摘要:

AbstractAny (finite) number of privately produced public goods are incorporated into a general trade‐theory model of private goods and factors. Postulating Cournot‐Nash behavior, a necessary condition for gainful trade is derived. Potential trade gains are related to the law of comparative advantage in private goods and the change in the underproduction of public goods. A sufficient condition is also proven. Trade gains/losses are compared for more or less populous economies. All the results have analogues in the literature on imperfect competition and/or increasing returns to sc

ISSN:0965-7576    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9396.1995.tb00058.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1995

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractThis paper analyzes the effects of tariff reductions on horizontal mergers in a Cournot oligopoly in a two‐country world. It is shown that for mergers between two domestic firms and for cross‐border mergers which supply both markets from a foreign plant, unilateral tariff reduction encourages mergers which concentrate market power at the expense of mergers which reduce cost, while bilateral tariff reductions have the opposite effect, encouraging mergers which significantly reduce cost. Cross‐border mergers which continue to supply each market from a local plant are discouraged by both unilateral and bilateral tariff redu

ISSN:0965-7576    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9396.1995.tb00059.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1995

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractTariff indices such as trade‐weighted means, variances, and coefficients of variation are commonly used despite their lack of a theoretical foundation. This paper provides a theoretical framework for the index‐number problem for tariffs. This paper shows that the Anderson and Neary (1993) trade‐restrictiveness index is a function of “marginal trade‐weighted moments” of the tariff schedule, higher mean and generalized variance both implying a higher TRI. In the CES case, the TRI is increasing in the trade‐weighted mean and in the variance of the tariff schedule. For this special case the mean and the variance are partiall

ISSN:0965-7576    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9396.1995.tb00060.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1995

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractThis paper studies the term structure of a repudiation‐proof debt contract encompassing many sequentially scheduled short‐term loans in a principal‐agent (lender‐sovereign borrower) framework. the extension of each loan is conditional on the full repayment of the previous loans in due maturity. Both direct sanctions and loss of access to the international credit market are present as debt‐repudiation costs. It is shown that the proposed repudiation‐proof composite contract exhibiting decreasing loan sizes and increasing maturities is better for coping with the enforcement problems that characterize sovere

ISSN:0965-7576    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9396.1995.tb00061.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1995

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractThis paper shows that when there is a high degree of learning by doing for a new superior technology (versus no learning by doing for the old inferior technology), there might be multiple equilibria in technology choice and export‐market expansion. the inferior technology might be chosen when there is no coordination between the firms and the government. With coordination, Pareto improvement might be possible, with each firm choosing the superior technology and the government undertaking to expand the international market. This idea is demonstrated by a two‐period (a learning period and a mature period) model with two firms that have symmetric demand and cost functi

ISSN:0965-7576    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9396.1995.tb00062.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1995

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractVoluntary export restraints are often administered in such a way that each firm's post‐VER output allocation is positively related to its output under free trade. When this is true, a credible threat of a future VER will induce foreign firms to dump in the current period, decreasing the domestic price (the Yano effect), and possibly increasing welfare. We show that if an importing government's preferences are private information and if the government makes a series of VER decisions, there may exist an incentive for a welfare‐maximizing government that normally prefers free trade to maintain a protectionist reputation by imposing a

ISSN:0965-7576    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9396.1995.tb00063.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1995

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractThis paper explains the wage‐growth slowdown that occurred in the US in the 1980s. Using the vector auto regression method, it is shown that (I) a substantial portion of variations in the growth rate of average hourly earnings and other sectoral wages in the US can be attributed to exchange‐rule changes; (2) during the 1983‐1985 period the strong appreciation significantly reduced the growth rate of wages, but the subsequent depreciation had only modest effects; and (3) sectors like construction and services, traditionally assumed to be immune to foreign competition, have become sensitive to exchange‐rate devel

ISSN:0965-7576    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9396.1995.tb00064.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1995

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractThis paper argues that the basic concept of comparative advantage, used in international trade theory to establish choices of commodities exported, can also be used to explain choice of technology by a firm. A firm with a current leading position in a given technology may spurn a new technology, which is developed by a currently lagging firm, leading to future overtaking.

ISSN:0965-7576    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9396.1995.tb00065.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1995

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractThis paper develops a noncooperative Nash model in which a closed border is opened to trade between countries that differ in size and transportation costs. the paper suggests an explanation as to why economists have not convinced policymakers to lift all barriers to free trade. the questions we pose are: Who will gain as a result of opening the borders? Is free trade beneficial to the two parties involved? Do they both share equally in the fruits of free trade? Which country, large or small, benefits most? It is shown that free trade is not beneficial to both countries.

ISSN:0965-7576    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9396.1995.tb00066.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1995

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractThis paper argues that in a general‐equilibrium context, it is not sensible for oligopolistic (and mono‐polistically competitive) firms to maximize profit, because the outcome would be sensitive to the choice of thenumeraire.the natural objective of these firms would be to maximize the utility of the shareholders if the shareholders are identical. I show that even if each firm takes the representative individual's marginal utility of income as given, the outcome of the utility maximization objective is Pareto optimal, and in equilibrium, each firm equates price with marginal c

ISSN:0965-7576    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9396.1995.tb00067.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1995

数据来源: WILEY