摘要:

AbstractPrevious studies of shareholder rights plans (poison pills) have emphasized short‐term valuation effects in the context of specific takeover attempts. This paper analyzes rights largely adopted in ‘neutral’ environments. Using a paired‐case control approach, differences between rights and non‐rights firms are examined. Positive long‐term valuation effects are associated with restructurings, while negative performance is associated with ownership/control influences. The evidence supports a multiple signalling model in which investors use subsequent information to revise probabilities concerning control preferences of management an

ISSN:0143-6570    

DOI:10.1002/mde.4090110201

出版商:John Wiley&Sons, Ltd.    

年代:1990

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractA retail search model of Salop and Stiglitz (1977) is adapted to analyze manufacturer incentives for resale price maintenance. For some retailer cost functions and distributions of consumer search costs, imposition of a minimum price for retailers causes a price distribution to collapse to an intermediate price. Manufacturers may benefit from price floors when sales to high‐search‐cost consumers that have obtained lower prices increase sufficiently so as to offset decreased sales to other consumers facing higher prices. In contrast to previous work, no free‐riding problem with respect to dealer services is necessary for manufacturers to prefer banning discounting of their pro

ISSN:0143-6570    

DOI:10.1002/mde.4090110202

出版商:John Wiley&Sons, Ltd.    

年代:1990

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractPrevious studies on strategic groups have examined issues such as the identification of strategic groups, the relationship between strategic groups structure and industry performance, and the movement of strategic groups over time. In contrast to previous studies, this paper uses the analytical concepts of game theory to explore the question of what strategic groups will exist in the future. These benchmark (future) strategic groups represent long‐run strategic positions available within an industry and thus reference points for firms in developing sustainable competitive strategies. The benchmark strategic groups are discussed and comments are offered to illustrate how firms can use the benchmark information to redirect their strategic positions in order to survive and remain competitive in the long ru

ISSN:0143-6570    

DOI:10.1002/mde.4090110203

出版商:John Wiley&Sons, Ltd.    

年代:1990

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractManufacturers and retailers in industrialized countries spend large sums on advertising and/or in‐store promotion in the hope of increasing sales of their merchandise through ‘impulse’ buying. Results are reported in this paper of the unplanned buying behaviour of 450 consumers in 15 major supermarkets in South Africa compared with similar studies in the United States and the United Kingdom. The findings indicate that unplanned buying is higher in the United States than in South Africa, but that the importance of in‐store stimuli holds true across cultures. Analysis of other variables such as brand loyalty, specific outlet, and presence of a shopping list is also reported on a cross‐cultu

ISSN:0143-6570    

DOI:10.1002/mde.4090110204

出版商:John Wiley&Sons, Ltd.    

年代:1990

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractThis paper shows how a decision‐making model can be applied to a sealed‐bid auction with both independent private value (IPV) and common value (CV) components. The model yields estimates for the winning bid and for the actual value and error components of the winning bid as functions of the number of bidders and the underlying value and error distributions, assuming that these distributions are normal. The winner's curse and the special cases of IPV and CV auctions are examined using the mo

ISSN:0143-6570    

DOI:10.1002/mde.4090110205

出版商:John Wiley&Sons, Ltd.    

年代:1990

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractIn this note we extend the analysis of Beck and Maher (1989) concerning the effects of discriminatory anti‐bribery regulation. We argue that their approaches are challengeable due to an additional assumption that is most likely inconsistent with the benchmark model. Upon discarding the controversial assumption, we have an asymmetric bribery game. The corresponding Bayesian Nash equilibrium is nonetheless possessed with the properties described in Beck and Maher, despite the fact that their approaches may be incorrec

ISSN:0143-6570    

DOI:10.1002/mde.4090110206

出版商:John Wiley&Sons, Ltd.    

年代:1990

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0143-6570    

DOI:10.1002/mde.4090110207

出版商:John Wiley&Sons, Ltd.    

年代:1990

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0143-6570    

DOI:10.1002/mde.4090110208

出版商:John Wiley&Sons, Ltd.    

年代:1990

数据来源: WILEY