摘要:

SummaryIn this article I was guided outside my special branch of science, by coincidences of thesenseof the ideas occuring almost simultaneously in different sciences : correspondence, complementary pairs of opposites and wholeness appear independently both in physics as well as in the ideas of the unconscious. The unconscioustitself has a certain analogy to the field in physics and both are shifted by an observational problem, outside the range of visualibility into the paradoxical. Although in physics one does not speak of archetypes which reproduce themselves, but of statistical laws of nature with primary probabilities, both formulations meet in the tendency to amplify the older more narrow idea of causality (determinism)to a more general form of connections in nature, toward which the psycho‐physical problem also points. This way of consideration leads me to the expectation, that the ideas on the unconscious will not be developed further in the narrow frame of its therapeutic applications, but that their junction with the general stream of the natural sciences of the phenomena of life will be decisive for the

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1954.tb01265.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1954

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1954.tb01266.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1954

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1954.tb01267.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1954

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

SummaryThose who claim formal logic to be plainly independent of any philosophical commitment often seem to overlook (1) the historicalfactsof cooperation between formal logic and logical empiricism, (2) the cases or more or less implicit shifting from ade factoto ade iuresituation.Three subcases are here examined of an explaining‐away argumentation which, whether directly of indirectly, contributes to bestowing undue prerogatives upon formalization. Objections are raised especially against some points of Ayer's discussion towards reducing the concept of thruth in such a way that it can be either dispensed with or readily assumed by that kind of uncritical epistemology which gravitates towards formalization and formal system

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1954.tb01268.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1954

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1954.tb01269.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1954

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1954.tb01270.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1954

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1954.tb01271.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1954

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1954.tb01272.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1954

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1954.tb01273.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1954

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1954.tb01274.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1954

数据来源: WILEY