ISSN:0143-6570    

DOI:10.1002/mde.4090120602

出版商:John Wiley&Sons, Ltd.    

年代:1991

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractVarious motives for making corporate acquisitions have been forwarded in the managerial economics literature. Two that have received a lot of attention are the maximization of stockholder wealth and the maximization of senior management's utility. These two alternative views can lead to different acquisition decisions. The paper examines the returns to senior management and the returns to stockholders following corporate takeovers in the United Kingdom. The evidence suggests that if shareholders profit from takeovers then so do the senior' management. Of more interest, however, is the finding that if acquisitions result in a reduction in stock market value for the acquiring firm, their senior management appear to gain. In particular, senior management remuneration increases substantially after an acquisition. This evidence is consistent with the maximization of senior management's utility being an important motive in many corporate‐acquisition decision

ISSN:0143-6570    

DOI:10.1002/mde.4090120603

出版商:John Wiley&Sons, Ltd.    

年代:1991

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractFor a sample of roughly 450 companies, hazard function estimation is used to determine the environmental and organizational variables precipitating the ‘sell‐off’ of divisional units. The sample focuses on 285 ‘lines of business’ fully divested between 1975 and 1981, comparing them to 2157 retained lines. The most powerful sell‐off predictor was prior profitability at the line of business level; the lower profits, the higher the sell‐off probability. Also, divestiture was more likely, the lower company‐wide profitability, the lower a line's market share, the lower the line's R&D/sales ratio, and in the aftermath of a company chief executive officer change. Units previously acquired in conglomerate mergers were more likely to be sold off than original units. On the buyer's side of the sell‐off market, large companies acquiring other firms' divested units tended to improve the units' profit performance, but not enough, on average, to realize a normal return on

ISSN:0143-6570    

DOI:10.1002/mde.4090120604

出版商:John Wiley&Sons, Ltd.    

年代:1991

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractThis paper empirically examines the possibility that there is leakage of information regarding a merger prior to the announcement of the first bid for the target firm. The tests for the existence of market anticipation are based on the behavior of variances implied in the premia of call options listed on the target firms' stocks. We conclude that the evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that the market anticipates an acquisition prior to the first announcement.

ISSN:0143-6570    

DOI:10.1002/mde.4090120605

出版商:John Wiley&Sons, Ltd.    

年代:1991

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractThis paper provides evidence that an equity carve‐out is usually the first stage of a two‐stage process either to dispose of parent interest in a subsidiary or eventually re‐acquire the subsidiary's publicly traded snares. Both the initial carve‐out announcement and subsequent sell‐off announcement yield, on average, significantly positive abnormal returns to parent shareholders. In contrast, the parent's price response to a re‐acquisition of subsidiary shares is, on average, insignificantly positive. Both sell‐off and re‐acquisition announcements have a strong positive impact on subsidiary share prices. These gains, however, are offset by the subsidiaries' below‐average return performance preceding

ISSN:0143-6570    

DOI:10.1002/mde.4090120606

出版商:John Wiley&Sons, Ltd.    

年代:1991

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractRecent empirical studies have indicated that mergers are value enhancing, yet the theoretical aspects of merger gains have not been as well explored. This paper presents a theoretical analysis of mergers. In the model of the firm presented, outstanding risky debt gives rise to agency costs of underinvestment which are offset by the benefit of debt‐related tax shields. The trade‐off specifies the optimal leverage for a firm. Within this framework, we then consider whether and under what circumstances firm value could be enhanced by a merger. Under a fairly broad set of assumptions it is shown that most firm combinations ‘improve’ investment incentives and increase the value of debt‐related tax shields. Mergers between optimally financed firms result in a merged firm that is also optimally financed, but such mergers are not synergistic. Nevertheless, firm value may be increased if mergers are undertaken in tandem with a refinancing program to bring the combined firms from suboptimal to optimal de

ISSN:0143-6570    

DOI:10.1002/mde.4090120607

出版商:John Wiley&Sons, Ltd.    

年代:1991

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractWhy do some firms refuse to sell assets that are worth more to another firm? This paper shows that the presence of debt could cause anex postoverinvestment agency problem. In contrast to Myers' underinvestment problem, which is concerned with debt and growth assets, the model in this paper analyzes the role of debt and alternate users of assets in place. This type of agency problem is of interest because it is inherently related to the important recent corporate finance phenomenon of restructuring.

ISSN:0143-6570    

DOI:10.1002/mde.4090120608

出版商:John Wiley&Sons, Ltd.    

年代:1991

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractIn this paper the workings of the generic version of the poison pill are investigated. The analysis shows that the poison pill with only a flip‐over provision is ineffective as either an anti‐merger mechanism or an anti‐takeover device. Two antidotes to the flip‐over provision (one of which is well known) are provided here. The analysis further demonstrates that with the inclusion of a flip‐in provision it is possible for the target firm to construct a poison pill right to either increase the tender price and allow the takeover or to eliminate the possibility of a successful hostile ten

ISSN:0143-6570    

DOI:10.1002/mde.4090120609

出版商:John Wiley&Sons, Ltd.    

年代:1991

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractThis paper examines the role of corporate financial policy in determining the equilibrium allocation of takeover gains in corporate control contests. The model justifies capital‐structure changes in response to a takeover bid, and shows how recapitalization can be used as a strategic device to alter the price a bidding firm pays to acquire the target fir

ISSN:0143-6570    

DOI:10.1002/mde.4090120610

出版商:John Wiley&Sons, Ltd.    

年代:1991

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractWe examine the influence of takeover threats on the stock price of firms proposing antitakeover amendments. Stock prices of the majority of firms, which are not takeover targets during the four years surrounding the amendments, are unaffected, while prices of firms that become takeover targets within two years increase significantly. We document weak evidence of wealth losses only for a sample of prior targets. Our findings suggest that shareholders of the average firm are not harmed by antitakeover amendments because they provide either a better bargaining position or an information signal to the market.

ISSN:0143-6570    

DOI:10.1002/mde.4090120611

出版商:John Wiley&Sons, Ltd.    

年代:1991

数据来源: WILEY