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1. |
The Special Position of Europe* |
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Scandinavian Political Studies,
Volume 9,
Issue 4,
1986,
Page 301-316
Reinhard Bendix,
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PDF (792KB)
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ISSN:0080-6757
DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9477.1986.tb00352.x
出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd
年代:1986
数据来源: WILEY
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2. |
Tax Structure and Public Spending ‐ Or How the Electorate Is Deceived into Paying for Bigger Public Spending than It Really Wants |
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Scandinavian Political Studies,
Volume 9,
Issue 4,
1986,
Page 317-336
Ole P. Kristensen,
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PDF (834KB)
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摘要:
It is a classical proposition that tax structure may influence public spending. Two such propositions concerning the visibility and the elasticity of the tax system are tested. Visibility is not important while highly elastic tax systems are correlated with big public spending in times of economic boom. In times of economic decline and recession, high spending countries turn to deficit financing. In both cases big spenders seem to rely more upon a dose of fiscal illusion than moderate spenders.
ISSN:0080-6757
DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9477.1986.tb00353.x
出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd
年代:1986
数据来源: WILEY
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3. |
Binary Games as Models of Public Goods Provision* |
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Scandinavian Political Studies,
Volume 9,
Issue 4,
1986,
Page 337-360
Jon Hovi,
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PDF (989KB)
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摘要:
Problems of public goods provision are categorized according to attributes of the good to be provided, and properties of the group of potential beneficiaries. It is argued that not all such problems are Prisoner's Dilemmas. Other games of interest include Chicken, the Volunteer's Dilemma, a variant of the Assurance Came and several others. Which particular model is relevant in a given context depends critically on the specific characteristics of the situation under consideration.
ISSN:0080-6757
DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9477.1986.tb00354.x
出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd
年代:1986
数据来源: WILEY
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4. |
How Policy‐Making Affects Implementation: The Decentralization of the Danish Disablement Pension Administration* |
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Scandinavian Political Studies,
Volume 9,
Issue 4,
1986,
Page 361-385
Søren Winter,
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PDF (1149KB)
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摘要:
‘Presidents are more likely to be punished for not making promises of administrative reform than for not implementing them.’ (March&Olsen 1983, 291)Policy‐making and implementation have usually been treated as two distinct disciplines. In this article it is argued that implementation is affected by the prior policy‐making process. Hypotheses regarding such impacts are derived from the policy‐making theories resting on a) the rational decision‐making model. b) the conflict‐bargaining model, and c) the garbage‐can model: Implementation failures are more likely 1) if goals are absent or vague and if alternatives and their consequences have not been considered; 2) if the policy‐making process involves participants with conflicting interests and compromising; 3) if there are many and changing participants with limited attention and if symbols are important in the poky‐making process. These hypotheses are tested and discussed in relation to a reorganization case, the decentralization of the disablement pension administration
ISSN:0080-6757
DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9477.1986.tb00355.x
出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd
年代:1986
数据来源: WILEY
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