摘要:

This discussion acknowledges that interest group ‐ governmental relations deserve further study, but argues that the corporatist literature of the last decade has failed to give useful guidance to the research. One major complaint concerns the hostility in many of the sources to pluralist analysis. As critiques, these attacks have been too shallow to be defended as constructive debate and in dismissing pluralist writings important insights into group‐Governmental relations have been neglected.The article broadly distinguishes two types of pluralism. There is the version which dwells on open competition between groups; there is also, however, a tradition of writing about and discussing closed group‐departmental relations and sectorized policy‐making. It is clearly this second strain that overlaps considerably with contemporary corporatist interest. It is suggested that it is worth reserving the termcorporate pluralismfor this model of segmented policymaking. This model is more descriptive than explanatory and is less ordered and systematised than corporatism appears to be in current theoretical use.It is further argued that in use many writers impute to corporatism little more than corporate pluralism suggests — and that advocates of corporatism now use the term in a less ambitious (an empirica

ISSN:0080-6757    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9477.1984.tb00298.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1984

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

The article discusses hierarchical decision‐making within a rational‐choice framework. The interaction between Superior and Subordinate is assumed to be influenced by three types of uncertainty regarding preferences, choice and ‘what happened’.A game‐theoretical analysis indicates that the Control Game may represent the decision situation of the superior and the subordinate actors, particularly when modelled as a one‐shot game with simultaneous moves. As this game has no Nash‐equilibrium, it is difficult to predict an outcome.A rather tentative empirical testing is performed. Using data from the budgetary process in the city of Oslo, it seems that the agencies do not exploit strategic opportunities to increase spending. This supports the theoretical presumption that it is rational bureaucratic self‐interest to comply with superior preferences, even under a non‐controlled d

ISSN:0080-6757    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9477.1984.tb00299.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1984

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

In this paper elements of a theory of electoral behaviour in referendums are presented and tested on a theoretically important case. Among the main determining factors — social class, political party and ideological attitude — it is shown that on a relatively simple issue with low importance for the everyday life of the voters, ideological attitude is far more important than politicál party and social class in explaining referendum voting. On this basis a scheme of analysis and a number of hypotheses are suggested for further s

ISSN:0080-6757    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9477.1984.tb00300.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1984

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0080-6757    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9477.1984.tb00301.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1984

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0080-6757    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9477.1984.tb00302.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1984

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0080-6757    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9477.1984.tb00303.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1984

数据来源: WILEY