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1. |
INSIDER TRADING: THE LAW, THE THEORY, THE EVIDENCE |
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Contemporary Economic Policy,
Volume 6,
Issue 3,
1988,
Page 1-13
JEFFRY M. NETTER,
ANNETTE B. POULSEN,
PHILIP L. HERSCH,
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摘要:
This paper reviews the arguments concerning the role and effects of insider trading. In reviewing the law of insider trading, we concentrate on the main elements of the regulatory framework and court interpretations. We discuss economic issues involved in the debate over the benefits and costs of insider trading. Finally, we discuss evidence illustrating that legal market research can explain much of the runup in a target firm's stock price before a tender offer is formally announced.
ISSN:1074-3529
DOI:10.1111/j.1465-7287.1988.tb00289.x
出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd
年代:1988
数据来源: WILEY
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2. |
ELECTRIC POWER DEREGULATION: BACKGROUND AND PROSPECTS |
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Contemporary Economic Policy,
Volume 6,
Issue 3,
1988,
Page 14-24
VERNON L. SMITH,
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摘要:
The incentive failures of rate‐of‐return regulation are well known and thus raise the question of whether to deregulate electric power. The development of long‐distance transmission and of alternative power sources in networks has spawned several institutions that would or could allow markets to substitute for such regulation. These include long‐term contract sales, spot power exchange, contract power pooling, shared facility ownership, and economic dispatch. Because of the current surplus of power, the existence of such institutions has caused increasing competition in the electric power market and has catalyzed the movement to deregulate generators from state authority and to restructure utility assets. By encouraging this movement, regulators can further the discipline that markets already exert on prices and costs. By making counterproposals to the utilities, regulators can influence asset restructuring so that some of the capital gains inherent in such restructuring can be shared with consumers in the form of rate relief. Finally, for the future, the cotenancy agreement—which is antitrust supervised and competitively ruled—has promising possibilities for deregulating transmission and d
ISSN:1074-3529
DOI:10.1111/j.1465-7287.1988.tb00290.x
出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd
年代:1988
数据来源: WILEY
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3. |
DEREGULATION OF ELECTRICITY: A VIEW FROM UTILITY MANAGEMENT |
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Contemporary Economic Policy,
Volume 6,
Issue 3,
1988,
Page 25-41
JOHN L. JUREWITZ,
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摘要:
Significant structural changes already have occurred in the electric power industry due to the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act. The industry has not, however, faced the same degree of deregulation as has some other industries such as natural gas and telecommunications. This is not mere happenstance. In many ways, the electric power industry presents the toughest case of all for deregulation. In fact, deregulation—in the usual sense of the term—probably is both unlikely and undesirable. Government is involved in the industry directly and is unlikely to withdraw. The production, transmission, and distribution of electric power is characterized by physical interdependencies potentially giving rise to externality problems as well as economies of horizontal and vertical integration. Any initiative to deregulate or substantially restructure the industry must address fairness in transition rules, the exact nature of the utility's obligation to serve customers, the potential loss of integration and coordination efficiencies, and a host of issues surrounding market participants' transmission access. Similarities as well as important differences exist among the electric power, natural gas, and telecommunications industries, suggesting that their respective benefits and problems associated with deregulation may be different. Policymakers must not draw hasty parallels among these industr
ISSN:1074-3529
DOI:10.1111/j.1465-7287.1988.tb00291.x
出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd
年代:1988
数据来源: WILEY
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4. |
ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY AND “PRUDENCE” ANALYSIS OF POWER PLANT INVESTMENT |
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Contemporary Economic Policy,
Volume 6,
Issue 3,
1988,
Page 42-59
BENJAMIN ZYCHER,
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摘要:
The various deregulation proposals for the electric utility sector rely on market forces to provide incentives. Even within the traditional regulatory framework, using market behavior instead of regulators' views as a criterion for regulatory decisions is part of the spectrum of deregulation proposals. This paper proposes such an implicit deregulation of rate base decisions. It presents an efficiency standard with which public utility commissions (PUCs) should conduct their “prudence” analyses of power plant construction costs. Prudence reviews, as typically conducted by PUCs, are likely to change the risk structure in regulated sectors so as to make both ratepayers and shareholders worse off. Moreover, the correct perspective for such analyses is ex ante rather than ex post. This means that the expected costs and benefits of alternative actions are the correct parameters for evaluating prudence, and that the interests of ratepayers are consistent only with this economic efficiency approach to prudence analysis. Average industry behavior is the correct standard for implementing the efficient prudence criterion. This paper describes an alternative procedure that PUCs can use to conduct prudence reviews correc
ISSN:1074-3529
DOI:10.1111/j.1465-7287.1988.tb00292.x
出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd
年代:1988
数据来源: WILEY
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5. |
LOWER OIL PRICES AND STATE EMPLOYMENT |
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Contemporary Economic Policy,
Volume 6,
Issue 3,
1988,
Page 60-68
S. P. A. BROWN,
JOHN K. HILL,
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摘要:
Even after two years of adjustment, it was apparent that the sharp drop in oil prices occurring during late 1985 and early 1986 would have a profound effect on the regional distribution of employment in the United States. In this paper, we develop and implement a procedure for quantifying the long‐term consequences of lower oil prices on employment in each of the 50 states. We use the estimates developed to determine how much of the variation in state employment growth during 1986 can be attributed to the oil price decline. We also use the estimates to gauge the feasibility of political action, such as an oil import tariff, to reverse the oil price declin
ISSN:1074-3529
DOI:10.1111/j.1465-7287.1988.tb00293.x
出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd
年代:1988
数据来源: WILEY
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6. |
MACROECONOMIC EFFECTS OF THE 1986 OIL PRICE DECLINE |
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Contemporary Economic Policy,
Volume 6,
Issue 3,
1988,
Page 69-82
JOHN A. TATOM,
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摘要:
The oil price decline during 1986 sparked a renewed debate over how oil price changes affect the economy and whether the effects of oil price declines are equal and opposite those of oil price increases. This article reviews theoretical and more casual arguments concerning this issue and describes some tests rejecting the hypothesis that the effects of oil price declines are asymmetric to those of oil price increases.
ISSN:1074-3529
DOI:10.1111/j.1465-7287.1988.tb00294.x
出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd
年代:1988
数据来源: WILEY
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7. |
OIL PRICE VOLATILITY AND U.S. MACROECONOMIC PERFORMANCE |
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Contemporary Economic Policy,
Volume 6,
Issue 3,
1988,
Page 83-96
TIMOTHY J. CONSIDINE,
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摘要:
This study uses a model with explicit energy sector linkages to estimate the macroeconomic impacts of the 1986 collapse in energy prices. The model combines features of neoclassical macroeconomics to estimate final demand spending and of general equilibrium analysis to estimate substitution possibilities. The model allows price and wage rigidities yet permits interfuel and input substitutions. The simulation results suggest three conclusions. First, the most significant macroeconomic impact of the 1986 oil price reduction is the sharp drop in inflation. Second, output and employment gains are relatively small due to the sharp drop in energy sector output. Finally, the estimated gain in real output due to lower energy prices is close to the output loss resulting from the trade deficit increase during 1986. This may be one reason why no substantial increase in economic growth occurred following the 1986 collapse in energy prices.
ISSN:1074-3529
DOI:10.1111/j.1465-7287.1988.tb00295.x
出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd
年代:1988
数据来源: WILEY
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8. |
ORIGINS OF THE TORT REFORM MOVEMENT |
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Contemporary Economic Policy,
Volume 6,
Issue 3,
1988,
Page 97-107
JOHN O. WARD,
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摘要:
The tort reform movement in the United States reached its peak during 1986, when 39 states passed legislation to limit court awards. The explosion of litigation and jury awards in the US. frequently was stated as the cause for the liability insurance crisis. This paper explores the origins of the tort reform crisis. It concludes that the crisis was produced by the natural instability of the liability insurance industry and by the impact of technology on specific coverage lines.
ISSN:1074-3529
DOI:10.1111/j.1465-7287.1988.tb00296.x
出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd
年代:1988
数据来源: WILEY
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9. |
CONTINGENT AND NONCONTINGENT ATTORNEYS' FEES IN PERSONAL INJURY CASES |
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Contemporary Economic Policy,
Volume 6,
Issue 3,
1988,
Page 108-121
JOSEPH M. FISHER,
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摘要:
Fee structures determine the economic incentives for lawyer performance. A certain hourly fee promotes excessive legal work, while a contingent fee leads to insufficient attorney effort. Competition among lawyers for enhanced reputation helps mitigate these effects, though client welfare still is not maximized. Clients' monitoring of attorney conduct often is necessary, but the expense of such monitoring limits its usefulness. This study concludes that the contingent fee may be a second‐best solution to the problem of regulating lawyer performanc
ISSN:1074-3529
DOI:10.1111/j.1465-7287.1988.tb00297.x
出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd
年代:1988
数据来源: WILEY
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