摘要:

ABSTRACTThis paper is concerned with the contrast in views between traditional mainstream Chinese philosophy and Western liberal individualism on the importance of the concept of individual rights in social and political thought. The contrast is striking because, whereas individual and political rights have long featured in public discourse in the West, in China, mainstream social and political thought has developed without a notion of individual rights. In search of the significance of this major difference, the paper traces ideas of the self in China through Confucian ethics, and compares the Confucian conception of the self with the deontological liberal conception of the subject as a bearer of rights in the West. Having established that the Chinese way of thinking about the self and about moral agency is in stark contrast to the image of the self as a bearer of rights in the deontological conception, the paper goes on to discuss the inadequacy of the moral individualism of a rights‐based morality and argues for an alternative view of morality which places importance on the intrinsic value of collective goods and on membership in a societ

ISSN:0264-3758    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5930.1990.tb00260.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1990

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

ABSTRACTMy aim in this paper is not to try to formulate the meaning the word ‘terrorism’has in ordinary use; the word is used in so many different, even incompatible ways, that such an enterprise would quickly prove futile. My aim is rather to try for a definition that captures the trait, or traits, of terrorism which cause most of us to view it with moral repugnance. I discuss the following questions: Is the historical connection of terrorism with terror to be preserved on the conceptual level, or relegated to the psychology and sociology of terrorism? Does mere infliction of terror qualify as terrorism, so that we can speak of non‐violent terrorism? If terrorism is a type of violence, does it have to be against persons, or should violence against property also count? In what sense can terrorism be described as indiscriminate violence? Should we use the word only in a political context? In such a context, can we speak of ‘state terrorism’, or should the word be restricted to actions not sanctioned by law? Is the terrorist necessarily oblivious to moral considerations, as those who define terrorism in terms of antinomianism imply? My answers to these questions lead up to the following definition: terrorism is the deliberate use of violence, or threat of its use, against innocent people, with the aim of intimidating them, or other people, into a course of action they otherwise would

ISSN:0264-3758    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5930.1990.tb00261.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1990

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

ABSTRACTMentally handicapped people have been taken in philosophical work as an obvious exception to the canons which are applied to other, ‘rational’individuals. This paper argues that mentally handicapped people should be accorded the same rights as others. If there are human rights, then mentally handicapped people are entitled to them as humans; and if there are rights which apply in general to citizens, the same rights apply equally to mentally handicapped people. The argument for the inclusion of mentally handicapped people as citizens is first, that there is a presumption of inclusion: if citizenship is accorded to all other individuals, there is no reason why citizenship should not be accorded to mentally handicapped people on the same basis as others. Second, mentally handicapped people cannot successfully be excluded without effectively challenging the presumption of inclusion applied to other groups. Third, and perhaps most important, there are positive reasons why mentally handicapped people, as a particularly vulnerable group, need to have rights to protect them against particular abu

ISSN:0264-3758    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5930.1990.tb00262.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1990

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

ABSTRACTParallel processing systems can carry out computational tasks which would be impossible to be carried out by sequential systems. Cognitive psychologists are discovering that brains do not operate on a sequential ordering of tasks, but along parallel processing models. Sequential ordering is abandoned in the new generation computers, which are being designed on evolving parallel processing models. My proposal consists in applying the parallel processing principles to the state, creating a ‘parallel governing’model for the decision‐making procedures at the political level, in place of the present sequentially ordered procedures. I describe the main principles of current parallel processing models, and use them towards the creation of a parallel governing system. The most fundamental principle is the ‘De‐Centralisation Principle’, which requires that there be no centralised unit with special rights to information, or to policy‐, and decision‐making authority. In parallel governing, political and moral principles are built into the structure of the system, which consists of units of specialised interests and powers, with specialised channels of communication between them. I close by delineating the main differences between parallel governing and Nozick's utopia and Hayek's neo

ISSN:0264-3758    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5930.1990.tb00263.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1990

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

ABSTRACTThe paper begins with the suggestion that the aura of respectability that surrounds the notion of self‐defence may render that notion suitable as a rallying point for agreement on the ethical legitimacy of warfare. I first argue that self‐defensive killing by a person X is morally justified if three conditions obtain: (1) X is together with at least one other person in a situation in which one of the persons will be killed through actions of the other person(s); (2) X is not responsible for bringing about that situation; (3) unless X kills another person, X him‐ or herself will be killed. Next, I show that on the basis of this principle military operations are morally justified only if there are no alternatives to executing them that would save more lives or prevent the total loss of freedom for people. The paper concludes with the observation that the morality of individual self‐defensive killing is unable to justify most of current national defence p

ISSN:0264-3758    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5930.1990.tb00264.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1990

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

ABSTRACTIn the first part of this article I discuss some objections which assert that surrogacy is primarily—but not exclusively—harmful in a moral sense. After examination of mainly but not exclusively morality‐dependent harms (objections from similarity with prostitution, exploitation, etc.) and after the discussion of possible non‐morality‐dependent harms (baby, couple, surrogate mother, agency, etc.), I argue, in the second part, that no one reason supports the possible prohibition of surrogacy. In the last part I try to show why moral reasons alone could not be sufficient to criminalize any kind of activity—including surrogacy—in a

ISSN:0264-3758    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5930.1990.tb00265.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1990

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

ABSTRACTI criticise the ‘liberal’view of the proper relationship between the family and State, namely that, although the interests of the child should be paramount, parents are entitled to rights of both privacy and autonomy which should be abrogated only when the child suffers a specifiable harm. I argue that the right to bear children is not absolute, and that it only grounds a right to rear upon an objectionable proprietarian picture of the child as owned by its producer. If natural parents have any rights to rear they derive from duties to bring their children into rational maturity where they can exercise rights for themselves. The presumption that natural parents are best suited to rear their own children should be discounted, as should the assumption that alternatives to natural parenting are unacceptably bad. I reject the suggestion that parents should be ‘licensed’but argue for a much closer monitoring of the family. Familial privacy, which such monitoring breaches, is shown to have a culturally specific and, given the facts of abuse, dubious value. In conclusion, I briefly specify the forms of monitoring I

ISSN:0264-3758    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5930.1990.tb00266.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1990

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

ABSTRACTApathy may be a Bad Thing, but it is not always bad in the cases and ways it is alleged to be. The charge that the apathetic are irrational often stems from an oversimplification of political decision‐making techniques. The apathetic need not, for example, simply deny the possibility of getting one's goals, or simply ignore the benefits of action. They may, instead, have learned from experience that an avidly desired and pursued goal is always more valued before than after its attainment, and that setting a low initial value on a goal may actually increase its final value. If the values of various alternatives are adjusted in the light of such knowledge, apathy looks much more rational. But that is not the end of the story. The adjustments may be either (i) a conventional and involuntary discounting and surcharging of existing alternatives in the light of known preference patterns, or (ii) a ‘voluntary decision’to value or devalue a goal in order to obtain a certain result. The latter sort of adjustment requires the introduction of new alternatives into the decision problem, and revisions to our notion of when inaction is irrat

ISSN:0264-3758    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5930.1990.tb00267.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1990

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

ABSTRACTBoth the general structure of Nozick's entitlement theory of justice and the particular arguments he directs against Rawls presuppose a conception of the person. The essay argues that this initial conception of the person is flawed and that Nozick must amend it. However, those amendments lead either to an equally flawed conception or to a conception which is substantially similar to that which Rawls invokes. On either possibility the entitlement theory is weakened. The argument has two steps. First, the initial conception of the person which emerges fromAnarchy, State and Utopiais stated. Second, the problems with that initial conception lead to the elucidation of subsequent conceptions, only the last of which is capable of avoiding those problems. The cost of avoidance is, however, a high one for Nozick's arguments against Rawls, in particular, and the entitlement theory in general.

ISSN:0264-3758    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5930.1990.tb00268.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1990

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

ABSTRACTWilliam Cooney has recently argued (The Journal of Applied Philosophy, Vol. 6, pp. 201–204) that the social programme of affirmative action, though controversial, can be supported by the doctrine of double effect in that, according to the doctrine, responsibility falls on the side of intended consequences and not on that of unintended consequences. The point of affirmative action is to include certain disadvantaged groups; it is not to exclude other groups, though this is an inevitable and foreseeable by‐product. In this article I contend that Cooney's argument ignores two important conditions of the doctrine of double effect; namely, that the good which results from the intended effect must be at least commensurate with the harm that results from the unintended effect; and, that the intended good effect is causally separate from the unintended harmful effect. Any use of the doctrine which neglects these conditions leads to morally problematic cases. Further, once we take the conditions into account, we have good reason to think that the doctrine of double effect has no relevance to the affirmative action deb

ISSN:0264-3758    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5930.1990.tb00269.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1990

数据来源: WILEY