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1. |
The environmental effects of nuclear war |
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AIP Conference Proceedings,
Volume 178,
Issue 1,
1988,
Page 1-18
Michael C. MacCracken,
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摘要:
Substantial environmental disruption will significantly add to the disastrous consequences caused by the direct thermal, blast, and radiological effects brought on by a major nuclear war. Local fallout could cover several per cent of the Northern Hemisphere with potentially lethal doses. Smoke from post‐nuclear fires could darken the skies and induce temperature decreases of tens of degrees in continental interiors. Stratospheric ozone could be significantly reduced due to nitric oxide injections and smoke‐induced circulation changes. The environmental effects spread the consequences of a nuclear war to the world population, adding to the potentially large disruptive effects a further reason to avoid such a catastrophe.
ISSN:0094-243X
DOI:10.1063/1.37827
出版商:AIP
年代:1988
数据来源: AIP
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2. |
Conventional forces and advanced technologies |
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AIP Conference Proceedings,
Volume 178,
Issue 1,
1988,
Page 19-34
Seymour Deitchman,
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ISSN:0094-243X
DOI:10.1063/1.37826
出版商:AIP
年代:1988
数据来源: AIP
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3. |
Nuclear arms race technologies in the 1990s The case of India and Pakistan |
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AIP Conference Proceedings,
Volume 178,
Issue 1,
1988,
Page 35-53
Warren H. Donnelly,
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摘要:
India and Pakistan continue to inch towards a capability to produce nuclear weapons, with India having the stronger industrial base of the two to supply the necessary nuclear materials. This trend challenges U.S. policy to discourage the further spread, or proliferation, of nuclear weapons. After providing background on the production of nuclear weapons materials, this paper briefly describes the nuclear industrial bases of India and Pakistan; reason for and against their acquisition of nuclear weapons, and related U.S. response; and suggests some options for action and for study.
ISSN:0094-243X
DOI:10.1063/1.37834
出版商:AIP
年代:1988
数据来源: AIP
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4. |
Seismic methods for verifying test ban treaties |
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AIP Conference Proceedings,
Volume 178,
Issue 1,
1988,
Page 54-108
Paul G. Richards,
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摘要:
Seismic monitoring of underground nuclear explosions, for purposes of treaty verification, is a process that entails three separate steps: eventdetection, explosionidentification, andyield estimation. For the 150 kiloton yield threshold treaties now in effect, the first two steps are easy. The third has been remarkably contentious and is the subject of new US–USSR negotiations, begun in November 1987, that have the potential both to resolve questions of Soviet non‐compliance with current test ban treaties, and to give credibility to seismic methods of yield estimation that have relevance for veryifying further restrictions on nuclear testing, for example a low yield threshold test ban.
ISSN:0094-243X
DOI:10.1063/1.37838
出版商:AIP
年代:1988
数据来源: AIP
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5. |
Monitoring yields of underground nuclear tests using hydrodynamic methods |
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AIP Conference Proceedings,
Volume 178,
Issue 1,
1988,
Page 109-148
F. K. Lamb,
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摘要:
The yields of nuclear explosions can be estimated using hydrodynamic methods. The approach that has been proposed by the United States for nuclear test ban monitoring makes use of the fact that the initial speed of the expanding shock wave produced by an underground explosion increases with the yield. Several techniques have been developed in the United States to measure the speed of the shock wave, of which the so‐called CORRTEX technique is the most recent and best. A variety of algorithms have been used to derive yield estimates from shock wave radius vs. time measurements. Although more intrusive than seismic methods, current hydrodynamic methods could be used to monitor the Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosion treaties, provided that appropriate changes in these treaties are negotiated and that adequate coorperative arrangements are made to assure accuracy. Significant engineering, operational, and analysis problems need to be solved before these methods could be used to monitor with confidence a low‐threshold test ban. The methods are not relevant to a comprehensive test ban.
ISSN:0094-243X
DOI:10.1063/1.37823
出版商:AIP
年代:1988
数据来源: AIP
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6. |
Public verification: The spot satellite technology |
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AIP Conference Proceedings,
Volume 178,
Issue 1,
1988,
Page 149-164
Pierre Bescond,
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摘要:
The successful launch and operation of the SPOT satellite system has raised significant interest from independent arms‐control and third‐party treaty‐verification organizations. SPOT is the first system to make detailed satellite images of any location on earth available to anyone on an unrestricted commercial basis. The operation of the satellite and the commercial distribution of the imagery follow the United Nations’ resolution referred to as ‘‘open skies, open access,’’ which recognizes space as an open resource, the peaceful use of which is openly available to everyone.
ISSN:0094-243X
DOI:10.1063/1.37824
出版商:AIP
年代:1988
数据来源: AIP
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7. |
Large phased‐array radars |
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AIP Conference Proceedings,
Volume 178,
Issue 1,
1988,
Page 165-205
Dr. Eli Brookner,
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摘要:
Large phased‐array radars can play a very important part in arms control. They can be used to determine the number of RVs being deployed, the type of targeting of the RVs (the same or different targets), the shape of the deployed objects, and possibly the weight and yields of the deployed RVs. They can provide this information at night as well as during the day and during rain and cloud covered conditions. The radar can be on the ground, on a ship, in an airplane, or space‐borne. Airborne and space‐borne radars can provide high resolution map images of the ground for reconnaissance, of anti‐ballistic missile (ABM) ground radar installations, missile launch sites, and tactical targets such as trucks and tanks. The large ground based radars can have microwave carrier frequencies or be at HF (high frequency). For a ground‐based HF radar the signal is reflected off the ionosphere so as to provide over‐the‐horizon (OTH) viewing of targets. OTH radars can potentially be used to monitor stealth targets and missile traffic.
ISSN:0094-243X
DOI:10.1063/1.37825
出版商:AIP
年代:1988
数据来源: AIP
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8. |
Infrared monitoring of nuclear power in space |
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AIP Conference Proceedings,
Volume 178,
Issue 1,
1988,
Page 206-219
David W. Hafemeister,
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摘要:
Using parameters for unclassified astronomical observatories based on Maui and on the Kuiper Airborne Observatory, we have determined the level of confidence of monitoring a ban on nuclear power in earth orbit. Existing military and astronomical observatories can detect and identify operating nuclear power sources on satellites, such as the Soviet RORSAT and American SP100, with a very high level of confidence to distances beyond geosynchronous orbit. A cold reactor can be detected with a medium level of confidence with visual observations by close‐flying reconnaissance satellites with medium confidence, and in the future with very high confidence with the interrogation of neutrons. The smaller thermal sources, RTG and DIPS, could be detected with medium level of confidence under certain conditions. Large pulsed reactors can be detected with a medium confidence level with visual observations from close satellites, and with a very high level of confidence with neutron interrogation.
ISSN:0094-243X
DOI:10.1063/1.37828
出版商:AIP
年代:1988
数据来源: AIP
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9. |
The transition to a deterrence posture more reliant on strategic defenses |
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AIP Conference Proceedings,
Volume 178,
Issue 1,
1988,
Page 220-243
Paul L. Chrzanowski,
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摘要:
Strategic nuclear deterrence is currently based on the overwhelming capability of the arsenals of the two superpowers. Massive damage would be inflicted upon the military forces and industrial capacity of both sides should nuclear war occur and escalation of conflict not be controlled. Nuclear deterrence has fostered a condition of peace in central Europe and an absence of direct conflict between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. However, some question whether deterrence will remain effective into the indefinite future, and should deterrence fail the consequences are grave.
ISSN:0094-243X
DOI:10.1063/1.37829
出版商:AIP
年代:1988
数据来源: AIP
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10. |
Observations on the feasibility and survivability of near‐term strategic defenses |
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AIP Conference Proceedings,
Volume 178,
Issue 1,
1988,
Page 244-260
Anthony Fainberg,
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摘要:
This paper reviews a possible early (mid‐1990s) missile defense system utilizing space‐based components and employs some elementary considerations to evaluate its usefulness. Topics covered include timelines for intercepts, system mass in orbit, U.S. launch capability, survivability, and some countermeasures. This review concludes that a degreee of skepticism is warranted.
ISSN:0094-243X
DOI:10.1063/1.37830
出版商:AIP
年代:1988
数据来源: AIP
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