摘要:

SummaryThis paper is a critical examination ofargumentum ad ignorantiam, or arguing from ignorance.Ad ignorantiamis regarded as a fallacy, and certainly no route to knowledge, by most philosophers. However, case studies ofad ignorantiamare almost non‐existent, and theoretical discussions few in number. Thus this paper begins with a number of case studies. From them some morals are drawn. The morals concern the interpretation and evaluation of arguments in general and the nature and epistemic value ofad ignorantiamin particular. Two theoretical discussions of the argument‐type are next considered, those of Richard Robinson and (in a jointly authored paper) John Woods and Douglas Walton. I conclude that there is no general fallacy ofad ignorantiam– no argument is fallacious just because it's anad ignorantiam– and that sometimes no reason is good

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1989.tb00947.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1989

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

SummaryAnti‐Realism claims that the Classical or Realist conception of truth as verification‐transcendent is incoherent. Our grasp of the meanings of statements from any given class is to be assimilated to a grasp of their assertibility or deniability conditions. In this paper I present an apparent counter‐example to the Anti‐Realist's positive claim which derives from the traditional problem of other minds.ResumeL'anti‐réalisme affirme ľincohérence de la conception réaliste classique de la vérité comme transcendante à la vérification. Notre saisie des significations des énoncés ? une classe donnáe quelconque doit être assimilée à la saisie des conditions dans lesquelles ils peuvent être affirmés ou niés. Dans cet article, je présente un apparent contre‐exemple, tiré du problème traditionnel de l'existence ? autres sujets, à la thèse positive des anti‐réalistes.ZusammenfassungDer Antirealist behauptet, dass die klassische realistische Auffassung der Wahrheit als einer der Prüfung unzugänglichen Begriffes unhaltbar sei. Um die Bedeutungen irgendwelcher Aussagen verstehen zu können, mussen wir die Bedingungen ihrer Behauptbarkeit kennen. Ich lege ein offenbares Gegenbeispiel zur These des Antirealisten vor, das sich aus dem traditionell

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1989.tb00948.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1989

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

SummaryFinite, or Fermat arithmetic, as we call it, differs from Peano arithmetic in that it does not involve the existence of an infinite set (of natural numbers) or Peano's induction postulate. Fermat's method of infinite descent takes the place of bound induction, and we show that a con‐structivist interpretation of logical connectives and quantifiers can account for the predicative finitary nature of Fermat's arithmetic. A non‐set‐theoretic arithemetical logic thus seems best suited to a constructivist‐inspired number

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1989.tb00949.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1989

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

SummaryThe paper presents a paradigmatic part of the logic of magnitudes, an invention of Descartes, different from alethic formal logic, but a proper formal logicsui generis.Descartes' logic consists of corporeal – geometrical and physical – devices that behave like deductive calculi, generating inferences of magnitudes from magnitudes. Its syntactic elements are magnitudes as corporeal entities, whose connections can be characterized by various magnitudinal connectives, distinguished from those of alethic logic. The paper presents two kinds of orthogonal and the congruence connectives applying them (1) to line segments and (2) to physical magnitudes. It describes the value semantics and the interpretative semantics of these connections, the inference rules they take part in, states the conditions for validity and theoremhood, and compares it to model theory. It shows that one of the orthogonal connections displays the ontic and logical properties of Descartes’ideae innatae, whereas the other displays those of Descartes’ideae factae, and shows that the physical lawmv =pregarded as an orthogonal connection is anidea

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1989.tb00950.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1989

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

RésuméCette brève étude tente de montrer comment la théorie peircienne de ľindividuation donne naissance à la première analyse moderne du nom propre. A travers une triple caractérisation, à la fois sémanique (unicité du référent), pragmatique (nature indexique du renvoi) et sémiotique (index iconico‐symbolique) du nom propre, Peirce fournit en effet la première description véritablement éclairante des conditions sous lesquelles devient possible la désignation ?individus dans le langage, nous offrant un exemple particulièrement suggestif de ce qu'on peut concevoir comme universaux de langage.SummaryThis brief study is an attempt to show how Peirce's theory of individuation gives rise to the first modern analysis of the proper noun. Through a triple characterization – semantic (uniqueness of the referent), pragmatic (indexical nature of the reference) and semiotic (iconico‐symbolic index) – of the proper noun, Peirce provides the first truly enlightening description of the conditions in which it becomes possible to designate individuals in language, which gives us a particularly suggestive example of what can be understoo

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1989.tb00951.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1989

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1989.tb00952.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1989

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1989.tb00953.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1989

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1989.tb00954.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1989

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1989.tb00955.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1989

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1989.tb00956.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1989

数据来源: WILEY