摘要:

ABSTRACTThis article examines the way in which some biomedical ethicists have constructed sexually transmitted AIDS as a significant threat to women's health. We demonstrate that the familiar claim that‘women are the fastest growing group'— whether of HIV‐infected or of AIDS patients — is misleading because it obscures the distinction between proportional rate of growth and absolute increase. Feminist ethicists have suggested that misogyny of a male dominated health care system has led to underreporting of women AIDS cases in order to support these feminists’claim of AIDS being a real threat to women's health. Given the apparent rarity of tertiary transmissions of AIDS, the assertion that most or even many women are at significant risk for AIDS seem wrong. Particularly disturbing in this campaign is the fact that the theme of‘risky sex’has been extended all the way to lesbians, even though their risk to acquire AIDS sexually is non‐existent to minuscule. We argue that actual harm is done to women by this exaggeration of their risk of contracting AIDS sexually. The scare has led to misappropriations of scarce health care funds. AIDS disproportionately affects women who inject drugs, and who suffer other diseases, poverty and malnutrition. It would have been better to concentrate health care efforts in this area instead of‘educating’women not at risk for AIDS how to prevent the acquisition of this disease. Unjustifiable AIDS anxiety has been created in women and has resulted in millions of unnecessary HIV‐tests, and many broken relationships. This anxiety has inevitably reduced the pleasure of having sex for many women. We reject the kind of‘victim ideology’that lies at the heart of this strategy which has, unfortunately, been supported by a number of influ

ISSN:0269-9702    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-8519.1996.tb00110.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

ABSTRACTIn 1994, the Committee on Assessing Genetic Risks of the Institute of Medicine published their recommendations regarding the ethical issues raised by advances in genetics. One of the Committee's recommendation was to inform women when test results revealed misattributed paternity, but not to disclose this information to the women's partners. The Committee's reason for withholding such information was that “'genetic testing should not be used in ways that disrupt families”. In this paper, I argue that the Committee's conclusion in favour of nondisclosure to the male partner is unethical. I argue that both parties ought to be infor

ISSN:0269-9702    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-8519.1996.tb00111.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

ABSTRACTI believe that there is no intrinsic moral difference between killing and letting die. That is, there is no difference that depends solely on the distinction between an act and an omission. I also believe that we can reasonably establish this thesis by appeal to the Bare Difference Argument. The form of this argument involves considering two imaginary cases in which there are no morally relevant differences present, save the bare difference that one is a case of killing and one a case of letting die. But in the pair of cases under consideration this bare difference makes no moral difference. Hence it cannot be that the bare difference between killing and letting die is in itself a morally important difference.Winston Nesbitt has recently argued that the Bare Difference Argument fails because “the examples produced typically possess a feature which makes their use in this context illegitimate, and that when modified to remove this feature, they provide support for the view which they were designed to undermine”. I argue that Nesbitt misunderstands the logic of the Bare Difference Argument and that accordingly his objections are mista

ISSN:0269-9702    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-8519.1996.tb00112.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0269-9702    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-8519.1996.tb00113.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

Book Reviews in this Article:Ethics and Biotechnology, edited by Anthony Dyson and John Harris. RoutledgeHuman In Vitro Fertilisation‐ A Case Study in the Regulation of Medical Innovationby Jennifer Gunning and Veronica English.Philosophical Perspectives on Psychiatric Diagnostic Classification, edited by John Z. Sadfer, Osborne P. Wiggins and Michael A. SchwartzChildren of Choice: Freedom and the New Reproductive Technologies, by John A. Robertson.Religious Methods and Resources in Bioethics, edited by Paul F. Camenisch.Moral Matters: Ethical Issues in Medicine and the Life Sciences, by Arthur Caplan.Wo lfgang Wagner(ed.).Arzneimittel und Verantwortung. Grundlagen und Methoden der Pharmaethikprugs and Responsibility — The Foundations and Methods of pharmaethics].GenEthics. Technological Intervetion in Human Reproduction as a Philosophical Problemby Kurt Bayertz.The Virtue in Medical Ethics, by Edmund D. Pellegrho and David C. Thom

ISSN:0269-9702    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-8519.1996.tb00114.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0269-9702    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-8519.1996.tb00115.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0269-9702    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-8519.1996.tb00116.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0269-9702    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-8519.1996.tb00109.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY