摘要:

SummaryThe early writings of Barry Barnes, as the co‐founder of the Edinburgh School of sociology of scientific knowledge, are explored to bring out and to evaluate his main presuppositions and arguments. Barnes is highly critical of anthropologists' conception of scientific knowledge, rationality, truth, and their asymmetrical explanatory approach towards different belief‐systems. Likewise he rejects the prevalent View of science among sociologists of knowledge, and also their approach to explanation of knowledge or belief‐adoption. His proposal is based on a Kuhnian model of science, and offers his own socio‐causal explanatory scheme applicable to all beliefs and knowledge‐claims. I have challenged the basis of his model of science and have tried to show that his use of Kuhn's concepts of normal practice and paradigm is problematic, and that his idea of social causation of beliefs is highly problematic.“new paradigms may gain support not because of any demonstrable superiority over the old but simply because scientists welcome the opportunity of a new try at explanation” Barry Barnes (1969)“all belief‐systems, scientific or preliterate, ‘true’ or ‘erroneous’, are most profitably compared and understood within a single fram

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1993.tb00093.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1993

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

SummaryIt is not the inconsistency in the sense of classical logic (CI) that we have to tolerate. The dialectical reasoning, described by N. Rescher, is outside the domain where CI is defined. The apparent contradiction between CI and paraconsistent logic (PL) can be removed by realizing that PL is a widening of the conceptual framework of classical logic. In this new framework the meaning of some words was changed similarly as, according to N. Bohr, in quantum mechanics the words “particle” and “wave” have changed their

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1993.tb00094.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1993

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

SummaryThis paper firms up previous arguments for referential transparency in intensional constructions by providing conclusive proofs of this, both formal and informal. Centrally the paper uses epsilon terms to symbolise referring expressions, and so it obtains the rigid designators needed to allow the same object to be referred to in all worlds and minds. The details of several contrary ideas are examined to reinforce the claim that they are incorrect. But also certain world‐dependent or mind‐dependent objects are identified, using epsilon terms, to give an understanding of what might have caused the historical belief in referential opac

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1993.tb00095.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1993

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1993.tb00096.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1993

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

Book reviewed in this article:Bild, Zeichen, Darstellung*

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1993.tb00097.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1993

数据来源: WILEY