摘要:

AbstractA general multiperiod multi‐echelon supply system consisting of n facilities each stocking a single product is studied. At the beginning of a period each facility may order stock from an exogenous source with no delivery lag and proportional ordering costs. During the period the (random) demands at the facilities are satisfied according to a given supply policy that determines to what extent stock may be redistributed from facilities with excess stock to those experiencing shortages. There are storage, shortage, and transportation costs. An ordering policy that minimizes expected costs is sought. If the initial stock is sufficiently small and certain other conditions are fulfilled, it is optimal to order up to a certain base stock level at each facility.The special supply policy in which each facility except facility 1 passes its shortages on to a given lower numbered facility called its direct supplier is examined in some detail. Bounds on the base stock levels are obtained. It is also shown that if the demand distribution at facility j is stochastically smaller (“spread” less) than that at another facility k having the same direct supplier and if certain other conditions are fulfilled, then the optimal base stock level (“virtual” stock out probability) at j is less than (greater than) or equal to that at f

ISSN:0028-1441    

DOI:10.1002/nav.3800130402

出版商:Wiley Subscription Services, Inc., A Wiley Company    

年代:1966

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractThis paper presents the results and the method of analysis for an attack‐defense game involving allocation of resources. Each player is assumed to have several different types of resources to be divided in optimal fashion among a fixed set of targets. The payoff function of the game is convex.The “No Soft‐Spot” principle of M. Dresher, and the concept of the generalized inverse of a matrix are used to determine optimal strategies for each player and the value of t

ISSN:0028-1441    

DOI:10.1002/nav.3800130403

出版商:Wiley Subscription Services, Inc., A Wiley Company    

年代:1966

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractA generalization of n‐person games, called “Alliance Games.” is defined. The relations with von Neumann and Morgenstern's games and with Thrall's games in partition function form are shown. The conceptual value of alliance games is discussed, and the mathematical value is illustrated by answering questions which Thrall raised concerning points between parti

ISSN:0028-1441    

DOI:10.1002/nav.3800130404

出版商:Wiley Subscription Services, Inc., A Wiley Company    

年代:1966

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractThe Tactical Warfare Simulation Program is a procedure by which the major interactions among opposing military units and terrain features can be treated in a tactical limited warfare situation. It is a critical‐area, sequence‐of‐event model and is programmed in SIM‐SCRIPT.In this program a military unit is described by such properties as strength, size, location, velocity, and attrition rates. Some of the events which can occur to a military unit are entering/leaving terrain features, becoming engaged/disengaged with opposing units, retreating, reaching an objective, and breaking. Following a discussion of the general features of the program, a study of a hypothetical war is pr

ISSN:0028-1441    

DOI:10.1002/nav.3800130405

出版商:Wiley Subscription Services, Inc., A Wiley Company    

年代:1966

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0028-1441    

DOI:10.1002/nav.3800130406

出版商:Wiley Subscription Services, Inc., A Wiley Company    

年代:1966

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0028-1441    

DOI:10.1002/nav.3800130407

出版商:Wiley Subscription Services, Inc., A Wiley Company    

年代:1966

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0028-1441    

DOI:10.1002/nav.3800130408

出版商:Wiley Subscription Services, Inc., A Wiley Company    

年代:1966

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0028-1441    

DOI:10.1002/nav.3800130401

出版商:Wiley Subscription Services, Inc., A Wiley Company    

年代:1966

数据来源: WILEY