ISSN:0143-6570    

DOI:10.1002/mde.4090140502

出版商:John Wiley&Sons, Ltd.    

年代:1993

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractThe theory of the firm views the firm as an organization characterized by (1) diversity of (and, most likely, conflict among) the interests of its members and (2) in spite of such diversity, the member's acceptance of a co‐ordinated choice of activities. A firm is a coalition formed when people play a co‐operative game, and this co‐operative game is the firm‐specific resource allocation mechanism. The theory includes: study of a descriptive general equilibrium model which embodies both the co‐operative game (for allocation of human resources, in particular for formation of firms) and the neoclassical market mechanism (for allocation of non‐human resources); its welfare implications; study of a normative mechanism to implement Pareto optimality in the presence of increasing returns to scale; and characterizations of the coalitionally stable hierarchical structures in a firm in a partial equili

ISSN:0143-6570    

DOI:10.1002/mde.4090140503

出版商:John Wiley&Sons, Ltd.    

年代:1993

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractThis paper presents a non‐co‐operative bargaining model of membership expansion in a producer co‐operative. The emphasis is on examining the distribution of the resulting surplus between the existing partners and the new member. In the presence of a number of alternative candidates, the existing partners can use the threat of switching negotiating partners to extract additional surplus from the negotiations. The degree of symmetry between the competing candidates necessary for these threats to be credible is specified, as is the nature of the dependence of the parties' payoffs on the various parameters of the model. Potential sources of misallocation within the model are ident

ISSN:0143-6570    

DOI:10.1002/mde.4090140504

出版商:John Wiley&Sons, Ltd.    

年代:1993

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractThis paper analyzes the welfare implications of acquiring information for profit‐maximizing and labor‐managed duopolies. We invent a unified method of exploring the role of information in a two‐person game under uncertainty on the basis of comparative static analysis, and then apply the method to both the PMF and the LMF. It is shown that whereas the LMF's behavior is analogous to that of the PMF twin in some circumstances, the former may be entirely different from the latter in others. Because a special status is accorded to labor as a variable factor of production, the informational analysis of the LM economy requires special care for both computations and interpreta

ISSN:0143-6570    

DOI:10.1002/mde.4090140505

出版商:John Wiley&Sons, Ltd.    

年代:1993

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractComparative static results are derived for two types of oligopoly: profit‐maximizing and labor‐managed Cournot oligopolies. After establishing a general principle for comparative statics for oligopoly, we will examine how a shift in the demand function, changes in the wage rate, indirect tax rates and fixed costs, and technical change affect the equilibrium Cournot industry and firms‘ outputs, firms’ profits and dividends per unit of labor. We will also analyze the effects of entry. Our analysis makes an extensive use of the relationship existing between an individual firm's and industry outputs. We will derive two kinds of stability conditions: one behavioristic and the other computational. Finally, we will conduct comparative static analysis for mixed oligopoly where several profit‐maximizing and labor‐managed fir

ISSN:0143-6570    

DOI:10.1002/mde.4090140506

出版商:John Wiley&Sons, Ltd.    

年代:1993

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractExtending earlier equivalence results for perfect competition and for (imperfect) quantity competition, here it is shown that in price competition, too, the behavior of a workers‘ enterprise (defined by the coincidence of its workers with its partners) is tamed by the worker‐partnership market so as to be identical with that of a twin entrepreneurial firm. Thus, not only is Bertrand–Nash equilibrium unaltered when an entrepreneurial firm is replaced by its workers’ enterprise twin, but such a replacement also leaves Bertrand‐von Stackelberg equilibrium intact whether we switch the leader or a follower from one form of ownership/management to

ISSN:0143-6570    

DOI:10.1002/mde.4090140507

出版商:John Wiley&Sons, Ltd.    

年代:1993

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractThis paper analyses a model of the dynamic interaction of a profit‐maximizing firm and a workers' enterprise (in the sense of Sertel, 1982) in an industry in which each acts as a duopolist. The framework is similar to that of Chiarella (1992). In that study labour was the only factor of production and workers were allowed to trade‐off work and leisure. Here we wish to analyse the effect of the capital accumulation decision on the outcome of the duopolistic competition. In order to obtain a tractable model we drop the work‐leisure trade‐off. We assume dynamic adjustment in the market for partnership deeds along the lines suggested by Okuguchi (1992a, b) and analyse the equilibrium of the duopoly, its comparative statics and stability with respect to key va

ISSN:0143-6570    

DOI:10.1002/mde.4090140508

出版商:John Wiley&Sons, Ltd.    

年代:1993

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractThis article formulates a capital accumulation model of the workers' enterprise in which the standard adjustment‐costs theory of investment is introduced into Sertel's framework. The existence, uniqueness and local stability of the steady state are shown to be established under mild conditions and the long‐run effects of changes in the price of output, the external wage rate and the interest rate on the volume of capital and the size of membership are exami

ISSN:0143-6570    

DOI:10.1002/mde.4090140509

出版商:John Wiley&Sons, Ltd.    

年代:1993

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractThis paper develops a model of international trade between a labor‐managed economy and a capitalist economy and examines the short‐ and long‐run optimal specific tariff in the presence of foreign imperfect competition among labor‐managed firms. It will be shown that the underlying conditions for the optimal tariff rule are different from conventional

ISSN:0143-6570    

DOI:10.1002/mde.4090140510

出版商:John Wiley&Sons, Ltd.    

年代:1993

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

AbstractThe effects of employee ownership, broadly defined, are estimated for a sample of Polish producer co‐operatives in three industries during 1976‐8, i.e. when Poland was a centrally planned economy. The results indicate that, in general, increasing either worker participation in control and/or in economic returns provides positive effects on productivity. The pattern of the different effects of employee ownership varies significantly across sectors. This new evidence strongly suggests that workers within Soviet‐type economies are responsive to economic incentives. Together with existing theoretical and empirical evidence for both Eastern and Western European firms, the findings suggest a larger role for employee ownership than typically either currently exists or that is under serious consideration in most restructuring econ

ISSN:0143-6570    

DOI:10.1002/mde.4090140511

出版商:John Wiley&Sons, Ltd.    

年代:1993

数据来源: WILEY