摘要:

Abstract:InThe Elm and the Expert, Jerry Fodor tries to reconcile three philosophical positions he is presently committed to: a computational theory of mind, intentional realism and a denotational theory of meaning. One problem he faces is this: a denotational semantics, according to which the meaning of a singular term like a name is exhausted by its referent, seems to rule out there being true intentional generalizations, or generalizations which advert to the contents of a subject's mental states. That there are such true generalizations is a major element in Fodor's intentional realism. Accordingly, Fodor is forced to find a way of dissolving this apparent incompatibility. This paper looks at his attempts to do so and concludes that they fail.

ISSN:0268-1064    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0017.1996.tb00044.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

Abstract:Daniel Dennett's book,Darwin's Dangerous Idea, offers a naturalistic teleology and a theory of the intentionality of the mental. Both are grounded in a neo‐Darwinian account of evolutionary adaptation. I argue that Dennett's empirical assumptions about the evolution of psychological phenotypes may well be unwarranted; and that, in any event, the intentionality of minds is quite different from, and not reducible to, the intensionality of selectio

ISSN:0268-1064    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0017.1996.tb00045.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

Abstract:Fodor's doubts about neo‐Darwinism are driven by something other than familiarity with evolutionary biology, so they should be set aside. His claim that a theory of intentionality cannot be constructed on an evolutionary foundation because there is no representation in the process of natural selection reveals that he has been blind to the chief beauty of Darwin's vision: its capacity to explain not just how the living can come, gradually, from the non‐living, but also how meaning can come, by incremental steps, out of the meaningl

ISSN:0268-1064    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0017.1996.tb00046.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

Abstract:Chomsky's criticism of Bloomfieldian structuralism's conception of linguistic reality applies equally to his own conception of linguistic reality. There are too many sentences in a natural language for them to have either concrete acoustic reality or concrete psychological or neural reality. Sentences have to be types, which, by Peirce's generally accepted definition, means that they are abstract objects.Given that sentences are abstract objects, Chomsky's generativism as well as his psychologism have to be given up. Langendoen and Postal's argument inThe Vastness of Natural Languagesto show that there are more than denumerably many sentences is flawed. But, with the view that sentences are abstract objects, the flaws can be corrected. Once psychologism and generativism are abandoned, the revolution against Bloomfieldian structuralism can be brought to completion and linguistics can be put on a sound philosophical basis.

ISSN:0268-1064    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0017.1996.tb00047.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

Abstract:The foundations of linguistics continue to generate philosophical debate. Jerrold Katz claims that the subject matter of linguistics consists of abstract objects and that, as a consequence, the discipline cannot be viewed as part of psychology. I respond by arguing (1) that Katz misinterprets work in the philosophy of mathematics which he believes sheds light on foundational questions in linguistics; (2) that he misunderstands aspects of Noam Chomsky's position, against whose conception of linguistics many of his claims are directed; (3) that Katz fails to dispose of a much more plausible analysis, according to which linguistics remains an empirical inquiry in spite of its abstract subject matter; and, finally, (4) that his arguments against what he calls‘generativism’, appealing to the existence of an infinitely long grammatical sentence of English, are fla

ISSN:0268-1064    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0017.1996.tb00048.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0268-1064    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0017.1996.tb00049.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY