摘要:

ABSTRACTThis essay advances several interrelated arguments concerning the proper role of the state with regard to marriage and divorce but my main contention is that ‘pure’no‐fault divorce laws are unjust—or, at least, they are unjust if marriage involves a genuinely contractual element, and there seems to be very little doubt that it does. Locke, Kant and Hegel are three eminent thinkers who are alike in viewing marriage as a contract (though in the case of Hegel, it is a ‘contract to transcend the standpoint of contract’) and in the first two sections of the essay I consider their views on the role of contract in marriage. Whilst holding (with Hegel) that marriage is more than a contract, I also hold (with Kant) that it is not less than a contract. In section three I consider the implications of this ‘not less than’, the most important one being that ‘pure’no‐fault divorce laws are unjust. I shall contend that whilst the irretrievable breakdown of marriage may be regarded as a suitable ground for divorce, it simply cannot, and certainly ought not to, be regarded as a justificatory basis for the laying aside of rights acquired by individuals as a result of their having entered into a marital contract. However minimal one might wish the role of the state to be, or however averse one might be from allowing the state any role at all in purely personal and confidential relationships, yet to allow the expression ‘the irretrievable breakdown of marriage’to be employed as a olanket to cover over the infringement of personal, contractually engendered and civilly recognised rights, is not to exercise commendable restraint but is, rather, to condone what is simply an abnegation by the state of its basic responsibility to ens

ISSN:0264-3758    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5930.1992.tb00304.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1992

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

ABSTRACTPolitical liberalism and the democratic ideal together supply the foundation of almost all contemporary political thinking. This essay explores the relation between them. It argues that, despite common parlance, there is an inevitable tension between the two. Furthermore, attempts to resolve this tension by showing that democracy is a good thing in its own right, or that it is the inevitable development of liberal aspirations, or that it is conceptually connected to fundamental liberal ideas, all fail. The conclusion to be drawn is that liberalism requires a pragmatic rather than a principled approach to democratic aspirations.

ISSN:0264-3758    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5930.1992.tb00305.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1992

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

ABSTRACTIn this article I freely use the thought of Charles Hartshorne to defend the ethical permissibility of abortion in the early stages of pregnancy. In the later stages of pregnancy the fetus has an ethical status similar to that of a sentient yet non‐rational animal, a status which should generate in us considerable ethical respect. The distinctiveness of this Hartshornian approach lies in the effort to bring metaphysics to bear on a controversial issue in applied ethics. In particular, the metaphysical issue of temporal relations is crucial to consider in the effort to ascertain the ethical status of the fetus. Two symmetrical (immoderate) theories of temporal relations are criticised, one of which provides the basis for opposition to abortion, a theory wherein one is internally related both to one's past and to one's future. An asymmetrical (moderate) theory of temporal relations is defended, a theory wherein one is internally related to one's past yet externally related to the future. This latter theory would permit abortion in the early stages of pregnanc

ISSN:0264-3758    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5930.1992.tb00306.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1992

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

ABSTRACTThere is a growing trend in moral philosophy that reflects a return to a more ancient perspective of the subject matter wherein moral theory and moral practice are thought to converge. Like their Greek and Hellenistic predecessors, contemporary moral philosophers are again analysing virtues and character traits, drawing normative conclusions at the end of arguments, and testing their theories against examples from common life. Unfortunately, this literature is still cluttered with abstract, general, unlikely, and cleverly‐constructed examples that are more apt to draw both reader and author away from the various moral issues under consideration. This paper argues that the selection of examples drawn from literature, history and common‐life experiences offers the following advantages: (1) such examples better serve the purpose of illustration; (2) they function as projects for moral inquiry; (3) they better connect both reader and author to the moral issues being discussed; (4) they help prevent the dichotomisation of moral philosophy into meta‐ethics and applied ethics; and (5) they help make it possible again for moral philosophy to have the relevance and importance it once enjoyed in previous periods of history. Selection criteria are outlined, and examples are provided that satisfy

ISSN:0264-3758    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5930.1992.tb00307.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1992

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

ABSTRACTQALY calcuations are currently being considered in the UK as a way of showing how the National Health Service (NHS) can do the most good with its resources. After providing a brief summary of how QALY calculations work and the most common arguments for and against using them to set NHS priorities, I suggest that they are an inadequate measure of the good done by the NHS because they refer only to its effects on what will be defined as the ‘patient community’. The benefit of the NHS to the wider community is best regarded as a public good—everyone benefits from the general belief that the NHS is there to provide care for those who fall into a state of medical need. QALY ideology threatens this belief because it gives efficiency a higher priority than caring in response to need. It is a fallacy that a QALY maximising health service will be a greater good to society, because this sort of quest for efficiency threatens the caring basis of the Welfare State as

ISSN:0264-3758    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5930.1992.tb00308.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1992

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

ABSTRACTThe much discussed ethical problems of clinicians, who have direct care of patients, are mainly within their responsibilities to the ‘index’patient with whom they are immediately concerned. When pathologists are practising clinical pathology they are responsible for performing and interpreting tests on specimens from patients at the request of clinicians, and advising on these tests. Their ethical problems, as they do not have direct care of patients, mainly lie between their obligations to the requesting clinician, to the index patient under investigation in the laboratory, and also to other patients, and to their staff. These problems are largely ignored in the literature both of medical ethics and of pathology. The ethical principles of: (1) respect for autonomy; (2) non‐maleficence; (3) beneficence; and (4) justice are discussed with particular reference to the work of clinical pathologists: possible applications of virtue ethics are also considered. Ethical problems that arise in the course of a pathologist's receiving, investigating, and reporting and advising on, a patient's specimen are examined on the basis of the above principles: an attempt is made to offer guidance on the pro

ISSN:0264-3758    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5930.1992.tb00309.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1992

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

ABSTRACTThis article discusses the nature of euthanasia, and the way in which redevelopment of the concept of euthanasia in some influential recent philosophical writing has led to morally less discriminating killing/letting die/not saving being misdescribed as euthanasia. Peter Singer's defence of non‐voluntary ‘euthanasia’of defective infants in his influential bookPractical Ethicsis critically evaluated. We argue that Singer's pseudo‐euthanasia arguments inPractical Ethicsare unsatisfactory as approaches to determining the legitimacy of killing, and that these arguments present a total utilitarian improvement policy—not a case for non‐voluntary

ISSN:0264-3758    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5930.1992.tb00310.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1992

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

ABSTRACTThe present essay concurs with R. Beehler's recent contribution to this journal (‘For One Concept of Liberty’, (1) 1991) in deeming the concept of negative liberty fully adequate for political discourse. Thus, section 1 indicates a plausible line of reasoning by which the negative concept can be defended against some standard objections. However, sections 2 and 3 argue that, nevertheless, Beehler's traditional conception of negative liberty is inadequate. It does not account correctly for various paradigmatic cases of ‘unfreedom’, for instance, the curtailment of the liberty of the poor by their lack of economic resources. More precisely, Beehler's account will in many such cases fail to identify the correct constraining agents. The present essay suggests how Beehler's aim may be achieved on the basis of a different conception of negative liberty: the ‘responsibil

ISSN:0264-3758    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5930.1992.tb00311.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1992

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

ABSTRACTThis paper attempts to show that the acorn–oak tree argument against the slippery slope on the personhood of the fetus is valid and William Cooney's attack on this argument fails. I also argue that the slippery slope argument leads to on undesirable conclusion and should not be used as a valid tool in the debate on the personhood of the fetu

ISSN:0264-3758    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5930.1992.tb00312.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1992

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

ABSTRACTIn the standard case of justifiable killing in self‐defence one agent without provocation tries to kill a second agent and the second agent's only way to avoid death is to kill his attacker. It is widely accepted that such killings in self‐defence are morally justifiable, but it has proved difficult to show why this is so. Recently, Montague has put forward an account in terms of forcing a choice between lives, and Teichman has propounded a quasi‐Hobbesian rights‐based account of self‐defence. I argue that neither Montague nor Teichman has succeeded in providing an adequate justification for killing in sel

ISSN:0264-3758    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5930.1992.tb00313.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1992

数据来源: WILEY