摘要:

Abstract::I present arguments in favour of the view that the propositions expressed by utterances containing singularly referring terms have modes of presentation of the objects referred to by those terms as constituents. I rely on recent work by Sperber and Wilson, Recanati and other pragmatists, and claim that a Fregean account of singular reference is supported by this work. This is in opposition to Recanati himself, who in his bookDirect Referencehas argued for a view which is closer to that of some neo‐Russellians. In particular, I argue contra Recanati for the truth‐conditionalrelevanceof the modes of presentation associated with demonstratives and other referential terms. That is, 1 argue that these modes of presentation must be seen as part of the truth‐conditional content of utterance‐tokens containing suc

ISSN:0268-1064    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0017.1996.tb00038.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

Abstract:When reasoning about deontic rules (what one may, should, or should not do in a given set of circumstances), reasoners adopt a violation‐detection strategy, a strategy they do not adopt when reasoning about indicative rules (descriptions of purported state of affairs). I argue that this indicative‐deontic distinction constitutes a primitive in the cognitive architecture. To support this claim, I show that this distinction emerges early in development, is observed regardless of the cultural background of the reasoner, and can be selectively disrupted at the neurological level. I also argue that this distinction emerged as a result of selective pressure favouring the evolution of reasoning strategies that determine survival within dominance hierarch

ISSN:0268-1064    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0017.1996.tb00039.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

Abstract:Cummins (this issue) puts the case for an innate module for deontic reasoning. We argue that this case is not persuasive. First, we claim that Cummins’evolutionary arguments are neutral regarding whether deontic reasoning is learned or innate. Second, we argue that task differences between deontic and indicative reasoning explain many of the phenomena that Cummins takes as evidence for a deontic module. Third, we argue against the suggestion that deontic reasoning is superior to indicative reasoning, either in adults or children. Finally, we re‐evaluate Cummins’interpretation of differences in children's performance on deontic and indicative versions of Wason's selection

ISSN:0268-1064    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0017.1996.tb00040.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

Abstract:When a belief is cited as part of the explanation of an agent's behaviour, it seems that the belief is explanatorily relevant in virtue of its content. In hisExplaining Behavior, Dretske presents an account of belief, content, and explanation according to which this can be so. I supply some examples of beliefs whose explanatory relevance in virtue of content apparently cannot be accounted for in the Dretskean way. After considering some possible responses to this challenge, I end by discussing how serious these counterexamples are for Dretske's account.

ISSN:0268-1064    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0017.1996.tb00041.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

Abstract:I argue that Fred Dretske's account of the causal relevance of content only works if another account works better, that put forward by Gabriel Segal and Elliot Sober. Dretske needs to appeal to it to deal with two problems he faces: one arising because he accepts that the mere association between indicators and indicated is causally relevant to the recruitment of indicators in causing behaviour, the other from the need to explain how a present token of a certain type of content is causally relevant. For this and other reasons their approach has clear advantages over Dretske's.

ISSN:0268-1064    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0017.1996.tb00042.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

Abstract:Melnyk complains that my account of the way reasons explain behaviour cannot be extended to cover novel behaviours. I admit that I did not extend it, but deny that it is not extendible. This, indeed, is what Chapter 6 of Dretske (1988) was all about. Noordhof finds faults with my account and claims there is another account (partial supervenience) that does a better job. I acknowledge one of the defects—a defect I was aware of when I wrote the book‐but deny that the partial supervenience of content on intrinsic properties represents a better theory of the explanatory role of cont

ISSN:0268-1064    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0017.1996.tb00043.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY