摘要:

Danish democracy has strong corporatist characteristics. The implication is that interest organizations are integrated in both policy‐making and policy implementation. This article deals with policy implementation. A distinction between different administrative regimes is developed. The proposition advanced here is that variations with respect to the involvement of interest organizations in administrative execution of public policy have consequences for administrative behavior. A number of scandals revealed during recent years concerning the management of public funds provide the basis of the empirical analysis. The conclusion is that with increased involvement of interest organizations in the administrative implementation of policy, legal norms are superseded by political norms, while the traditional institutions of administrative accountability are weakene

ISSN:0080-6757    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9477.1993.tb00038.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1993

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

This article is based on a mail questionnaire sent to members of the Swedish parliament (the Riksdag) in 1988. To increase our understanding of how the institution works, an analysis of members' perceptions of the distribution of powerwithinthe Riksdag is undertaken. Members were asked (1) how influential various groups and bodies are, and (2) how influential these groups and bodiesshouldbe. The results show that members want more power to be given to parliamentary party groups, committees and MPs as individuals, and less power to the party leaders and the chiefs of staff, Differences in perceptions along partisan lines are small. However, members of the Greens ‐ an anti‐establishment party ‐ are more oriented toward strengthening the influence of individual MPs and toward weakening the power of party leaders than are members of the established pa

ISSN:0080-6757    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9477.1993.tb00039.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1993

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

To what extent is political power fundamentally different from or, alternatively, comparable to economic power? While it is true that the basic institutions of democratic political life ‐ the electoral arena and the sovereign representative assembly ‐ differ from such capitalist economic institutions as the market and the joint‐stock company, the logic of the power game which takes place in both settings is quite similar. In both institutions power will be a function of the capacity to enter decisive coalitions with other players: individuals, political parties, stockholders or groups of stockholders. Power indices may therefore be employed in order to reveal aspects of the strategic gaming that takes place both in representative assemblies and at yearly stockholders' meetings. This article discusses and compares various quantitative measures of voting power in the two kinds of voting b

ISSN:0080-6757    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9477.1993.tb00040.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1993

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

One of the most important decision making bodies in the EC is the Council of Ministers. In that voting body the member states have different voting weights roughly in proportion to the size of their populations. This article focuses on the voting power of current and prospective member states (Finland, Norway and Sweden) utililizing the Shapley‐Shubik and Banzhaf indices of voting power. As the decision rules play a crucial role in the computation of these indices, the a priori voting power distribution is considered under various decision rules ranging from simple majority to near unanimity. We also discuss the a priori voting power distribution of various political groupings in the current European Parliament and in the hypothetical parliament which would have Finland, Norway and Sweden as new members. Although thus far the real power base in the EC is the Commission, the analysis of voting power distributions in the Council of Ministers and in the parliament sheds some light upon the relative influence that various actors might have in EC decision‐making proces

ISSN:0080-6757    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9477.1993.tb00041.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1993

数据来源: WILEY