摘要:

AbstractMany argue that sceptical enquiry is incoherent insofar as it requires a detachment from and assessment of the framework judgements that constitute our practice of enquiry. This paper accepts that enquiry is relative to a framework, but argues that the Cartesian sceptical enquiry is consistent with that relativity. Part I presents Marie McGinn's Wittgen‐steinian anti‐sceptical argument, comparing its view of enquiry to Carnap's. Part II clarifies the sense in which Wittgenstein's ‘Moore‐type’ framework judgements could be unquestionable, and argues that McGinn's antisceptical argument fails. Part III shows that the sceptical enquiry finds all our beliefs to lack justification by suspending our normal non‐sceptical framework judgement regarding perception in a way that is consistent with the framework‐relativity of enquiry, and encouraged by normal standards. The paper closes by recommending a view of scepticism as a stimulus

ISSN:0034-0006    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9329.1994.tb00057.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1994

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractIn this paper I outline an argument which Louis Loeb attributes to Descartes, which attempts to ground the epistemic priority of reason over sense‐perception in the brute psychological irresistibility of the former. I claim that the position thus ascribed to Descartes collapses into a crude form of idealism, and attempt to pinpoint precisely the flaw in the argument which gives rise to this collapse. I finish by suggesting that the same flaw might be apparent in Philip Pettit's recent development of the notion of response‐dependent conce

ISSN:0034-0006    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9329.1994.tb00058.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1994

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractThe rational choice paradigm has proved to be a fruitful means of analysis and explanation in various disciplines concerned with questions of practical rationality, but in various attempts to extend its fields of application the deficiencies of the original account of rational choice have become evident. This paper tries to give a systematic overview of ways in which the rational choice paradigm can be extended and modified.

ISSN:0034-0006    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9329.1994.tb00059.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1994

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractSimon Blackburn has developed an interesting challenge to moral realism based on its alleged inability to account for supervenience relations between the moral and nonmoral. If supervenience holds, then any base property once giving rise to a supervening one must always do so. The realist accepts supervenience, but also (according to Blackburn) accepts the claim that nonmoral base properties do not necessitate the moral ones that supervene on them. This combination is thought deadly, because it leaves the realist without an explanation of why ethical supervenience should be true.I offer three responses on behalf of the moral realist. The first rejects the need for explanation, arguing that supervenience should be understood as closely analogous to Leibniz's law, which, I argue, needs no defense. I next argue that ethical naturalism may be right, and if so, would provide an adequate response to Blackburn. Lastly, I show that the success of Blackburn's arguments implies a global antirealism, and so does not, as he claims, amount to a special problem for realism in ethics.

ISSN:0034-0006    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9329.1994.tb00060.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1994

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractSometimes people are unfortunate in ways which facilitate their success ‐ and happiness. This creates the perplexity whether someone can be said to have been unfortunate, if an apparent misfortune has been, overall, beneficial to his or her life. I argue that whether something is a misfortune cannot be determined in itself, even in seemingly obvious cases. It depends also upon what one makes of it, what it makes of one. In short, it depends upon what happens later. People cannot claim to have suffered a misfortune for which they are to be pitied or compensated, when this ‘misfortune’ is crucial in having made them what they are, what they are happy to be. Hard determinism aside, the notion of ‘fortunate misfortune’ lacks, however, an easy parallel in ‘unfortunate go

ISSN:0034-0006    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9329.1994.tb00061.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1994

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractAristotle's account ofakrasiais unsatisfactory for a number of reasons. First, his account of the problem is coloured by a number of unattractive assumptions and preoccupations; second, his central claim, thatakrasiainvolves a temporary displacement of knowledge, deals at best with only a small number of cases; third, he is wrong to suppose that theakratesis typically someone overwhelmed by passion. We need to follow Davidson in recognising that the central problem consists in a failure to convert intention into action. Any solution must involve a recognition that we are dealing with a range of very different kinds of case, which demand different kinds of treatment. For example sometimes agents are overtaken by passion; sometimes they coolly and calmly do the wrong thing; sometimes they are insincere; sometimes they are suffering from a weakness of will; sometimes they are guilty of some kind of self deception; and sometimes they may have difficulty in comparing the goods and evils available.

ISSN:0034-0006    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9329.1994.tb00062.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1994

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0034-0006    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9329.1994.tb00063.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1994

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

Book Reveiwed in this article:Thomas Hurka,Perfectionism

ISSN:0034-0006    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9329.1994.tb00064.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1994

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0034-0006    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9329.1994.tb00065.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1994

数据来源: WILEY