摘要:

AbstractIntentional states appear to relate thinkers to objects and situations even when these latter do not exist. Given the concern to allow that thought is a mode of engagement between subject and world, many writers have presented relational theories of intentionality and introduced odd relata to account for thought of the non‐existent. However there are familiar epistemological and ontological objections to such accounts which give reason to look for other ways of accommodating the appearance of relationality. A little explored possibility is to countenance not oddrelatabut oddrelations, ones not requiring existent terms other than those which ground the relation on the side of the subject. Proposals to this effect by Findlay and Grossmann are underdescribed and not obviously different from more familiar odd relata theories. Here a more developed view is explored, which derives from scholastic accounts of intentionality, in particular that presented by John of St Thomas, as this has been elaborated and defended in recent writings by John Deely. While judging it to fail, I suggest that it leads us towards an older tradition according to which the intentionality of thought is constituted by the occurrence of the forms of things in the mind. ‘Formally and principally the whole difference between a mind‐independent relation and a mind‐dependent one comes down to this, that a physical relation has a mind‐independent fundament with a coexistent terminus while a mental relation lacks such a foundation.’(Joannes a Sancto Thoma,Cursus Philosophicus: Ars Logica; Tractatus

ISSN:0034-0006    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9329.1996.tb00099.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractThe traditional conception of knowledge as justified true belief is refuted in two famous counterexamples by Edmund L. Gettier. Roderick M. Chisholm has attempted to rescue a version of the traditional conception by distinguishing between defective and nondefective kinds of justification, and redefining knowledge more specifically as nondefectively justified true belief. Chisholm's revised definition avoids Gettier's counterexamples, but goes too far in the opposite direction, imposing conditions that are too narrow and not jointly necessary for knowledge. Chisholm's definition excludes some claims that intuitively constitute genuine knowledge1by entailing that if a true belief is invalidated as knowledge when defectively justified by a total body of evidence that also makes evident at least one false proposition, then no knowledge whatsoever can be supported by the same evidence. An alternative analysis of knowledge is proposed, according to which the potential loophole between the state of affairs that justifies belief in a proposition, and the state of affairs that makes the proposition true, permitted by the traditional concept of knowledge and discovered by Gettier's counterexamples, is closed by redefining knowledge as semantically‐epistemically evidentially relevant justified true belie

ISSN:0034-0006    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9329.1996.tb00100.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractThe revival of virtue ethics over the last thirty‐five years has produced a bewildering diversity of theories, which on the face of it seem united only by their opposition to various features of more familiar Kantian and Utilitarian ethical theories. In this paper I present a systematic account of the mainpositivefeatures of virtue ethics, by articulating the common ground shared by its different varieties. I do so not to offer a fresh defence of virtue ethics, but rather to provide a conceptual map that locates its main claims and arguments in relation to those of rival theories, and identifies its distinctive contribution to contemporary ethics. I set outsixspecific claims which are made by all forms of virtue ethics, and I explain how these claims distinguish the theory from recent character‐based forms of Kantian ethics and Utilitarianism. I then use this framework to briefly survey two main strands of virtue ethics which have been developed in the literatu

ISSN:0034-0006    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9329.1996.tb00101.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractMany philosophers assert that psychological verbs generate opaque contexts and that the object of a psychological verb cannot be replaced with a co‐referring expressionsalva veritateas the objects of non‐psychological verbs can be. I argue that the logical and linguistic concerns which govern this assertion do not transfer to observational and experimental situations because the criteria that we use in order to verify that an observed subject has one hypothesized desire rather than another provide inconclusive evidence when we don't allow for all regular substitutions in psychological contexts. This becomes more obvious when we contextualize intentional behavior within the appropriate framework by recognizing that, in order to make sense of any desire attribution, we must understand the subject experiencing the desire to be pursuing each desired situation as a means to a further overarching goal. I conclude that the object of desire should always be readde

ISSN:0034-0006    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9329.1996.tb00102.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0034-0006    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9329.1996.tb00103.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0034-0006    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9329.1996.tb00104.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0034-0006    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9329.1996.tb00105.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1996

数据来源: WILEY