摘要:

ZusammenfassungVagheit (Kontinuität) und Selbstreferenz (Reflexivitat) sind die offensichtlichen Ursachen aller logico‐philosophischen Paradoxien. Beide Ursachen sind nur ein Stück weit formal zugänglich und führen uns über das Rätsel der mentalen Repräsentation/Partizipation/Produktion zuletzt zur unbegreiflichen Subjekt/Objekt‐Trennung. Die epistemischen Paradoxien vomHenker‐ Typ sind ein Labyrinth von Vagheit und Selbstreferenz. In Teil I analysierten wir eine zeitlose Variante von Hollis (1984), in Teil II betrachten wir zwei klassischeHen

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1996.tb00006.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

RésuméComment devons‐nous appliquer notre savoir scientifique (lois de la nature, théries, etc.) pour qu'il contribue à mieux comprendre les phénomènes (événements particuliers, regularité, etc.) que nous observons? Le modèle déductif‐nomologique d'explication scientifique, dans lequel Carl Hempel construit le concept d'explication déductive‐nomologique, ne procure pas une réponse complète à cette question. Un des problèmes est que Hempel nous dit ce que nous devons construire quand nous voulons comprendre un phéomène (une explication déductive‐nomologique), mais ne nous dit pas comment une explication de ce type est construite. Afin de réoudre ce problème, une méthode pour construire des explications déductiv

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1996.tb00007.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

summaryThis paper discusses objections against the idea that the meaning of a word is its use. Sct. 1 accepts Rundle's point that ‘meaning’ and ‘use’ are used differently, but insists that this is compatible with holding that use determines meaning, an therefore holds the key to conceptual analysis. Scts. 2–4 rebut three lines of argument which claim that linguistic philosophy goes astray by reading into the meaning of words non‐semantic features of its use: Searle's general speech act fallacy charge, Hacker's use of the Frege‐point against Wittgenstein's account of avowals, and Grice's attack on Wittgenstein's discussion of ‘trying’. Sct. 5 argues that Grice's doctrine of conversational implicature fails to show that the features he disregards are pragmatic rather than semantic. Sct. 6 ends with some suggestions about how use can be related to meaning wit

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1996.tb00008.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

summaryAccording to the radical sceptic we have no reason to believe anything, being unable even to distinguish the more probable from the less. I propose to consider the practical problems engendered by this stance. It seems to require that we suspend judgement, but it is not clear that we can acquiesce to this demand. Is it psychologically possible to suspend belief? And if it is, can the sceptic live and act without believing? The practical difficulties, I shall argue, are genuine (although not always properly understood), but do not absolve us from the need to contend with sceptical arguments.

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1996.tb00009.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

summaryQuine's ontological relativity thesis requires that objects be treated as «neutral nodes» in the logical structure of our total theory of the world. It is by treating objects as neutral that we are able to vary ontology yet leave the evidential support of our theory undisturbed. In this article, I present arguments against the possibility of treating objects asneutra

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1996.tb00010.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1996.tb00011.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY