摘要:

In this paper we present a dialogue between game theory and laboratory/field experiments using a number of examples from the economic systems design literature. We observe that neither game theory or laboratory experimentation is sufficient for economic design. Instead, what seems to be critical is the ability of each to inform the other. We discuss the rapid emergence of 'smart' markets which are being engineered to extract the gains from exchange in increasingly complex resource allocation environments. We describe some of the desirable properties of these markets.

ISSN:0740-817X    

DOI:10.1080/07408179908969882

出版商:Taylor & Francis Group    

年代:1999

数据来源: Taylor

摘要:

Most existing methods for scheduling are based on centralized or hierarchical decision making using monolithic models. In ihis study, we investigate a new method based on a distributed and locally autonomous decision structure using the notion of combinatorial auction. In combinatorial auction the bidders demand a combination of dependent objects with a single bid. We show that not only can we use this auction mechanism to handle complex resource scheduling problems, but there exist strong links between combinatorial auction and Lagrangean-based decomposition. Exploring some of these properties, we characterize combinatorial auction using auction protocols and payment functions. This study is a first step toward developing a distributed scheduling framework that maintains system-wide performance while accommodating local preferences and objectives. We provide some insights to this framework by demonstrating four different versions of the auction mechanism using job shop scheduling problems.

ISSN:0740-817X    

DOI:10.1080/07408179908969883

出版商:Taylor & Francis Group    

年代:1999

数据来源: Taylor

摘要:

Firms who are involved in R&D activities are often “racing” against competitors to become the lirst to attain the desired breakthrough. The goal might indeed be to "beat" the competitors in as many such R&D races as possible. However, when resources are limited, and competitors' budget allocation to these R&D activities unknown, the challenge becomes to devise a method of allocating R&D budgets to activites in a strategically “optimal” way. We model the decision problem of a firm wishing to allocate a fixed budget among several activities, so as to maximize the expected profit from the activities it captures. The probability of capturing an activity is an increasing function of one's allocation to it, and a decreasing function of the competitor's allocation. For a specific plausible capture-probability function, we find the optimal allocation between two activities conditional on the competitor's allocation (the “reaction curve”). Nash and Stackelberg equilibria for that model are then characterized. Wc also briefly explore the implications of more general, or different, capture-probability functions.

ISSN:0740-817X    

DOI:10.1080/07408179908969884

出版商:Taylor & Francis Group    

年代:1999

数据来源: Taylor

摘要:

In many industries a supplier's total demand from the retailers she supplies frequently exceeds her capacity. In these situations, the supplier must allocate her capacity in some manner. We consider three allocation schemes: proportional, linear and uniform. With either proportional or linear allocation a retailer receives less than his order whenever capacity binds. Hence, each retailer has the incentive to order strategically; retailers order more than they desire in an attempt to ensure that their ultimate allocation is close to what they truly want. Of course, they will receive too much if capacity does not bind. In the capacity allocation game, each retailer must form expectations on how much other retailers actually desire (which is uncertain) and how much each will actually order, knowing that all retailers face the same problem. We present methods to find Nash equilibria in the capacity allocation game with either proportional or linear allocation. We find that behavior in this game with either of those allocation rules can be quite unpredictable, primarily because there may not exist a Nash equilibrium. In those situations any order above one's desired quantity can be justified, no matter how large. Consequently, a retailer with a high need may be allocated less than a retailer with a low need; clearly anex postinefficient allocation. However, we demonstrate that with uniform allocation there always exists a unique Nash equilibrium. Further, in that equilibrium the retailers order their desired amounts, i.e., there is no order inflation. We compare supply chain profits across the three allocation schemes.

ISSN:0740-817X    

DOI:10.1080/07408179908969885

出版商:Taylor & Francis Group    

年代:1999

数据来源: Taylor

摘要:

In this paper, we study coordination mechanisms through penalty schemes between manufacturing and marketing departments which enable organizations to match demand forecasts with production quantities. This research was motivated by our interactions with a leading electronics and computer manufacturer. We consider two possible organizational structures - centralized and decentralized. In the decentralized case we model a single period problem where demand is uncertain and the marketing department provides a forecast to manufacturing which in turn produces a quantity based on the forecast and the demand distribution. In the centralized case, marketing and manufacturing jointly decide on the production quantity. Among other results we show that by setting suitable penalties one can generate the same result in a decentralized system as that obtained from a centralized system. We also show that setting the correct penalty for marketing is essential for coordination. Subsequently, we analyze models where the marketing department has the ability to change the distribution of demand based on efforts (through promotion, advertising and personal relationship with customers). An interesting result indicates that ii. is possible to set penalties so that a coordinated decentralized system outperforms a centralized system when there are no tangible costs to the firm for the efforts expended by the marketing department.

ISSN:0740-817X    

DOI:10.1080/07408179908969886

出版商:Taylor & Francis Group    

年代:1999

数据来源: Taylor

摘要:

In this paper we model the design quality competition in durable product markets. We use a duopolistic non-cooperative game theoretic framework. Each firm controls the design quality level and the price of its product. The resulting control theoretic model is solved under certain functional assumptions to describe the Nash equilibrium design quality and pricing strategies of the two competitors. We compare open and closed loop design quality and pricing strategies. We use an extensive set of numerical experiments to investigate the effects of various parameters of the model on the optimal policies. We conclude with a brief summary of our results and some useful managerial insights derived from the model.

ISSN:0740-817X    

DOI:10.1080/07408179908969887

出版商:Taylor & Francis Group    

年代:1999

数据来源: Taylor

摘要:

There is a significant worldwide trend for countries to participate in economic integration schemes on a regional basis for the planning of industrial development programs. These regional industrial programs are characterized by plant allocation decisions coupled with cost/benefit distribution decisions. The research work described in this paper addresses these issues by combining the traditional mathematical programming approach for determining plant location, size, timing, with a game theoretic approach for determining a reasonable distribution of costs and benefits among the members of a collectivity. Afte; developing the necessary theoretical framework by introducing and evaluating the properties of certain new concepts such as the Sharing Mechanism and the Durable Bargaining Equilibrium, they are illustrated through a real-life application to the planning of the petrochemical industry in a regional integration scheme. The theoretical results of this research can be applied to a wide range of situations involving multiple parties where the incentive for cooperation is present and yet the elements of self-interest bring in the possibility of conflict.

ISSN:0740-817X    

DOI:10.1080/07408179908969888

出版商:Taylor & Francis Group    

年代:1999

数据来源: Taylor

摘要:

We examine a dynamic Total Tardiness Problem (TTP) arising out of a decentralized job acquisition by several agents. Since the underlying static TTP is NP-hard, we first present a heuristic in order to solve the dynamic TTP without regard to the participation constraints of the agents. In the main part of the paper a cost allocation based on the results of the heuristic is developed by applying game theoretic concepts. Introducing the concept of a fair cost allocation according to Nash [1] in a special case, the results are subsequently transformed to suit the general situation. Two cost allocation schemes are discussed.

ISSN:0740-817X    

DOI:10.1080/07408179908969889

出版商:Taylor & Francis Group    

年代:1999

数据来源: Taylor

摘要:

As the information revolution continues, those who depend upon secure information-networks but cannot adequately protect them will become more vulnerable to tampering by an adversary. Prescriptive models used to recommend improvements to networks usually use reliability or flow as the Measure Of Effectiveness (MOE). Such measures will not give value to efforts that make a network component more difficult to exploit. Similarly, Risk Assessment Models (RAMs) are used to quantify the importance of a component to overall network performance (again measured in terms of reliability or flow) but do not prescribe improvement strategies. This study develops a prescriptive RAM that includes an MOE called invulnerability. This gives value to efforts that make a component more difficult to exploit. Results show that including the vulnerability MOE as a second criterion to complement the reliability MOE allows one to formulate component-hardening strategies. Furthermore, the Pareto-efhcient frontier generated by trading off these two MOEs is very small. This helps to pinpoint specific components that should be improved or hardened for information security.

ISSN:0740-817X    

DOI:10.1080/07408179908969890

出版商:Taylor & Francis Group    

年代:1999

数据来源: Taylor

ISSN:0740-817X    

DOI:10.1080/07408179908969891

出版商:Taylor & Francis Group    

年代:1999

数据来源: Taylor