摘要:

It is generally accepted that banks must be regulated so as to avoid the moral hazard situation that deposit insurance generates. Accepting this argument implies that expanded bank powers must await deposit insurance reform. This article rejects the accepted view and argues instead that the existing regulatory system enhances rather than diminishes the riskiness of banks' portfolios. The article argues that the benefits from permitting banks to diversify probably would outweigh the costs. It concludes, however, that deposit insurance is a major culprit in the current wave of bank failures.

ISSN:1074-3529    

DOI:10.1111/j.1465-7287.1988.tb00282.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1988

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

This paper assesses the implications for the banking industry of relaxing interstate branching prohibitions. Theoretical models suggest that the number, size distribution, and specialization of firms in an industry are determined so as to minimize costs of production. Analysis presented here shows that interstate branching prohibitions, or their removal, are likely to affect costs only if the “convenience” of office location is important and if significant economies of scale are associated with office expansion. These conditions apparently do not hold in either retail banking or wholesale banking. The paper concludes that productive efficiency alone will not force a major consolidation of the banking system when branching restrictions are eliminated. To the extent that a consolidation does occur, it likely will reflect factors not considered in our model. These factors include (1) possibilities for increased diversification with greater size, (2) scarce managerial resources, (3) managerial incentives to maximize the organization's size, and (4) demand for multi‐office ba

ISSN:1074-3529    

DOI:10.1111/j.1465-7287.1988.tb00283.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1988

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

Over the past several years, antitrust laws' significance as a public policy to promote competition in banking has diminished. Deregulation has intensified competition so much that it has made antitrust laws nonbinding constraints, even during a merger movement of extraordinary proportions. Deregulation and attenuating antitrust raise a question as to whether a distinctive competitive policy for commercial banks should exist as it has in the past.Two earlier policies are identified and reviewed in this paper: (1) free banking, which in several forms existed from the 1830s to the early 1930s, and (2) antitrust, which became relevant during the early 1960s. Experience under both policies illuminates the interaction between competition and regulation in banking. Such experience indicates that the effects of current competitive policy must be evaluated within the developing regulatory environment. Partially evaluating current policy within this context suggests that new charter requirements should be reformulated and that large bank mergers should be limited. So long as a distinctive regulatory system exists, a distinctive competitive policy for banks is needed.

ISSN:1074-3529    

DOI:10.1111/j.1465-7287.1988.tb00284.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1988

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

Expansion across state boundaries has been the dominant change in the structural landscape of banking. Forty‐one states and the District of Columbia now permit full‐service interstate banking. This paper reviews and analyzes these laws and their related provisions. Geographical liberalization is found to be mostly pro‐competitive.Regional reciprocity statutes dominated the interstate banking landscape until mid‐1985. Of the first 18 laws, 12 were regional. However, the regional approach peaked quickly, and most remaining states enacted nationwide laws—either immediate nationwide bills or regional bills that “trigger” to the nationwide level at a certain date. Presently, 27 of the 42 laws are nationwide. At least 9 states that initially selected regional laws are soon expected to switch to a nationwide approach.Regional banking compacts seemed inherently unstable and difficult to establish. Only the Southeast successfully established a stable regional banking zone. The location of control over the nation's banking assets is being restructured. In some states with well‐capitalized holding companies aggressively exploiting the new laws, banks have grown in size. Other states that were slow to pass legislation, or whose banks are in no financial position to make acquisitions, have lost rank.After a relatively short time, the federal government finally may legislate on the interstate banking issue. Pressure to do so would derive from the different banking structures and regions, problematic competitive dimensions, banks' supervision and regulation necessities, and eventual interstate bran

ISSN:1074-3529    

DOI:10.1111/j.1465-7287.1988.tb00285.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1988

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

I do not claim in this paper that the international gold standard was a principal cause of the Great Depression. Instead, I explore the events that allowed the world to slip deeper into depression despite the gold standard. The volatility of international short‐term capital flows surely contributed greatly to the Depression. I argue that this volatility was exacerbated—rather than ameliorated—by the international gold standard. The reason is that despite governments' legal assurances that they are committed to a gold standard, speculators never perceive the terms of gold parity as immutable. This statement holds with increasing force when one observes the precarious status of government debts and international finance during the 1920s. This reality renders a gold standard vulnerable to precisely the type of volatility in international capital markets that made the 1931 downturn more s

ISSN:1074-3529    

DOI:10.1111/j.1465-7287.1988.tb00286.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1988

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

This paper reviews and assesses international explanations for the depth and duration of the Great Depression. Many of the conclusions are negative. The U.S. Smoot‐Hawley Tariff Act of 1930 came too late to account for the 1929 downturn and fails to explain the severity of the contraction in the U.S. The competitive devaluations of the 1930s redistributed the Depression's effects across countries but did not worsen it overall. The deflationary consequences of the liquidation of foreign exchange reserves were minor. Domestic central bank policies and their failure to be coordinated internationally must bear the major responsibility for the Depressio

ISSN:1074-3529    

DOI:10.1111/j.1465-7287.1988.tb00287.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1988

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

In January 1929, the Canadian government suspended gold exports and implemented a floating exchange rate regime that endured until the onset of World War II. In sharp contrast to the experience of other countries that left the gold standard, Canada's deflation and declining economic activity continued until 1933. This paper examines why the Canadian government chose to follow a restrictive monetary policy and how that policy affected the Canadian exchange rate. We show that the chosen policy was rational—given the government's assumptions and objectives—and that it was consistent with fiscal policy. In so doing, we argue that the government's commitment to monetary stability was credible. We show that one can explain the Canadian exchange rate's behavior by a simple expectations‐based model of exchange rate determination, given external events and the government's monetary p

ISSN:1074-3529    

DOI:10.1111/j.1465-7287.1988.tb00288.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1988

数据来源: WILEY