摘要:

Voluntary programs' effectiveness in reducing agricultural pollution is under debate in the professional literature, within government regulatory agencies, and among legislators. In general, non‐farm business owners bear little or none of the costs of environmental degradation that their business activities cause. However, farmers who reside on the farm may bear some of the costs associated with using chemicals. As a result, voluntary programs encouraging adoption of management practices that simultaneously improve on farm and off‐farm environmental quality may not require subsidizing farmers for their full loss in profits. However, farmers likely will not adopt regulatory agencies' recommended management practices that do not positively affect on farm environmental quality unless subsidies exceed full adoption co

ISSN:1074-3529    

DOI:10.1111/j.1465-7287.1994.tb00417.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1994

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

Existing institutions allocating water in California reflect prior appropriation water rights established when water was abundant. These allocation rules queue users and do not encourage water conservation. Increased water scarcity and growing valuation of water's environmental benefits are inducing a transition to water allocation mechanisms that increase water efficiency in agriculture. Transferable rights systems will lead to market‐like water allocation, induce farmers to adopt water conservation technology, and may not face strong objection from senior water rights holders. One must weigh the efficiency gains associated with transition from water rights to water markets against the transaction costs associated with installing facilities that enable water exchange and trading.Transition to water markets may preserve the agricultural sector's well‐being while allowing the transfer of some water outside of agriculture—in particular, for environmental benefit. The cost of policies proposed to reduce agricultural water supply while encouraging water trading are inversely related to the extent of trading allowed. The more farmers trade water, the less costly reducing water supply is to agriculture. Policies reducing water supply to Central Valley Project contractors and allowing trading only among these contractors are much more expensive than are policies encouraging trading among all agricultural water users in Calif

ISSN:1074-3529    

DOI:10.1111/j.1465-7287.1994.tb00418.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1994

数据来源: WILEY