ISSN:0080-6757    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9477.1992.tb00138.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1992

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

The question addressed in this article is how to explain major intentional changes in national political systems. The theoretical point of departure is that political systems are usually so tightly structured that the prospects of actors introducing such changes are very small. The argument put forward is that only under certain periods of crisis can such changes occur; it is only during suchformative momentsthat political actors change the institutional parameters or the nature of the ‘game’. Empirically, the article extends this argument in an attempt to explain why Sweden's political system became highly corporatist. It has been shown that from a rationalistic approach, collective action ‐ e. g. why individuals join and support interest organizations ‐ is difficult to explain. Instead, an institutional explanation is offered. The empirical analysis shows how centrally placed politicians in Sweden during the 1930s, by changing the payoffs, could solve the ‘free‐rider’ problem for both farmers' and workers' interest organizations. Contrary to earlier studies, the analysis shows that the breakthrough of corporatist principles in Swedish politics took place under a Liberal government strongly supported by the Conservative Party. The traditional connection between the Swedish Social Democrats and the corporatist nature of Swedish politics is thus questioned and the alliance between the Social Democrats and the Farmers' League in 1933 is given a ne

ISSN:0080-6757    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9477.1992.tb00139.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1992

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

The joint‐stock company as an institution rests on two major principles. On the one hand, it embodies the logic of collective choice. The ultimate rights to power are vested in a constituency composed of the stockholders. The constituency elects a board which in turn appoints an executive. Decisions are usually taken by majority rule. In these respects, the joint‐stock company resembles the democratic polity. On the other hand, it also includes important elements of market exchange. Unlike many other instances in which the logic of collective choice applies, the rights to power can be freely exchanged on a stock market. This paper examines the power implications of this combination of principles using illustrations drawn from the corporate world of Sweden. It argues that although there are similarities between the situation of stockholders and that of voters, the incentives to participate in the exercise of control are rather different. Whereas a model based solely on instrumental rationality is insufficient to explain the participation of voters, it does well in accounting for that of stockholders. Further, the prerequisites of the emergence and maintenance of participatory norms are favorable with respect to voters but unfavorable with regard to stockholders. The paper concludes by considering the implications of the results for the alleged autonomy of managers vis‐à‐vis the owners and by examining the importance of the exit mechanism as a means of power for minor stoc

ISSN:0080-6757    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9477.1992.tb00140.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1992

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

The dramatic and surprising process of democratization in Eastern Europe poses a challenge to political science. There is a demand for theories which may help us to understand these transitions from authoritarian rule to democracy. This article is primarily focused on that set of hypotheses which are found in Adam Przeworski's writings on liberalization and democratization. Its main purpose is to develop some proposals for a game theoretical interpretation of Przeworski's ideas. At the outset this seems to be foredoomed to failure, since in some cases ‐ i. e. the collapse of communism in East Germany and Czechoslovakia ‐the process of democratization was turbulent to the extent that even the characteristics of a game were the subject of dramatic changes. One may then ask if it is at all possible to model these processes as a game, i. e. a situation where the actors, their opportunity sets and their payoffs are well defined? In lieu of a conclusion the article ends with a suggestion that the snowball effect, as observed at the repeated demonstrations in such places as Leipzig and Wenzler Square, can be understood in terms of Granovetter's threshold model of collective act

ISSN:0080-6757    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9477.1992.tb00141.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1992

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

The theme addressed is the criticism of constructivism and rationalism in politics as presented in the political theory of F. A. Hayek. Hayek's thesis is that goal‐directed rationality in politics is counter‐final. The main argument of this article is that on closer examination Hayek appears to be a constructivist himself. The purpose of Hayek's anti‐rationalism is primarily ideological and instrumental. Hayek wants to induce certain anti‐rationalistic beliefs because he believes rationalism has bad consequences. Yet this very project can be considered a case of goal‐directed rationality. Furthermore, the argument is that Hayek mixes abstract philosophical doctrine with empirical theory. In his critique of constructivism, Hayek confuses two notions of ‘rationality’. On the one hand he argues against epistemological rationalism associated with Descartes, and on the other he argues against the subjectivistic, action‐oriented notion of ‘rationality’ associated with the idea of ‘economic man’. Arguments against Cartesian rationalism do not, however, imply the impossibility of goal‐directed rationalism in politics. The so‐called information problem cannot be solved at an epistemological level. It is a practical problem, which Hayek has certain ideas how to solve. The argument here, therefore, is that Hayek's thesis of ‘tacit knowledge’ is not an expression of

ISSN:0080-6757    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9477.1992.tb00142.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1992

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

This article gives a rationalistic, individualistic explanation of social norms. Two different explanatory models for aggregate social phenomena are presented. It is argued that the emergence of such norms can be given a kind of socio‐cultural evolutionary explanation, with boundedly rational actors, in social interaction situations having the characteristics of community. Their maintenance in larger settings, however, require that they are internalized into behavioral habits. These results, it is argued, are relevant for several fields of political scienc

ISSN:0080-6757    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9477.1992.tb00143.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1992

数据来源: WILEY