摘要:

Editor's Note: I wish to thank the symposium editors, George Bittlingmayer, Associate Professor, and Gary Walton, Professor, Graduate School of Management, University of California Davis, Davis, CA., for their special efforts and valuable input as they shepherded these papers through the refereeing and editorial process. I also wish to thank Rodney T. Smith, Professor of Economics, Claremont McKenna College and Claremont Graduate School and Coeditor of Economic Inquiry,who served as coordinator of the symposium efforts, and Carolyn Williams, assistant to the editor, who served as liaison betweenEconomic Inquiry, the symposium editors and the authors. These combined efforts have resulted in the exciting collection of papers that follow.

ISSN:0095-2583    

DOI:10.1111/j.1465-7295.1992.tb01652.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1992

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

This article describes the ambiguity inherent is U.S. antitrust policy, arguing that it is a necessary consequence of the true, but not commonly understood, task of antitrust policy. Competition is multidimensional in form, and its different dimensions cannot be maximized together. Therefore, antitrust policy cannot maximize competition per se, but aims to achieve an efficient mix of competitive forms. Inadequate knowledge of the technical and preference tradeoffs involved guarantees that questions about the appropriate competitive mix will remain open to debate. The resulting policies, in the author's opinion, merit one cheer out of a possible three.

ISSN:0095-2583    

DOI:10.1111/j.1465-7295.1992.tb01653.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1992

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

Recent discussions of antitrust based on the private interest theory of government conclude that the real, as opposed to the stated, purpose of antitrust legislation is to protect politically influential industries against competition. Yet several prominent antitrust scholars who accept the private interest theory of government in general see antitrust legislation serving the public interest by increasing competition. We argue that the private interest theory of government is consistent with the view that antitrust legislation promotes competition. Indeed antitrust legislation may be supported by organized interest groups because such legislation increases the competition they face.

ISSN:0095-2583    

DOI:10.1111/j.1465-7295.1992.tb01654.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1992

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

Most economists associate antitrust policy with the Sherman and Clayton Acts. Nonetheless, there is in England and America a much older body of antitrust law, namely, the common law of restraint of trade. This regulation, like language and markets, evolved over a long period of time. This article examines whether the rules that the common law courts developed can be explained by a hypothetical wish to maximize social wealth and concludes that many of them can be. The last part of the article outlines a theory of legal evolution.

ISSN:0095-2583    

DOI:10.1111/j.1465-7295.1992.tb01655.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1992

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

The Meat Inspection Act of 1891 and the Sherman Act of 1890 are closely tied. This link makes clearer Congress' intent in enacting the legislation. Both laws were products of economic conditions after 1880 and reflected, in part, widespread concern about the market power of Chicago meat packers. The concerns of local slaughterhouses, which were being displaced by new, low‐cost refrigerated beef, and of farmers, who sold livestock to the large Chicago packers, were echoed elsewhere by other small businesses and farmers, who feared for their livelihood during a time of structural change in the econom

ISSN:0095-2583    

DOI:10.1111/j.1465-7295.1992.tb01656.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1992

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

According to Robert Bork's influential analysis, the Sherman Act was expressly instituted by the 51st Congress to advance consumer welfare, but has often been misinterpreted by federal courts handing down anticonsumer decisions. This paper suggests that the political coalition backing the 1890 antitrust statute sought multiple social ends and did not faithfully seek to impose economic efficiency. The key evidence includes historical economic trends, congressional debate, the legislative agenda of Senator John Sherman, and the political conflict generated by the most contentious (and most electorally important) issue of the 51st Congress: the highly protectionist McKinley Tariff Act.

ISSN:0095-2583    

DOI:10.1111/j.1465-7295.1992.tb01657.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1992

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

The Justice Department's 1982/1984: merger guidelines identify various factors –concentration, entry barriers, ease of collusion, efficiency–that would thereafter determine whether the government will challenge a merger. Analysts have criticized enforcement agencies, however, for not following the guidelines, and criticize the guidelines themselves for not identifying the weights attached to the factors. Using a 1982‐86 sample of seventy horizontal mergers, we examine which factors influenced Federal Trade Commission decisions to challenge mergers. The relative importance of the guidelines and other factors in merger challenges is measured, and related empirical issues are also exp

ISSN:0095-2583    

DOI:10.1111/j.1465-7295.1992.tb01658.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1992

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

Economists today play prominent roles in formulating antitrust policy and litigating antitrust cases. This paper explains why economics influences antitrust law and describes how economic theories enter and shape the antitrust system. Antitrust policy and doctrine change over time in response to developments in economic theory, and the decentralization of the antitrust adjudication system and the wide latitude accorded judges in interpreting antitrust statutes ensure that legal rules will reflect advances in the economic literature concerning the appropriate content of standards governing business conduct.

ISSN:0095-2583    

DOI:10.1111/j.1465-7295.1992.tb01659.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1992

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

The federal judiciary's present, cautious approach to delivered pricing is appropriate. Using court records and recent contributions to the economic literature, this article evaluates the antitrust history of those practices. Delivered pricing can replace mill pricing naturally in some rivalrous settings, but under special circumstances could be collusive. Thus, delivered pricing has sometimes been adjudged a Sherman Act violation, but only given other evidence of collusion. For a time, however, the legal system threatened to treat delivered pricing as a per se violation of the Clayton and Federal Trade Commission Acts. That reflected poor economic understanding.

ISSN:0095-2583    

DOI:10.1111/j.1465-7295.1992.tb01660.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1992

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

Two models in which price stickiness results from price adjustment costs are tested. One, an (s,S) pricing model, assumes lump‐sum adjustment costs and predicts firms will make relatively large, infrequent price changes. The other assumes convex adjustment costs and predicts frequent, partial price adjustments. Survey data of firms' price behavior reveal patterns consistent with the (s,S) model. However, many of the patterns are also consistent with partial‐adjustment rules, although the high percentage of firms which fix prices for a quarter or more casts doubt on the plausibility of the partial‐adjustment hypot

ISSN:0095-2583    

DOI:10.1111/j.1465-7295.1992.tb01661.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1992

数据来源: WILEY