摘要:

Berry examines alternative regulatory reform proposals which could lead to greater citizens group control over regulatory policy making. Citizens groups have been handicapped by problems of maintaining large‐scale lobbying efforts, seeing little in the way of long‐term rewards for accomplishing deregulation, being unwilling to play the Congressional logrolling game, and simultaneously favoring regulation in one area and deregulation in another. The costs and benefits to citizen group organizations are emphasized in considering the alternatives they advocate. Citizen participation programs are seen as the most likely to expand in the fut

ISSN:1541-132X    

DOI:10.1111/j.1541-1338.1982.tb00455.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1982

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

The authors estimate the impact of occupational licensing on interstate migration and earnings. Interstate misallocation of labor resources and a redistribution of income in favor of the most highly regulated occupations is seen as a consequence of licensure barriers. The article presents descriptive information about the barriers to mobility posed by licensure; it compares interstate migration rates; and it develops an econometric model of licensing, migration, and earnings for those in universally licensed occupations.

ISSN:1541-132X    

DOI:10.1111/j.1541-1338.1982.tb00456.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1982

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

The author argues that the development of satisfactory market models in dentistry and other health care areas is crucial to a realistic examination of various deregulation proposals. He argues that such examinations cannot rely on the logic of economics alone, but must be rooted in empirical analyses well‐founded in theory. Using expanded function dental auxiliaries as an example, the author demonstrates the complexities of the issues involved and the relevance of political economy model

ISSN:1541-132X    

DOI:10.1111/j.1541-1338.1982.tb00457.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1982

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

Tobin reviews the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's (NHTSA) self‐regulating program including recall of vehicles, the ever‐changing definition of defects, frequency of defect reports, and the notification of vehicle owners. He concludes that self‐regulation–while minimizing government's cost and involvement in the private sector–has serious defects of its own. It gives manufacturers too much latitude in determining the existence of a defect and makes government overly dependent on the manufacturers for information. Under self‐regulation the definition of what constitutes a defect changes from year‐to‐year; and under it manufacturer's recalcitrance in acknowledging a defect has kept the NHTSA from o

ISSN:1541-132X    

DOI:10.1111/j.1541-1338.1982.tb00458.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1982

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

Top corporate management responds to what is socially desirable when the costs and economic benefits provide the incentive to do so. Even when changing directions to match what is thought to be socially desirable would produce long‐term profit maximization, some firms may stay with what is socially undesirable for what is perceived as a greater short‐term profit maximization. Halpern suggests that such short‐term profit decisions made by General Motors with the Corvair, and by Ford with the Pinto, backfired. A key problem is seen as the time lag between corporate misdeeds and the final judgment of courts or the gover

ISSN:1541-132X    

DOI:10.1111/j.1541-1338.1982.tb00459.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1982

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

The authors undertake an empirical examination of the hypothesized relationship between political variables and regulatory commission behavior (i.e., utility rate levels). Focusing on five political variables, they find evidence to support the argument that political factors do effect electric utility rates. They find commissioner terms of office and number of commissioners to be significantly, related to rate levels and offer explanations for contrary findings.

ISSN:1541-132X    

DOI:10.1111/j.1541-1338.1982.tb00460.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1982

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

Attempts to reign‐in runaway regulatory bureaucracy fail because the bureaucracy has all the important resources. The bureaucracy also holds the upper hand in policy‐making because Congress has neither the time nor inclination to effect legislative control and oversight. The authors examine the travails of the Federal Trade Commission during the 1970s to show the blurred distinction between bureaucratic autonomy and legislative cont

ISSN:1541-132X    

DOI:10.1111/j.1541-1338.1982.tb00461.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1982

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

The authors examine the relationship between the courts and HEW's Office for Civil Rights (OCR), to illustrate the effects of legal efforts to generate more vigorous agency enforcement. Opponents of racial and sex discrimination in public schools won a series of suits against OCR after it had ceased to effectively implement anti‐discrimination legislation. As a result of court decisions, OCR has had its discretion over how it will carry out its legislative responsibilities curtaile

ISSN:1541-132X    

DOI:10.1111/j.1541-1338.1982.tb00462.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1982

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

The authors argue that delegation of discretion over environmental regulation to the states may trigger a process analogous to Gresham's Law in which lax regulation in one state drives out stringent regulation in neighboring states. This devolution to regulatory laxity is illustrated by the lax pesticide regulations in five Midwestern “agricultural” states. Questions are raised about the effects of the Reagan Administration's commitment to reduce the stringency of federal environmental regulations and delegate more regulatory discretion to the sta

ISSN:1541-132X    

DOI:10.1111/j.1541-1338.1982.tb00463.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1982

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

Two extreme positions dominate the decentralization debate in urban politics: one school consistently opposes decentralization, while the other maintains that only complete radical community control can solve the problems of politics and administration in the city. Positions and policies between these two extremes tend to get lost in rhetoric and argument, or receive only passing recognition. This paper is an attempt to carve out, theoretically and empirically, some space for an intermediate position. Following a brief exploration of the decentralization debate, we discuss and present some analysis from a team policing experiment, a type of ecentralization that falls in between the two extremes. The data suggest that this type of decentralization can be successful if the program is designed as a non‐zero‐sum game, and the paper concludes that intermediate programs represent attractive third choices to discredited or unworkable alternati

ISSN:1541-132X    

DOI:10.1111/j.1541-1338.1982.tb00464.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1982

数据来源: WILEY