Quine, a holistic view of justification. Although justification in science, epistemology and ethics are different in certain respects, holism accounts for the justification of scientific, epistemological and ethical beliefs at a general le

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1996.tb00003.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

Book reviewed in this article:Charles S. Peirce's Evolutionary Philosophy*Francois Lasserre, La naissance des mathématiques à l'époque de Platon, Vestigia, Fribourg‐Paris,

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1996.tb00004.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1996.tb00005.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY