摘要:

This paper puts the current problems facing the thrift industry, Federal Home Loan Bank Board, and Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation into historical perspective. It discusses the development of federal deposit insurance and regulation of depository institutions. The paper discusses causes of the recent financial difficulties faced by thrift institutions and the policy responses to those problems. It then examines the effect of the recent 511 thrift failures on the risk‐taking behavior of institutions and the Bank Board's policy responses to risk‐taking. Finally, the paper suggests possible responses to the large and growing number of insolvent institutions that have an economic incentive to pursue extremely risky portfolio opportunit

ISSN:1074-3529    

DOI:10.1111/j.1465-7287.1985.tb00818.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1985

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:1074-3529    

DOI:10.1111/j.1465-7287.1985.tb00819.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1985

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

Monetary history is the chronicle of an unending conflict between the goals of the state and the interests of the individual. In using the power of money creation to gain control over economic resources, governments violate the interests of individuals, more subtly to be sure, but in a manner not essentially different from the foraging of an invading army. Resistance to the exactions of the state has taken two forms in modern times: the writings and counter‐speculations of three great economists—Richard Cantillon, Henry Thornton, and David Ricardo—and more recently through the operations of the money markets. What is remarkable is that this contest between the state and the individual has been staged and restaged without significant variation for more than 200 years. As Santayana said, “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to rep

ISSN:1074-3529    

DOI:10.1111/j.1465-7287.1985.tb00820.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1985

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

Evidence presented here supports a two‐part hypothesis that (1) the Federal Reserve is a powerful political entity, not independent of politics, and (2) it preserves its political power by carrying out the monetary policy desired by the President of the United States. This evidence includes the historical record from the Truman to Reagan administrations, politicization of Federal Reserve research, and political lobbying by the Federal Reserve. Formerly secret minutes of the regional Federal Reserve Banks' boards of directors meetings provide source material. The conclusion suggests a more efficient method of translating political signals and a rule for more predictable monetary polic

ISSN:1074-3529    

DOI:10.1111/j.1465-7287.1985.tb00821.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1985

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

In recent years, the rules‐versus‐discretion debate over monetary policy has taken on new life. In the 1960s, this debate focused on the relative merits of nonactivist policies versus activist stabilization policies. When rational expectations arguments emerged in the 1970s, the debate broadened into three categories: activist policies characterized by rules, activist policies characterized by discretion, and nonactivist policies characterized by rules.This paper presents arguments for a particular example of the latter of these policies…specifically, a monetary policy which accords preeminence to achieving price‐level stability. Central to these arguments is a comparison of this hypothetical policy with the actual monetary policy pursued by the Federal Reserve System, which is a type of activist policy characterized by discretion. The comparison suggests that actual monetary policy is more constrained than is generally realized. A rule mandating that the Federal Reserve accord preeminence to achieving price‐level stability, then, should not be regarded as a policy which would significantly increase constraints on monetary policy. Instead, such a rule should be regarded as replacing implicit, poorly understood constraints with explicit co

ISSN:1074-3529    

DOI:10.1111/j.1465-7287.1985.tb00822.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1985

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:1074-3529    

DOI:10.1111/j.1465-7287.1985.tb00823.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1985

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

Under certain conditions, monetary targets can reduce information costs and transaction costs to market participants. In international financial markets, these costs are associated with several types of risk which can influence the extent of international financial intermediation. During the 1970s, several factors seem to have prompted the trend toward targeting. The search by central banks for improved methods of inflation control was the primary factor. Targeting took a number of forms with respect to time periods, growth rates, and aggregates employed. In general, the experience with foreign monetary targeting to date probably has not lowered information costs or transactions costs to market participants, due to the extensive shifting between targets, changing of targeting time periods, and continual base drift. Such changes in targeting procedures along with the failure to hit targets tend to mask whether a change in monetary growth is temporary or permanent. The desire of foreign central banks to implicitly target exchange rates influences their ability to achieve monetary targets. The extent of this influence depends on the ability of foreign central banks to sterilize exchange market intervention.

ISSN:1074-3529    

DOI:10.1111/j.1465-7287.1985.tb00824.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1985

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

Links between fluctuations in domestic money supplies and subsequent fluctuations in rates of real output have been less visible in Western Europe than in the United States. This paper discusses some of the causes and investigates the stability of the demand for money in West Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland. In all three countries, temporary changes in short‐term interest rates temporarily affect the demand for money. These temporary changes in the demand for money are reflected in temporary blips in the monetary statistics, as agents substitute among various monetary assets.The hypothesis that aggregate demand responds only to longer‐lasting changes in interest rates is tested by a two‐step procedure. First, the official data on European money supplies are corrected for temporary disturbances caused by temporary changes in domestic interest rates. Second, changes in real activity are regressed on a measure of monetary stimulus, which takes into account the correction for temporary disturbances. This two‐step procedure avoids some of the bias present in ordinary estimates of the demand‐for‐money function. The results show that the links between changes in money and subsequent changes in output are somewhat more tenuous in West Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland than in the U.S. but significant effects do exist. These effects are more easily documented when corrected time series for the European money suppli

ISSN:1074-3529    

DOI:10.1111/j.1465-7287.1985.tb00825.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1985

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

Monetary targets have been instituted in major countries for nearly a decade. There has been a rather wide variety of experience with them, both in the control procedures and in the success with which targets have been achieved. This paper presents results of a reaction function investigation into the extent to which elements of discretionary monetary policy remained even under targeting. Generally, targets probably were successful in focusing central bank attention on the long run. But a conclusion here is that distinguishable elements of discretion (as opposed to rule), evidenced by movements in targeted aggregates themselves, were present for several countries, including the United States.

ISSN:1074-3529    

DOI:10.1111/j.1465-7287.1985.tb00826.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1985

数据来源: WILEY