摘要:

AbstractUncertainty may be categorized along two dimensions: (1)the nature of probabilistic information(i.e. frequency information, about the outcomes of similar situations in the past, versus process information, about the way(s) in which a future loss might occur), and (2)the degree of personal control(i.e. the extent to which an activity's outcomes depend on internal factors (e.g. knowledge, skills) versus external (e.g. chance) factors). The effects of variations in both dimensions on people's risk‐taking tendency were experimentally studied. In a computerized task, subjects had to stop a fast‐moving symbol before it passed a target line. Success yielded a financial gain, failure led them into a ‘penalty task’ with the possibility of a considerable loss. On each trial subjects chose among 10 risk levels (varying symbol speeds): low levels resulted in small but almost sure gains, high levels yielded larger but less probable gains. Across subgroups of subjects, three penalty task characteristics were varied: (1) the actual loss probability, (2) the external versus internal determination of outcomes, and (3) the available risk information. Major findings were: (a) subjects did not set a lower risk level, but they did appear to be more attentive (i.e. they failed fewer trials) when the actual loss probability was lower; (b) internal outcome determination resulted in more failed trials (lesser caution); (c) subjects ignored frequency information, but were sensitive to process information. Results are discussed in terms of effort allocation for controlling risk during task perf

ISSN:0894-3257    

DOI:10.1002/bdm.3960040402

出版商:John Wiley&Sons, Ltd.    

年代:1991

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractIn the first section of this paper, we analyze classic framing effects according to principles of fuzzy‐trace theory. The key principle of the theory is that reasoning prefers to operate on simple gist, as opposed to exact details. Then, we introduce new data in three experiments designed to test this fuzzy‐processing assumption. In the first experiment, framing effects were conserved when numerical information was omitted from standard problems, arguing against a critical role for numerical processing. In the second experiment, evidence is presented that some subjects simplified framing problems by mentally truncating linguistically redundant complements in gambles. Experimentally deleting parts of gambles mimiced such effects, and choices varied depending on the information that remained explicit. In the third experiment, truncation effects were also demonstrated for mixed‐frame problems, in which one option is positive and the other is negative. The data disconfirmed a ‘halo’ hypothesis that subjects merely selected the positive option over the negative one. Instead, choices were accounted for by conversion, that is, transforming problems into uniformly positive representations to avoid the complexity of negation. In all three experiments, choices could be explained as a consequence of radically simplifying decision in

ISSN:0894-3257    

DOI:10.1002/bdm.3960040403

出版商:John Wiley&Sons, Ltd.    

年代:1991

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractThe credible intervals that people set around their point estimates are typically too narrow (cf.Lichtenstein, Fischhoff,&Phillips, 1982). That is, a set of many such intervals does not contain the actual values of the criterion variables as often as it should given the probability assigned to this event for each estimate. The typical interpretation of such data is that people are overconfident about the accuracy of their judgments. This paper presents data from two studies showing the typical levels of overconfidence for individual estimates of unknown quantities. However, data from the same subjects on a different measure of confidence for the same items, their own global assessment for the set of multiple estimates as a whole, showed significantly lower levels of confidence and overconfidence than their average individual assessment for items in the set. It is argued that the event and global assessments of judgment quality are fundamentally different and are affected by unique psychological processes. Finally, we discuss the implications of a difference between confidence in single and multiple estimates for confidence research and theory.

ISSN:0894-3257    

DOI:10.1002/bdm.3960040404

出版商:John Wiley&Sons, Ltd.    

年代:1991

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractExperiences often consist of a number of temporally separated events or outcomes, events which might be positive or negative. Building on previous research, the present paper proposes that the chronological order of the component events influences overall evaluations of these experiences. In particular, a preference for happy endings is hypothesized such that an experience consisting of a positive and a negative event is evaluated as more satisfactory if the positive event occurs last. This preference is examined in three studies in a variety of contexts. A preference for happy endings is shown to influence people's preferences, even to the extent of influencing preferences for segregated versus integrated events (Thaler, 1985). The implications of a preference for happy endings for decision researchers are also explored.

ISSN:0894-3257    

DOI:10.1002/bdm.3960040405

出版商:John Wiley&Sons, Ltd.    

年代:1991

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractA model of judgment made by sports judges is outlined. Its main assumptions are as follows. (1) From the beginning a judge tries to form a hypothesis about which of the two competitors should be awarded the victory. (2) The advantages of both competitors are assessed, and these values are changed according to successive observations. (3) However, the meanings assigned to successive actions are not impartial: the greater the initial advantage of one competitor, the more his gains are enhanced and his losses de‐emphasized. Both statistical analysis of judgments made at a boxing championship and in a special experiment with boxing judges revealed several regularities which seem to fit the outlined model, including a pervasive primacy effect. This effect seems to be a consequence of early preselection of the potential winner and a subsequent one‐sided processing of sequentially presented information. Possible ways of avoiding partiality in boxing assessments are briefly discus

ISSN:0894-3257    

DOI:10.1002/bdm.3960040406

出版商:John Wiley&Sons, Ltd.    

年代:1991

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractA fundamental postulate of utility theory is its independence of long‐run considerations. Consequently, unique and repeated gambles are supposed to be treated alike. Recent empirical studies (e.g. Keren and Wagenaar, 1987; Montgomery and Adelbratt, 1982; Wedell and Bockenholt, 1989) cast doubt on the descriptive adequacy of this assumption. Additional empirical evidence is presented, supporting the claim that people exhibit different patterns of choice under unique and repeated gambles. Potential explanations for these findings are briefly discusse

ISSN:0894-3257    

DOI:10.1002/bdm.3960040407

出版商:John Wiley&Sons, Ltd.    

年代:1991

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0894-3257    

DOI:10.1002/bdm.3960040401

出版商:John Wiley&Sons, Ltd.    

年代:1991

数据来源: WILEY