1. |
EMPIRICAL ADVANCES IN POLITICAL ECONOMY |
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Economic Inquiry,
Volume 33,
Issue 3,
1995,
Page 351-354
MARK A. ZUPAN,
Frank C. Wykoff,
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摘要:
Editor's Note: I wish to thank Coeditor Mark Zupan, who took responsibility for organizing and implementing both the special symposium on public choice and the processing of papers through the refereeing and editorial process for this special section. On behalf of all the editors, I also would like to express thanks to Carolyn Williams, editorial coordinator, for taking on yet another responsibility in arranging the conference symposium meetings and the management of the files. The symposium on public choice was held at Lake Tahoe during the 1993 WE A meetings. The many efforts of authors, referees, editors and staff have resulted in an exciting complement to this year'sEconomic Inquiryofferings.
ISSN:0095-2583
DOI:10.1111/j.1465-7295.1995.tb01867.x
出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd
年代:1995
数据来源: WILEY
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2. |
GORDON TULLOCK'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE THEORY OF PUBLIC CHOICE |
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Economic Inquiry,
Volume 33,
Issue 3,
1995,
Page 355-364
ROBERT D. TOLLISON,
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摘要:
This paper offers a commentary on Gordon Tullock's various contributions to economics and social science. Tullock's methodology and style, and various critical appraisals of Tullock's work are discussed. The importance of Tullock's work and its significance for the future of economics are also assessed.
ISSN:0095-2583
DOI:10.1111/j.1465-7295.1995.tb01868.x
出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd
年代:1995
数据来源: WILEY
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3. |
THE FAILURE OF GOVERNMENT‐SPONSORED CARTELS AND DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERAL FARM POLICY |
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Economic Inquiry,
Volume 33,
Issue 3,
1995,
Page 365-382
ELIZABETH HOFFMAN,
GARY D. LIBECAP,
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摘要:
While economists recognize that private cartels are difficult to sustain, they are too sanguine about the prospects for government‐assisted cartels. Although the state's coercive power would seem to make it an effective enforcer of cartel agreements, the political costs of enforcement can be high of segments of the industry resist. The government's solution lies in alternative strategies for raising prices. Examining government efforts to organize an orange cartel in the 1930s, we find that farmers' opposition to output cuts and quota assignments because of their distributional effects forced a policy she to purchases of “excess stoc
ISSN:0095-2583
DOI:10.1111/j.1465-7295.1995.tb01869.x
出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd
年代:1995
数据来源: WILEY
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4. |
DEVIATIONS FROM CONSTITUENT INTERESTS: THE ROLE OF LEGISLATIVE STRUCTURE AND POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE STATES |
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Economic Inquiry,
Volume 33,
Issue 3,
1995,
Page 383-401
THOMAS W. GILLIGAN,
JOHN G. MATSUSAKA,
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摘要:
This paper investigates the determinants of state spending over 1960—1990. Recent empirical studies suggest that state government expenditure is greater than the electorate desires. Our main finding is that expenditure was positively related to the number of seats in a state's legislature. This is consistent with the hypothesis that logrolling leads representatives to spend more than their constituents would like. We also find that political parties do not have a pronounced effect on overall levels of expenditure, but do influence the composition of spending. In particular, Democratic control of state government is associated with higher levels of welfare spendin
ISSN:0095-2583
DOI:10.1111/j.1465-7295.1995.tb01870.x
出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd
年代:1995
数据来源: WILEY
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5. |
WHERE DOES ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT REALLY COME FROM? CONSTITUTIONAL RULE AMONG THE CONTEMPORARY SIOUX AND APACHE |
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Economic Inquiry,
Volume 33,
Issue 3,
1995,
Page 402-426
STEPHEN CORNELL,
JOSEPH P. KALT,
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摘要:
Governments are public goods that provide the organizational and legal structures by which societies arrange and enforce “rules of the game” that enable divisions of labor, exchange, and collective action. We argue that shared, pre‐constitutional cultural norms of political legitimacy among rational individuals provide the foundations of effective self‐government. The performance of contemporary Apache and Sioux economies on Indian reservations governed by common federally imposed constitutions is examined to test the framework. Unlike the impoverished Sioux, the relatively successful Apaches are found to have pre‐existing political norms that (serendipidously) match the structure of their formal con
ISSN:0095-2583
DOI:10.1111/j.1465-7295.1995.tb01871.x
出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd
年代:1995
数据来源: WILEY
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6. |
ELECTORAL POLITICS AND THE EXECUTIVE VETO: A PREDICTIVE THEORY |
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Economic Inquiry,
Volume 33,
Issue 3,
1995,
Page 427-440
KEVIN B. GRIER,
MICHAEL MCDONALD,
ROBERT D. TOLLISON,
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摘要:
We argue that winner‐take‐all voting in states and the unequal distribution of electoral votes across states in presidential elections makes incumbent presidents rationally place more weight on the preferences of voters in closely contested, larger states when making policy decisions. This hypothesis is tested by examining whether presidential veto decisions are influenced by the floor votes of senators from these electorally crucial states. In a pooled sample of 325 individual bills from 1970 through 1988, we find significant evidence of this behavior by incumbent preside
ISSN:0095-2583
DOI:10.1111/j.1465-7295.1995.tb01872.x
出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd
年代:1995
数据来源: WILEY
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7. |
LOGROLLING IN THE U.S. CONGRESS |
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Economic Inquiry,
Volume 33,
Issue 3,
1995,
Page 441-456
THOMAS STRATMANN,
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摘要:
Does exchange, i.e., vote trading, occur in legislatures?!f so, is it quantitatively important or optimal? How important are political parties for the organization of logrolling coalitions? To address these questions, this paper investigates a broad range of votes where logrolling has been reported among interests favoring subsidies for urban, labor, and farm interests. The findings suggest that logrolling agreements are widespread, that many Democratic congressmen changed votes because of logrolling agreements, and that the Democratic party served to facilitate logrolling between its members. Furthermore, logrolling coalitions exhibited a strong degree if stability.
ISSN:0095-2583
DOI:10.1111/j.1465-7295.1995.tb01873.x
出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd
年代:1995
数据来源: WILEY
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8. |
THE EFFECTS OF DIFFERENTIAL MORTALITY RATES ON THE PROGRESSIVITY OF SOCIAL SECURITY |
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Economic Inquiry,
Volume 33,
Issue 3,
1995,
Page 457-475
DANIEL M. GARRETT,
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摘要:
Does the Old‐Age and Survivors Insurance portion of Social Security become regressive once we allow for the shorter lifespan of poor people? This paper compares the net returns of poor households to the net returns of other households after taking into account differential longevity. Earnings and Social Security tax and benefit histories are simulated for families of various income levels in the 1925 birth cohort. These tax and benefit profiles are then weighted by the agents' probabilities of survival. For some plausible values of key mortality parameters, differences in mortality eliminate the progressive spread in returns across income categorie
ISSN:0095-2583
DOI:10.1111/j.1465-7295.1995.tb01874.x
出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd
年代:1995
数据来源: WILEY
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9. |
CRIMINAL DETERRENCE IN THE REDUCED FORM: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON EHRLICH'S SEMINAL STUDY |
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Economic Inquiry,
Volume 33,
Issue 3,
1995,
Page 476-483
JAMES ANDREONI,
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摘要:
Ehrlich [1973] is perhaps the best known and most influential study of criminal deterrence. Ehrlich's structural estimation of a three‐equation simultaneous system found large and significant direct deterrent effects of penalties on crime rates. However, recent theoretical results show that higher penalties may indirectly increase crime rates by reducing the probability of conviction. Hence, a reduced‐form model is needed to learn the total effect of penalties on crime rates. Using such a model, we find that the marginal deterrent effects reported by Ehrlich vanish. This result generates much different policy implications than those widely adopted following Ehrlich's publicat
ISSN:0095-2583
DOI:10.1111/j.1465-7295.1995.tb01875.x
出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd
年代:1995
数据来源: WILEY
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10. |
COULD STABLE MONEY HAVE AVERTED THE GREAT CONTRACTION? |
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Economic Inquiry,
Volume 33,
Issue 3,
1995,
Page 484-505
MICHAEL D. BORDO,
EHSAN U. CHOUDHRI,
ANNA J. SCHWARTZ,
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摘要:
We test the hypothesis that the Great Contraction would have been attenuated had the Federal Reserve not allowed the money stock to decline. We simulate a model that estimates separate relations for output and the price level and assumes that output and price dynamics are not especially sensitive to policy changes. The simulations include a strong and a weak form of Friedman's constant money growth rule. The results support the hypothesis that the Great Contraction would have been mitigated and shortened had the Federal Reserve followed a constant money growth rule.
ISSN:0095-2583
DOI:10.1111/j.1465-7295.1995.tb01876.x
出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd
年代:1995
数据来源: WILEY
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