摘要:

SummarySubjecting to a detailed analysis Kant's diagnosis of dialectical error in the Transcendental Dialectic of the firstCritique, the author posits that Kant's understanding of such error is, to the extent that it conflates the subjective‐objective, phenomenal‐noumenal, and regulative‐constitutive distinctions, fundamentally incoherent. The author argues not only that these three distinctions cannot on Kant's own terms be conflated, but also that Kant's treatment of dialectical error is further vitiated by circularity of argument: Kant proposes to explain the three distinctions by means of the notion of transcendental error, which however the distinctions themselves were supposed to explain in the first place. After showing that Kant's diagnosis of dialectical error cannot be salvaged even by resorting to the Kantian concept of “transcendental subreption”, the author concludes that unless Kant could in some other way spell out the minimal conditions for dialectical error, Kant's very distinction between understanding and reason becomes difficult t

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1991.tb00974.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1991

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

SummaryLeft wing interpreters of Kant's transcendental idealism argue that the doctrine must be excised in order to disclose the viable philosophical content of the firstCritique. For right wing interpreters, this leaves a Hamlet without the prince. I chart and defend a middle path. Transcendental idealism, while essential to Kant's position, renders that position philosophically indefensible. Constant misinterpretation of the doctrine results from a failure to appreciate the inter‐theoretic (i.e. dialectical) relations between Kant's conceptualisation of sense‐involving experience and the output of (what I call)‘Cartesian theory of e

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1991.tb00975.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1991

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

SummaryDonald Davidson's account of the interrelation between attitudes, and linguistic and non‐linguistic behaviour is a thoroughly holistic one. The project of radical interpretation itself embodies a holistic approach to the interpretative task. Yet Davidson also accepts a degree of indeterminacy in interpretation. Davidson's commitment to both holism and indeterminacy can give rise to a problem in the Davidsonian position. That problem is explained and a solution proposed. The indeterminacy thesis is thereby clarified, as is the nature of Davidsonian holis

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1991.tb00976.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1991

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

SummaryQuine's doctrine of underdetermination of physical theory presents him with a dilemma: Should he say of two global theory formulations that are empirically equivalent, logically compatible, equally simple, but which cannot be rendered logically equivalent by any known reconstrual of predicates, that they are both true (the ecumenical view) or that only one of them is true (the sectarian view)? If the former, then Quine's commitment to naturalism is at risk; if the latter, then his commitment to empiricism is at risk. When confronted with the dilemma Quineinitiallyopted for the sectarian view. A.C. Genova finds Quine's sectarian resolution of the dilemma unsatisfactory. He advocates, instead, an ecumenical resolution of the dilemma which, he maintains, is compatible with Quine's (and Davidson's) most prominent views. I disagree; I argue that Genova's way out involves a relativistic notion of true that is incompatible with Quine's (and Davidson's) absolutist view of truth. I then present Quine'slatestthoughts on the dilemma of underdetermination.

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1991.tb00977.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1991

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

SummaryDummett has offered an argument which begins with certain criteria of adequacy for any account of the way in which communication functions and which ends with normative and revisionary conclusions concerning our logical practice. This argument, which hinges on Dummett's criticisms of holism, is inadequate as it stands, for the holist can give an adequate description of the functioning of communication. There is a plausible defence of intuitionism to be extracted from Dummett's writing, but it should be recognised that it has a normative starting point and does not follow from the criteria of adequacy with which Dummett apparently begins.

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1991.tb00978.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1991

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1991.tb00979.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1991

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0012-2017    

DOI:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1991.tb00980.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1991

数据来源: WILEY