ISSN:0363-6550    

DOI:10.1111/j.1475-4975.1984.tb00059.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1984

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0363-6550    

DOI:10.1111/j.1475-4975.1984.tb00060.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1984

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

There is a type of explanation frequently employed in the sciences, particularly the quantitative ones, that I intend to focus on. It seeks to understand some phenomenon or regularity that occurs in a type of systemSby deriving an equation describing that phenomenon or regularity from a set of equations that govern S. I want to propose a way of understanding such explanations.

ISSN:0363-6550    

DOI:10.1111/j.1475-4975.1984.tb00061.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1984

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

By now everyone knows that the thought experiment of Einstein‐Podolsky‐Rosen (1935) has something to teach us about the structure of quantum mechanics and about the world. The premise of this paper is that it has something to teach metaphysicians about causat

ISSN:0363-6550    

DOI:10.1111/j.1475-4975.1984.tb00062.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1984

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0363-6550    

DOI:10.1111/j.1475-4975.1984.tb00063.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1984

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

The mind‐body problem arises because of our status as double agents apparently en rapport both with the mental and with the physical. We think, desire, decide, plan, suffer passions, fall into moods, are subject to sensory experiences, ostensibly perceive, intend, reason, make believe, and so on. We also move, have a certain geographical position, a certain height and weight, and we are sometimes hit or cut or burned. In other words, human beings have both minds and bodies. What is the relation between these? Religion often tells us that we are really embodied souls released at death from our bodily prisons. Could this be righ

ISSN:0363-6550    

DOI:10.1111/j.1475-4975.1984.tb00064.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1984

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

Functionalism is perhaps the most prominent theory of mind today. The central thesis of functionalism is that the standard mental relations (or properties or states) are uniquely determined by their causal roles in functioning organisms. That is, the principles of psychology specify the characteristic way that (behavioral or physiological) input, the standard mental relations such as belief and desire, and (behavioral or physiological) output are causally arranged; and the central idea of functionalism is that, e.g., belief's characteristic causal role can be fulfilled by exactly one relation‐namely, belief itself. Clearly, then, the most direct way to refute functionalism would be to show that there are relations that demonstrably differ from the standard mental relations and that, nevertheless, could fulfill the same causal role as those mental relation

ISSN:0363-6550    

DOI:10.1111/j.1475-4975.1984.tb00065.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1984

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

One may gather from the arguments of two of the last papers1published before his death that J. L. Mackie held the following three theses concerning the mind/body problem:1There is a distinct realm of mental properties, so a dualism of properties at least is true and materialism false.2All bodily movements probably have sufficient causes in physical facts and properties, but mental facts and properties are not causally irrelevant to human action.3At the same time, the view that there are not sufficient causes in the physical realm alone for all bodily movements has no good and adequate empirical or philosophical reasons against it.In this paper I wish (1) to register my strong agreement with the first thesis by way of simply taking it for granted, (2) to defend the second thesis in greater detail and in a manner somewhat different from Mackie's, and (3) to show the third thesis to be false.

ISSN:0363-6550    

DOI:10.1111/j.1475-4975.1984.tb00066.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1984

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

If, as Melden claims, causal explanations are “wholly irrelevant to the understanding we seek” of human actions then we are without an analysis of the “because” in “he did it because…,” where we go on to

ISSN:0363-6550    

DOI:10.1111/j.1475-4975.1984.tb00067.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1984

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0363-6550    

DOI:10.1111/j.1475-4975.1984.tb00068.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1984

数据来源: WILEY