摘要:

Abstract.If norms are neither true nor false, can logical relations such as contradiction and entailment obtain between them? Earlier logical positivists and also Hans Kelsen in his later years have answered the question with No. While appreciating the seriousness of the problem, the author of the present paper makes a fresh attempt to answer the question with Yes. His answer presupposes that norms can be judged from the point of view of theirrationality. The deontic loic or logic of norms built on this foundation is much more restricted, however, than tae “classical” systems. This again is a consequence of the author's opinion that the sentential connectives (negation, conjunction, disjunction, etc.) apply to norms only on condition that they can be “shifted” from joining norm‐formulations to the descriptive contents of the norms t

ISSN:0952-1917    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9337.1991.tb00099.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1991

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

Abstract.The author gives a short survey of the different methods which have been proposed to deal with the logic of norm sentences on the basis of logical systems of descriptive language: deontic logic, logic of norms as an isomorphism of propositional logic, restriction of logical relations to the propositional content of norm sentences, transformation of norms into sanction sentences, preference interpretation of norm sentences, double interpretation of ought‐sentences and the use of the descriptive interpretation as a tool for establishing the logic of norms, proposition about norms in the place of normative logic, the logic of admissible worlds, postulates addressed to the rational lawgiver and technical ought as a substitute for nor‐mological considerations. A critical analysis of these attempts may prove them inappropriate, but it is not sufficient to prove the impossibility of any method of founding normative logic on systems of a descriptive language. Therefore the author adds a general consideration on the chances of such approac

ISSN:0952-1917    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9337.1991.tb00100.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1991

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

Abstract.According to the normative theory of legal science, juristic ought‐sentences describe rules, since legal science just deals with rules, and rules cannot be described but by means of ought‐sentences. The author challenges this view. Two different constructions of “describing rules” are proposed: Namely, either interpreting or stating the validity of rules. “Interpreting rules,” in its turn, can be understood in three different senses: listing all the possible meanings of rule‐formulations, reporting the different interpretations a rule‐formulation has in fact received by courts, or ascribing meaning to rule‐formulations. However, the author argues that ought‐sentences are not the proper tools to accomplish such tasks. At the same time, juristic ought‐sentences cannot be understood as validity statements, since they neither mention any rule whatsoever, nor include the term “valid.” Further, if validity‐statements were ought‐sentences, their logical behaviour would reflect the logic of rules themselves. However, as the late Kelsen argued, things do not run this way, since two inconsistent ought‐sentences, if understood as validity statements, can paradoxically both be true, as well as both false. Hence, validity‐statements cannot be reduced to ought‐sentences iterating the rules wh

ISSN:0952-1917    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9337.1991.tb00101.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1991

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

Abstract.One of the theses of the present work is that, at the strictly logical and methodological level, practical logic has neither made, nor can it make any contribution to the philosophy of law, since none of the three branches of practical logic that have been taken into account, namely, the logic of norms, deontic logic and legal logic, seems to be theoretically possible. The contribution of practical logic to the analysis of legal language is assessed in terms of both the instruments of analysis elaborated by practical logic, the artificial languages, and the results obtained in two capital subjects, the negations of norms and the permissions.

ISSN:0952-1917    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9337.1991.tb00102.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1991

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

Abstract.The authors concentrate on the analysis of the concept of permission. After a general account of differing concepts of permission both with regard to different legal theories and to different legal ideologies, they argue in favour of a “radical” imperativism which leaves no place for permissive norms. Thus, in contrast with the logic of normative language (LNL) purported by Alchourrón and Bulygin, the authors figure out a system of deontic logic ‐ supplemented by devices of the possible world semantics ‐ according to which a normative system (N) is conceived as a set of logical consequences of a certain finite set of basic obligations and no room is left either for the concept of weak permission or for the concept of strong permission. Finally the authors raise some criticisms concerning the view maintained by Alchourron and Bulygin on strong per

ISSN:0952-1917    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9337.1991.tb00103.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1991

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

Abstract.The starting point of deontic logic is the distinction between non‐normative necessity and normative necessity. The first part of the paper shows that the distinction between normative necessity and non‐normative necessity occurs already in Aristotle'sOrgunon. The second part of the paper makes a further distinction within normativedeonitself: The distinction between deonticdeonand anankasticdeon. Anankasticdeonbehaves differently from deonticdeonin a very important respect: Deontic indifference has no anankastic counterp

ISSN:0952-1917    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9337.1991.tb00104.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1991

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

Abstract.The paper outlines the approach to the analysis of deontic conditionals taken in earlier work by Jones and Pörn, compares it very briefly with two main trends within dyadic deontic logic, and then discusses problems associated with the augmentation principle and the factual detachment principle. The author then modifies Jones and Pörn's previous system, using a classical but not normal (in the sense of Chellas) deontic modality to provide the basis for an alternative analysis of deontic conditionals. This new analysis validates neither the factual detachment nor the augmentation principles. However, influenced by the approach of James Delgrande to default reasoning, the author tries to show how a restricted form of factual detachment may be accommodated within the revised syste

ISSN:0952-1917    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9337.1991.tb00105.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1991

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

Abstract.The author replies to some semantic and epistemic criticisms of the concept of norm proposition. The author's contention is that though some, many, or most norm formulations are uncertain or indefinite with respect to their validity or interpretations, insofar as at least some norms with definite content definitely belong to the legal order, the concept of norm proposition can be maintained to be sound. Three such cases are singled out. Finally the author argues for a consensus theory of legal order focusing on the concept of valid norm conceived either as a norm accepted or as a norm to be accepted by the legal community.*

ISSN:0952-1917    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9337.1991.tb00106.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1991

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

Abstract.The paper offers a critical survey of two main sorts of problems hindering the possibility of conceiving deontic logic as a suitable account of the logical behaviour of (sentences expressing) legal norms. The notion of “legal norm” is viewed as the main source of the first sort of problems: (a) the typological variety of legal norms requires an account both of the differing logical behaviour of (sentences expressing) differing legal norms, and of the relations which might hold amon them; (b) the ontologic, semantic, and epistemic features of legal norms shed doubt on the very attempt to figure out a logical analysis of (sentences expressing) legal norms. The notion of “systemic legal validity” is viewed as the main source of the second sort of problems: Deontic logic does not provide suitable logical tools to account for legal phenomena like enactment, derogation, and conflicts between legal norms which rely on systemic legal v

ISSN:0952-1917    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9337.1991.tb00107.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1991

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0952-1917    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9337.1991.tb00108.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1991

数据来源: WILEY