ISSN:0143-2095    

DOI:10.1002/smj.4250121002

出版商:John Wiley&Sons, Ltd.    

年代:1991

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractThis essay examines the relationship between strategic management and economics. It introduces the special issue on this same topic by providing a guide to the eight papers contained in the special issue, and it offers the guest editors viewpoints on the contributions of each discipline to the other. The essay notes the major contribution from economics has been primarily from the industrial organization literature, with promises of important gains to be made from the ‘new’ economics as it breaks away from the neoclassical theory of the firm. Contributions from strategic management to economics are noted. Areas for further research utilizing the relationship between strategic management and economics are also indica

ISSN:0143-2095    

DOI:10.1002/smj.4250121003

出版商:John Wiley&Sons, Ltd.    

年代:1991

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractThe basic functions of the corporate headquarters (HQ) multibusiness firms are both entrepreneurial (value‐creation) and administrative (loss prevention). The development and implementation of these HQ functions reflect the industries in which the firms operate. Historically, the ability of the headquarters to carry out these functions has determined both the successful paths to growth for a multibusiness enterprise and the limits to that growt

ISSN:0143-2095    

DOI:10.1002/smj.4250121004

出版商:John Wiley&Sons, Ltd.    

年代:1991

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractThis paper reviews the evidence on takeover waves of the 1960s and 1980s, and discusses the implications of this evidence for corporate strategy, agency theory, capital market efficiency, and antitrust policy. We conclude that antitrust policy played an important role in the two takeover waves, and that the wave of the ';60s presents a problem for efficient capital markets.

ISSN:0143-2095    

DOI:10.1002/smj.4250121005

出版商:John Wiley&Sons, Ltd.    

年代:1991

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractIn virtually all economic analyses, differences among firms in the same line of business are repressed, or assumed to reflect differences in the market environments that they face. In contrast, for students of business management and strategy, firm differences are at the heart of their inquiry. This paper explores the reasons behind this stark difference in viewpoint. It argues that economists really ought to recognize firm differences explicitly.

ISSN:0143-2095    

DOI:10.1002/smj.4250121006

出版商:John Wiley&Sons, Ltd.    

年代:1991

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractThis article argues that strategy, like charity, begins at home. Specifically, economy is the best strategy. That is not to say that strategizing efforts to deter or defeat rivals with clever ploys and positioning are unimportant. In the long run, however, the best strategy is to organize and operate efficiently.

ISSN:0143-2095    

DOI:10.1002/smj.4250121007

出版商:John Wiley&Sons, Ltd.    

年代:1991

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractThis paper reviews the progress of the strategy field towards developing a truly dynamic theory of strategy. It separates the theory of strategy into the causes of superior performance at a given period in time (termed the cross‐sectional problem) and the dynamic process by which competitive positions are created (termed the longitudinal problem). The cross‐sectional problem is logically prior to a consideration of dynamics, and better understood. The paper then reviews three promising streams of research that address the longitudinal problem. These still fall short of exposing the true origins of competitive success. One important category of these origins, the local environment in which a firm is based, is described. Many questions remain unanswered, however, and the paper concludes with challenges for future resea

ISSN:0143-2095    

DOI:10.1002/smj.4250121008

出版商:John Wiley&Sons, Ltd.    

年代:1991

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractThis paper examines the potential usefulness of game‐theoretic modeling for the development of theory in strategic management. It is argued that there is significant potential for the development of ‘metaphorical’ models that capture the broad qualitative features of settings involving strategic interactions. The paper discusses the positive attributes of mathematical modeling, the nature and role of game‐theoretic modeling, and its potential for contributing to empirical work and to providing advice to m

ISSN:0143-2095    

DOI:10.1002/smj.4250121009

出版商:John Wiley&Sons, Ltd.    

年代:1991

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractGame theory has not been applied much to business strategy. I review some criticism of the game‐theoretic approach which inhibits its application, and mention some others. The common criticism that game‐theoretic models assume too much rationality is often wrong because (i) some games require little rationality to compute equilibria; and (ii) players may reach an equilibrium by communicating, adapting, or evolving to it rather than by calculating it. However, other criticisms can be forceful: Game theory is hard to use and test, it threatens to explain anything, it generates customized models of local settings rather than general regularities, and it offers only part of the advice a manager needs. Nonetheless, game theory could be a fruitful source of ideas and testable implications for strategy, requiring more fine‐grained, longitudinal studies sensitive to interactions between structural vari

ISSN:0143-2095    

DOI:10.1002/smj.4250121010

出版商:John Wiley&Sons, Ltd.    

年代:1991

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractCritics of game theory claim that it can be used to rationalize anything—even bank presidents setting their pants on fire in public. This article verifies the claim with a simple signalling model. The paper goes on to argue, however, that this criticsm is without force. Game theory is a toolbox for constructing useful models, rather than an empirically substantive theory; its power comes from imposing logical discipline upon the stories we tel

ISSN:0143-2095    

DOI:10.1002/smj.4250121011

出版商:John Wiley&Sons, Ltd.    

年代:1991

数据来源: WILEY