摘要:

Abstract.One of the strongest arguments against the legalization of voluntary euthanasia is that even though a given suffering or comatose patient may have a moral right to die, legal recognition of the right would lead inevitably to mistakes and abuses inothercases. The flaw in this argument is the assumption that it is always and necessarily a greater evil to let someone die by mistake than to keep a person alive by mistake. In fact, we cannot plausibly say that one of these two kinds of mistake is in itself, isolated from other factors, always more serious than the other. This point is illustrated by an examination both of a terminal patient whose prospect is a full year of intolerable pain (Matthew Donnelly) and of a patient in a “persistent vegetative state” (Nancy Cruzan). Moreover, it is untrue that legalization would necessarily lead to greater numbers of mistakenly approved discontinuances of treatment than of mistakenly approved refusals of termination, and numbers, it is argued, do mat

ISSN:0952-1917    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9337.1991.tb00090.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1991

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

Abstract.The author discusses Hart's concept of legal obligation, especially his contention that there is an obligation to obey the law which is peculiarly legal, i.e., non‐moral. This view is held to be mistaken. What is denied is that legal rules, merely by their being issued, offer a justification for the use of coercion to ensure compliance with them. Although moral and other social (customary) rules are considered self‐justifying, that is not the case of legal rules. Any analogy between these two types of rules in justifying their implementation by force is deemed wron

ISSN:0952-1917    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9337.1991.tb00091.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1991

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

Abstract.The article deals with the difference between some forms of legal positivism. It is argued that, even in continental legal systems which are typically “rule bound,” there is some space left for principles in the legal system. The author tries to explain how this space can be filled and what methods should be used by a judge to do

ISSN:0952-1917    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9337.1991.tb00092.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1991

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

Abstract.The legitimate impact of common morality on legal restrictions has been continuously discussed within the Western philosophy of law since Lord Patrick Devlin in the late 1950s presented his moralistic arguments against some liberal conclusions drawn by the English Committee on Homosexual Offences and Prostitution in their public report. Devlin's arguments were subsequently identified and refuted by Richard Wollheim, H. L. A. Hart and Ronald Dworkin, but in a way that later provoked further argument. In particular the attack against anti‐moralistic principles set forth by Simon Lee (1986) owes much to the rather naive liberalism represented by the opponents of Devlin. The battle over liberalism and moralism from the Hart‐Devlin debate to the present day is reviewed. In addition to the discussion of the philosophers mentioned above, a potential flaw in the argumentation of Joel Feinberg (1986) is conside

ISSN:0952-1917    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9337.1991.tb00093.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1991

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0952-1917    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9337.1991.tb00094.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1991

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0952-1917    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9337.1991.tb00095.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1991

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0952-1917    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9337.1991.tb00096.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1991

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0952-1917    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9337.1991.tb00097.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1991

数据来源: WILEY