摘要:

«The chapter on «Times's Arrows» is a confusing blend of speculation and possibly wrong ideas.»From a review of M Gell‐Mann's «The Quark and the Jaguar» by P W Anderson in Physics World, Augu

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1996.tb00012.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractThe paper explores the relationship between skepticism on the one hand and the metaphysical realist and the internal realist conceptions of truth on the other. After a brief description of the metaphysical realist and the internal realist positions, it is argued that the former but not the latter is committed to an important sort of skepticism, namely, that we might be wrong about practically everything at the same time. First an abstract argument is presented to this effect, then the issue is further clarified through an analysis of Hilary Putnam's anti‐skeptical argument about brains in a vat. The analysis shows that the argument can be rejected only from the metaphysical realist standpoint. Since the argument is conclusive from the internal realist point of view, internal realism, in contrast with metaphysical realism, is safe from skepticis

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1996.tb00013.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractIt is trivially true that solipsism, the view that “the world is my world” and that whatever there is is ontologically dependent on my thought or language, cannot be conclusively refuted. The issue of solipsism is, however, an important one. The paper considers this issue mainly from the point of view of Wittgenstein's remarks on solipsism in the Tractatus and in his early Notebooks. It is argued that we should not accept the Wittgensteinian idea that solipsism eventually coincides with “pure realism”. A position labeled “pragmatic realism” is briefly sketched in order to avoid both solipsism and what I call “credo realism”. Thus, I try to show that the issue of solipsism vs. realism should not simply be dismissed and that it should be approached from a pragmat

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1996.tb00014.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

Book reviewed in this article:Niels Bohr's Philosophical Background*

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1996.tb00015.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1996.tb00016.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1996.tb00017.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY