摘要:

During the decade ending in 1981, more than 100,000 gasoline dealers exited the industry. This tremendous decline gave rise to numerous allegations that the major oil companies were engaged in anticompetitive activity designed to eliminate their dealers. This paper examines the legislative responses to these allegations, discusses some current economic issues, reviews changes in gasoline marketing before and after decontrol, and evaluates empirically the impact of these events on competition.The primary conclusions of the paper are (1) that these changes in gasoline marketing have resulted from competitive responses to changing market conditions, (2) that most statutes proposed to aid dealers in fact make their demise more likely, (3) that dealers' share of sales has stabilized after decontrol, and (4) that divorcement tends to increase market concentration significantly.

ISSN:1074-3529    

DOI:10.1111/j.1465-7287.1985.tb00812.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1985

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

Since decontrol of the U.S. gasoline market in January 1981, substantial changes in operations of gasoline retailers (dealers) and wholesalers (jobbers) have occurred. This paper analyzes decontrols impact on the operations of these two classes of firms. A primary conclusion is that removing regulations allowed dealers to profit by cutting prices and margins for self‐service gasoline, while increasing prices and margins for full‐service gasoline. In addition, decontrol resulted in lower jobber margins and profitability, which in turn caused a substantial number of jobbers to exit from the market. Overall, removal of the regulations allowed operational changes which were consistent with emerging technology and consumer demands, but which had been constrained by a decade of pervasive federal regulation of the U.S. gasoline market. Thus, decontrol fostered greater economic efficiency in the marketing of gasoline, which contributed to lower gasoline prices during a time of rising gasoline taxes and increasing general inflat

ISSN:1074-3529    

DOI:10.1111/j.1465-7287.1985.tb00813.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1985

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

Allegations of predatory pricing by large refiners have been made repeatedly by dealers' representatives, who have advocated retail divorcement as a solution. The states of Maryland and Connecticut and the District of Columbia have passed strong divorcement laws, while a host of other state legislatures have considered such laws. Using a special set of price data on refiner‐operated stations, and on their competitors in Maryland, this paper tests the hypothesis that refiners have preyed on dealers. The findings, which do not support the hypothesis, deny the validity of the predatory‐pricing allegati

ISSN:1074-3529    

DOI:10.1111/j.1465-7287.1985.tb00814.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1985

数据来源: WILEY