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11. |
Pesticides and Policies |
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Journal of Applied Philosophy,
Volume 1,
Issue 1,
1984,
Page 123-131
G. A. MALINAS,
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摘要:
ABSTRACTThe decision to accept or to reject an empirical hypothesis concerning the risks and hazards of a pesticide requires assessing the cost's of error if the wrong decision is taken. The assessment of such costs involves scientists in problems which are closely related to those which policy‐makers face in deciding what to do in view of the information provided by scientists. These problems include the unforeseeable effects of agricultural technologies, the assessments of costs and benefits, and the choice of decision rule to use in policy formation. I conclude that the combined impact of these problems motivates the use of prudentially weighted decision rules in forming policies which regulate the use of pesticides, and it motivates the development of bio‐environmental alternatives to chemically based pest control polic
ISSN:0264-3758
DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5930.1984.tb00192.x
出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd
年代:1984
数据来源: WILEY
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12. |
Duress and Responsibility for Action |
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Journal of Applied Philosophy,
Volume 1,
Issue 1,
1984,
Page 133-140
ROBERT CAMPBELL,
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摘要:
ABSTRACTNot all crimes require mens rea, but all serious ones do. Crudely the requirement is that the defendant be able to take responsibility for theactus reusof which he is accused. What must be implied by this is essentially that the agent retain control of his actions. It is unjust to punish actions which are outside of the agent's control since such punishment cannot deter and is, arguably, pointless.Duress does not remove an agent's control of his actions. This does not mean that actions performed under duress should be viewed as fully intentional. For though the agent foresees and wishes for the result of his action performed under duress, it is wished for as the best option out of a range of alternatives manipulated by the one who makes the threats which constitute the duress. The agent is responsible for his choice, but not for what is available for him to choose. He has an obligation to do what is best in the circumstances and should not be blamed if that would, in other circumstances, be accounted criminal.
ISSN:0264-3758
DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5930.1984.tb00193.x
出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd
年代:1984
数据来源: WILEY
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13. |
Work and the Human Essence |
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Journal of Applied Philosophy,
Volume 1,
Issue 1,
1984,
Page 141-150
ROBIN ATTFIELD,
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摘要:
ABSTRACTJenkins and Sherman hold that belief in the value of work is artificially inculcated and that a ‘leisure society’ is desirable and possible, as well as being necessitated by the introduction of microprocessors. After distinguishing between meaningful work and labour (first section), I reply obliquely to their case by contending that meaningful work affords most people their best chance of the necessary good of self‐respect (second section), and that it constitutes the exercise of an essential human capacity, the development of which is necessary to human wellbeing (third section). Because of the contingent connections between employment on the one hand and meaningful work and self‐respect on the other, we should recognise the value of work and plan for full employment (fourth s
ISSN:0264-3758
DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5930.1984.tb00194.x
出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd
年代:1984
数据来源: WILEY
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14. |
Inefficient Unanimity |
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Journal of Applied Philosophy,
Volume 1,
Issue 1,
1984,
Page 151-163
GEOFFREY BRENNAN,
LOREN LOMASKY,
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摘要:
ABSTRACTThe notion of consensus plays an important epistemological role in modern welfare economics, in that unanimous consent is a (unique) conceptual test for those changes that are ‘Pareto‐desirable’ (that is, make someone better off and no‐one else worse). In this paper, we seek to show that unanimous consent does not logically imply Pareto‐desirability—that a rational individual may fail to veto policy changes that make him/her worse off. The central element in the proof of this proposition is the observation that in social agreements involving a significant number of participants, any one individual's veto is decisive if it is theonlyveto. If the individual does not expect to be decisive, he will rationally exercise his vote ‘expressively’, and without sole regard to its consequences. When all individuals so act, a sort of prisoners' dilemma interaction may emerge, even under exp
ISSN:0264-3758
DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5930.1984.tb00195.x
出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd
年代:1984
数据来源: WILEY
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15. |
Book Reviews |
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Journal of Applied Philosophy,
Volume 1,
Issue 1,
1984,
Page 165-171
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摘要:
Book Review in this ArticlesEnvironmental Philosophy: a Collection of Readings. Robert Elliot&Arran Gare (Eds)Charter 77 and Human Rights in Czechoslovakia. H. Gordon SkillingAnimals and Why They Matter. Mary MidgleyAfrican Philosophy. Paulin J. Hountondji, 1983 Translated by H. Evans in collaboration with J. ReeRights, Killing and Suffering: moral vegetarianism and applied ethics. R. G. Frey
ISSN:0264-3758
DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5930.1984.tb00196.x
出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd
年代:1984
数据来源: WILEY
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