摘要:

Abstract.The object of this paper is to throw light on the reciprocal exchanges between legal philosophy and the theory of speech acts (as developed by Austin and Searle). The first part concerns the contributions to legal philosophy made by the theory of speech acts with a view to developing new perspectives. The second part deals with the contributions of legal philosophy to speech act theory.

ISSN:0952-1917    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9337.1988.tb00015.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1988

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

Abstract.The author conceives rules as action‐determining ideas. They are general and of hypothetical form, and they are of three semantic types: descriptive, technological, and normative rules. The most important categorisation of normative rules is the distinction between rules of behaviour and power‐conferring rules. Both kinds of rules are necessary to establish institutions. Principles are a special kind of normative rules. The social existence of normative rules is connected with their institutionalisation as frames for action. The dynamics of rules is in principle based on two elements: on socially approved habit, and/or on authorised norm creat

ISSN:0952-1917    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9337.1988.tb00016.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1988

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

Abstract.The aim of this paper is to clarify the logical structure of a code connecting together some distinctions already introduced by different authors: a distinction between primary norms and secondary norms, the latter being implied by the provisions describing institutions in the indicative; a distinction between norms the content of which concerns a state and those the content of which concerns a behaviour which is itself function of several states; a distinction, among the primary norms, of the norms of competence by which a normative power can be delegated to an individual; lastly a distinction between regulative rules and constitutive rules.

ISSN:0952-1917    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9337.1988.tb00017.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1988

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

Abstract.The essay is an attempt to examine aspects of legal interpretation from an external, sociological point of view. “Interpretation”, in its normal juristic sense, is primarily a process in which decision‐makers with secondary legitimacy link their decisions to authority of primary legitimacy. The type of legitimacy which is dominant within the legal system greatly influences the style of interpretation ‐ in “closed” systems, where the stock of premises is fixed, “legalism” will abound. Legal interpretation is not concerned with what a text really means, in any literal sense; and standards for judging legal interpretation are different from the standards of judging other forms of communication, for example, literature. Indeed, a judge can be considered great precisely because of his creative acts ofmi

ISSN:0952-1917    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9337.1988.tb00018.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1988

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0952-1917    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9337.1988.tb00019.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1988

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0952-1917    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9337.1988.tb00020.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1988

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0952-1917    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9337.1988.tb00021.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1988

数据来源: WILEY