摘要:

In Milgram's experiments, subjects were induced to inflict what they believed to be electric shocks in obedience to a man in a white coat. This suggests that many can be persuaded to torture, and perhaps kill, another person simply on the say‐so of an authority figure. But the experiments have been attacked on methodological, moral and methodologico‐moral grounds. Patten argues that the subjects probably were not taken in by the charade; Bok argues that lies should not be used in research; and Patten insists that any excuse for Milgram's conduct can be adapted on behalf of his subjects. (Either he was wrong to conduct the experiments or they do not establish the phenomenon of immoral obedience). We argue that the subjects were indeed taken in, that lies (though usually wrong) were in this case legitimate, and that there were excuses available to Milgram which were not available to his subjects. So far from ‘disrespecting’his subjects, Milgram enhanced their autonomy as rational agents. We concede however that it might be right to prohibit what it was right to

ISSN:0264-3758    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5930.1996.tb00169.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

Though we humans are immensely more gifted than other animals, yet we are not the outcome of an inevitable selection of the ‘fittest’. Nor on the other hand is our importance diminished by our evolutionary inheritance. Besides, we are already here! Faith in inevitable progress is a ‘scientific’, not a Christian, delusion. We realise that the universe has its own rules and complications which intrude on our lives and often thwart our choices. It is therefore legitimate to talk of chance, but we often fail to appreciate the real significance of this word. Chance is not a cause; in essence it refers to our own consciousness that we are immersed in circumstance, and it has no reality without our own purposiveness. Thus chance is not some blind and indifferent or even hostile cosmic mystery; it is the occasion of our own responses, and it even offers the opportunity of human growth. Just as we accept the laws (and dangers) of physics (e.g. gravitation), as the framework of our ordered existence, so also we may accept the surprises of chance without any despairing conclusion either from our latest researches in astronomy or from a fatal accident in the

ISSN:0264-3758    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5930.1996.tb00170.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

After a short description of the nature of philosophical counselling, this paper suggests that what makes philosophical counselling philosophical is that it helps the counsellee in philosophical self‐investigations. These are critical non‐empirical investigations of the fundamental principles underlying the counsellee's ‘lived understanding’(i.e. conceptions which the counsellee lives by, though not necessarily articulates in words), aimed at the development of wisdom.In order to illustrate the nature of philosophical self‐investigation, two case studies are presented. The nature and measurability of success in philosophical counselling is then discussed. A questionnaire filled out by a counsellee is quoted as an illustration of the possible effects and success of philosophical co

ISSN:0264-3758    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5930.1996.tb00171.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

This paper suggests that a basic distinction between philosophical counselling and psychotherapy is to be found in the conception of ‘the person’that is inherent in each of the fields. Understanding this distinction allows not only for a more profound recognition of what is unique to philosophical counselling but also for a better view of possibilities of interchange between the fields.

ISSN:0264-3758    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5930.1996.tb00172.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

Philosophical counselling, Ran Lahav and others claim, helps clients deepen their philosophical self‐understanding. The counsellor's role is the minimalist one of providing the client with the philosophical tools needed for reflective self‐evaluation. Respect for the client's autonomy entails refraining from intervening with substantive moral criticism, theories, and methods; the client's ways of working out fundamental questions like ‘Who am I and what do I really want?’cannot be assessed by the counsellor in terms of their truth‐value, but only in terms of whether they reflect the client's autonomous choice to express him/herself in a certain way.I argue that this view, which is informed by an anti‐realist account of self and life‐history, undermines the distinction between self‐knowledge and self‐deception. Once interpretive and criteriological free rein is given to the client, and once personal, pragmatic and aesthetic considerations take precedence over truth‐value, then the way is left open to clients to generate the most morally convenient self‐interpretation to suit their current needs.I defend the view that truth matters in philosophical counselling; more specifically, that there is a basic distinction between true and false forms of self‐understanding. To do this, I offer a broadly realist account of self and reflective self‐evaluation. If this is right, then philosophical counsellors shoulder a significant burden of responsibility in helping their clients achieve an accurate, defensible, action‐guiding and truth

ISSN:0264-3758    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5930.1996.tb00173.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

In a very influential paper, Abortion, Joel Feinberg offers a series of arguments against four popular proposals for the criterion of moral personhood and defends a fifth proposal. In this paper, I demonstrate that two widely‐accepted arguments employed by Feinberg against the modified species criterion and the strict potentiality criterion, respectively, are unsound. Moreover, I argue that there is a general feature of his inquiry into the criteria for moral personhood which undermines his efforts to argue convincingly either in favour of his own candidate or against other candidate

ISSN:0264-3758    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5930.1996.tb00174.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

On Nationality DavidMiller

ISSN:0264-3758    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5930.1996.tb00175.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

Exploring Philosophy: The Philosophical Quest (Second Edition) BrendaAlmondIntroducing Applied Ethics BrendaAlmond(ed.)

ISSN:0264-3758    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5930.1996.tb00176.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

Penal Theory and Practice: Tradition and innovation in criminal justice Edited by AntonyDuff, SandraMarshall, RebeccaEmersonDobashand RussellP. DobashState Punishment: Political principles and community values NicolaLacey

ISSN:0264-3758    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5930.1996.tb00177.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

The Struggle for Recognition: The moral grammar of social conflicts AxelHonneth

ISSN:0264-3758    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5930.1996.tb00178.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY