摘要:

SummaryScientific realists like Boyd, Newton‐Smith and Putnam have argued that scientific realism is an empirical hypothesis; hence testable and falsifiable ‐future scientists could come to the insight that, after all, genes, electrons and most or all of the other entities posited by contemporary science cannot be said to exist. We show that such a naturalistic view of scientific realism is incompatible with a causal theory of reference and we suggest that there is currently no theory of reference that can deal with the threat of meaning incommensurability and leave open the possibility that scientific realism is fa

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1995.tb00112.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1995

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractIn a recent series of papers, John Worrall has defended and elaborated a philosophical position – traced back to Poincaré– which he calls structural realism. This view stands in between scientific realism and agnostic instrumentalism and intends to accommodate both the intuitions that underwrite the ‘no miracles’ argument for scientific realism and the existence of scientific revolutions which lead to radical theoretical changes. Structural realism presents itself as the best of both worlds. In this paper I critically examine the epistemic status of structural realism, and argue that it is not the best of both worlds. Yet, I stress that it reveals an insight which, properly understood, can cast new light on the debates over scientific

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1995.tb00113.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1995

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

RésuméSoixante‐cinq ans après sa publication, la controverse que l'article #Einstein, Podolsky et Rosen (EPR, 1935) suscita à propos de I'image de l'univers physique (Weltbild et Weltanschauung) suggérée par le formalisme de la théorié quantique n'est pas close. Elle oppose une minorité«localiste», petit cercle de physiciens réalistes partisans de la localitéd’ Einstein, á une majorité«non localisten» adepte – non uniformément, cependant – des prédictions non locales de la thhrie quantique et de l'Interprétation dite positiviste de Copenhague érigée principalement sur la philosophie de Bohr et de Heisenberg.Les arguments, les modèles avands par des physiciens de ces deux camps philosophiques et les tests expkrimentaux, passb ou futurs, destinb depuis les InBgalités de Bell (1964) à trancher cette controverse sont présidera à la lumière de I'enjeu percu par une minorité d'entre eux: quelle définition du réalisme physique: Locale on non‐locale, présidera à la construction de l'«image du monde», (Weltbild et Welt

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1995.tb00114.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1995

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

Professor Davidson, you are one of the dominant figures in analytic philosophy, your articles and papers are read worldwide and long gone are the times when only a few American specialists knew about what you were doing. So today, there is no need to ask you to in introduce your philosophy in “ten sentences that everybody can understand”. Rather, I would like to give your readers the chance to get an impression of the person behind the philosophy as well as a somewhat closer look at some of that person's current philosophical attitudes. What I am interested in, to put it in a nutshell, are all sorts of relations and transitions ‐relations between your philosophy and that of others, and transitions your thinking and interests, philosophical and otherwise, underwent over the years.Let me start with a couple of “historical” questions: What were the earliest philosophical problems that you were interested in? In the long run, you have become especially well known as the inventor of Anomalous Monism – have you always a physicalist o

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1995.tb00115.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1995

数据来源: WILEY