摘要:

Abstract:Cognitive ethologists are in need of a good theoretical framework for attributing intentional states. Heyes and Dickinson (1990) present criteria that they claim are necessary for an intentional explanation of behavior to be justified. They suggest that questions of intentionality can only be investigated under controlled laboratory conditions and they apply their criteria to laboratory experiments to argue that the common behavior of approaching food is not intentional in most animals. We dispute the details of their argument and interpretation of the laboratory experiments. While criteria such as those suggested have a role to play in comparative studies of cognition, both laboratory and field studies are important for assessing the applicability of intentional explanations across different taxa.

ISSN:0268-1064    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0017.1995.tb00017.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1995

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

Abstract:Responding to Allen and Bekoff's (this issue) critique of Heyes and Dickinson's (1990) analysis of the intentionality of animal action, we reiterate that our approach does not assume that a hypothesis can be definitively falsified by the results of a single experiment, and argue that the evolutionary analysis favoured by Allen and Bekoff insulates intentional accounts of animal behaviour from rejection in the usual‘holistic’process of scientific evaluation. Specifically, we present data showing that the maintenance of behaviour on an omission schedule cannot be construed as rational because on these schedules it is reward for withdrawal that restores approach. In addition, we argue that, since behaviour can be affected by the non‐intentional properties of representations such as search images and cognitive maps, whether or not these representations have intentional properties can be assessed empirically only through research on instrumental beha

ISSN:0268-1064    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0017.1995.tb00018.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1995

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

Abstract:Philosophers have often argued that ascriptions of content are appropriate only to the personal level states of folk psychology. Against this, this paper defends the view that the familiar propositional attitudes and states defined over them are part of a larger set of cognitive processes that do not make constitutive reference to concept possession. It does this by showing that states with nonconceptual content exist both in perceptual experience and in subpersonal information‐processing systems. What makes these states content‐involving is their satisfaction of certain basic conditions deriving from a general account of representation‐driven behaviour that is neutral on the question of concept possession. It is also argued that creatures can be in states with nonconceptual content even though they possess no conceptual abilities a

ISSN:0268-1064    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0017.1995.tb00019.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1995

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0268-1064    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0017.1995.tb00020.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1995

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

Abstract:Two main theories of concepts have emerged in the recent psychological literature: the Prototype Theory (which considers concepts to be self‐contained lists of features) and the Theory Theory (which conceives of them as being embedded within larger theoretical networks). Experiments supporting the first theory usually differ substantially from those supporting the second, which suggests that these theories may be operating at different levels of explanation and dealing with different entities. A convergence is proposed between the Theory Theory and the intentional stance in the philosophy of language and mind. From this stance, concepts should not be thought of as concrete physical entitie

ISSN:0268-1064    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0017.1995.tb00021.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1995

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

Abstract:The discussion of whether people understand themselves and others by using theories of behaviour (theory theory) or by simulating mental states (simulation theory) lacks conclusive empirical evidence. Nichols et al. (1996) have proposed the Langer effect (Langer, 1975) as a critical test. From people's inability accurately to predict the difference in the subjective value of lottery tickets in choice and no‐choice conditions, they argued that people do not simulate behaviour in such situations.In a series of four experiments, we consistently failed to replicate the original difference between choice and no‐choice under the conditions used by Nichols et al. We conclude that the replicability of the effect depends on an unknown combination of factors. As long as the target effect is not better understood and under better experimental control, it is difficult to use it as a yardstick against which the accuracy of simulation can be asses

ISSN:0268-1064    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0017.1995.tb00022.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1995

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

Abstract:Kühberger et al. show that producing the Langer effect is considerably more difficult than has been assumed. Although their results clearly demonstrate a need for further exploration of the Langer effect, none of their arguments undermines the evidence against simulation theory that we presented in Nichols et al. (1996). In our study the actor subjectsdidshow an effect, but the prediction subjects did not predict it, despite the fact that they were provided with all the details of the actor's situation. Further, we report additional evidence that corroborates our empirical case against simulation theory

ISSN:0268-1064    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0017.1995.tb00023.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1995

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

Abstract:InTalk About Beliefs, Mark Crimmins claims thatde rebelief reports are not nearly as common as they are generally thought to be. In the following paper, I take issue with this claim. I begin with a critique of Crimmins’arguments on behalf of the claim, and then follow with an argument on behalf of the opposing claim: thatde rebelief reports are indeed quite common. In defending this claim, I make some observations about the nature of tacit reference, a phenomenon central to Crimmins’account of belief repo

ISSN:0268-1064    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0017.1995.tb00024.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1995

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

Abstract:I hold that a belief report characterizes the subject's belief not only by its truth conditions, but also by the token mental representations involved in it (based on conversational hints). To what extent does a belief report specify the mental representations required to make it true? I advance two surprising theses: (i) many reports specify representations by actually referring to them, and (ii) it is not clear that any ordinary reports simply leave open what sorts of representations are required for their truth. I defend these claims from the arguments of Marga Reimer and other critics.

ISSN:0268-1064    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0017.1995.tb00025.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1995

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0268-1064    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0017.1995.tb00026.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1995

数据来源: WILEY