摘要:

Abstract:A great deal of philosophical work has addressed the question of whether Man's computational theory of early vision is individualistic. Burge and Davies have argued that, according to Marr's theory, visual states are individuated non‐individualistically. Segal has denied that Marr's theory has these non‐individualistic implications. More recently, Shapiro has argued that the entire debate has been misguided. I argue that Shapiro is mistaken in a fairly deep way, attention to which allows us to raise and clarify several important issues involved in discussions of individualism. Contrary to Burge and Davies, and by a route rather different from Segal's, I defend the claim that Man's theory offers no reason to think that visual states are individuated non‐individualisti

ISSN:0268-1064    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0017.1996.tb00050.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

Abstract:Frege's account of opacity is based on two attractive ideas: every meaningful expression has a sense (Sinn) that determines the expression's semantic value (Bedeutung); and the semantic value of a‘that’‐clause is the thought expressed by its embedded sentence. Considerations of compositionality led Frege to a more problematic view: inside ‘that’‐clauses, an expression does not have its customaryBedeutung.But contrary to initial appearances, compositionality does not entail a familiar substitutivity principle. And Fregeans can exploit this point in a way that lets them rejectBedeutu

ISSN:0268-1064    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0017.1996.tb00051.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

Abstract:In his influential paper ‘Speaker's Reference and Semantic Reference’, Kripke defends Russell's theory of descriptions against the charge that the existence ofreferentialandattributiveuses of descriptions reflects asemanticambiguity. He presents a purely defensive argument to show that Russell's theory is not refuted by the referential usage and a number of methodological considerations which apparently tell in favour of Russell's unitary theory over an ambiguity theory. In this paper, I put forward a case for the ambiguity theory that thwarts Kripke's defensive strategy and argue that it is not undermined by any of his methodological poi

ISSN:0268-1064    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0017.1996.tb00052.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

Abstract:Three experiments investigating children's understanding of inference as a source of knowledge and beliefs were used to determine whether children use a theory in understanding the mind. A child watched while a sweet was placed in a box whereas a doll was merely given a message about which sweet had been transferred. Children were asked to judge whether the doll knew the colour of the sweet in the box and what colour the do6 would think the sweet was. The main finding was that children tended to say the doll would hold a false belief about the colour of the sweet whenever the doll had not looked in the box. This result is easily reconciled with the theory view as a drive for coherence within the different aspects (knowledge and belier predictions) of the child's theory of mind. The result is contrary to the simulation view because children were generally good at‘inputting’or taking account of the relevant information (i.e. the doll's knowledge of the sweets’colours and the message to the doll), because children assessed their own beliefs quite differently from the doll's beliefs, and because contrary to the default assumptions set out by Harris (1991) children found it easier to assign a false belief to the doll than to assign a true b

ISSN:0268-1064    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0017.1996.tb00053.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

Abstract:If ‘a’ and‘b’are (proper) names and if the meaning of a name is exhausted by its referent, how can‘a = a’differ in cognitive value from‘a = b’if‘a = b’is true? This is Frege's famous puzzle and Bezuidenhout reconstructs it using demonstrative NPs in place of names, i.e.: This X is that X.’Her solution is to posit the‘truth‐conditional relevance’of thede remodes of presentation of such expressions. My major objection is that Bezuidenhout's examples are such that the NP to the right of the copula is anaphoric rather than demonstrative and cannot, ther

ISSN:0268-1064    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0017.1996.tb00054.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

Abstract:Grimberg identifies four arguments which she alleges are used in my paper‘Pragmatics and Singular Reference’(Bezuidenhout, 1996a) in order to establish the truth‐conditional relevance ofde remodes of presentation. In fact, only one of these, properly understood, is an argument which I would endorse. However, I do plead guilty to having used examples with features which misleadingly suggest that I endorse these various arguments. It is an easy matter to construct examples free from these defects, which is what I attempt

ISSN:0268-1064    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0017.1996.tb00055.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0268-1064    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0017.1996.tb00056.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0268-1064    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0017.1996.tb00057.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0268-1064    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0017.1996.tb00058.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY