ISSN:0019-8676    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-232X.1975.tb00608.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1975

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0019-8676    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-232X.1975.tb00609.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1975

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

SummaryThe theory of final offer arbitration promises more than its actual performance delivers, based on admittedly limited experience. There is no showing that fewer negotiations reach impasse than would occur under conventional arbitration. There is evidence, however, that final offer arbitration does tend to produce awards less equitable than warranted by the positions and strengths of the parties, particularly when there are multiple issues at impasse and when arbitrators may select only one overall package or another. This tendency is built‐in to the process, since the whole point of final offer arbitration is deterrence, with little or no concern for getting a good settlement through arbitration.“Bad” awards cannot fail to generate irritation and to have a corrosive effect on responsible contract administration. It is possible that such awards, and their effects, will be accepted as the necessary price of a final offer selection system. What seems more likely, however, is that the system will be modified along the lines of those in Eugene and Michigan. Those modifications can be expected to have two effects. First, they will make it more likely that the parties will be able to reach their own agreement by encouraging mediation and further negotiations, even after arbitration has been invoked. Second, they will increase the possibility of an acceptable arbitrated settlement by allowing the arbitrator greater flexibility in making an award. By doing these things, however, the deterrent effect of final offer selection will be substantially weakened, and what will be left will be a useful form of mediation‐arbitration but not a substitute for the strike which contains an equivalent incentive to ne

ISSN:0019-8676    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-232X.1975.tb00610.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1975

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0019-8676    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-232X.1975.tb00611.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1975

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0019-8676    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-232X.1975.tb00612.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1975

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0019-8676    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-232X.1975.tb00613.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1975

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

SummaryTo explain the variation in the salaries of specialized workers in São Paulo's industries of transformation, we have used a model made up of five variables: the person's occupational preparation, the influence he may exert within the company because of his occupation, his age, his seniority in the company, and his time on the job.The data obtained for the total sample show clearly that the status of the worker within the company (occupational influence) as well as his occupational preparation and age, are powerful partial determinants of salary levels in São Paulo. On the whole, training is the most powerful of these variables because it has a strong direct effect on wages and because it has an indirect effect on wages through its impact on occupational influence level. Variables indicating experience in the company (seniority) and in the present job are almost negligible. The results suggest the presence of a modern industrial structure where one's technical preparation and position in the company are closely related and where these factors weigh far more heavily than experience on the job and in the company.Except for age, the viable variables used here are special cases of major status dimension: wealth (wages); power (occupational influence); informational status (occupatibnal preparation or education). Occupational prestige was also investigated and, in a stepwise regression, was found useless as a determinant of wages. In this research we explore, possibly for the first time, the use of a power variable, occupational influence, as a determinant of a reward variable, hourly wages. Though theoretically promising, power has previously been remarkably resistant to empirical analysis. Although our use of occupational influence has been successful, the introduction of new variables is always risky. We hope that others will conduct studies leading either to refinements in the use of this and similar indicators or to their rejection.Also, recent publications report only a small effect of most known variables on individual income differentials in the United States. Perhaps adding occupational influence might help. It is worth repeating that in the present data‐set, this variable alone explains just about as much variance in hourly wages (23 per cent) as a set of 13 repressors does on job income (27 per cent) in data analyzed by Spaeth. The whole set of five variables is, of course, more effective here, with 36 per cent of the variance explained. These differences may be due to many factors. It would seem that education may be more influential in Brazil—or at least in this sample —than in the United States. Clearly, educated personnel are in shorter supply than in the United States, and the relative rewards may be greater. If this is true, the rewards for education should decrease as Brazil's education system improves.In any case, by its clear elimination of job experience and seniority, and its strong support for occupational training, occupational influence level, and age, we hope the present work may add to the growing body of evidence regarding the determinants of wage differentials, especially in Brazil and perhaps in other dynamic third world

ISSN:0019-8676    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-232X.1975.tb00614.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1975

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0019-8676    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-232X.1975.tb00615.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1975

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0019-8676    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-232X.1975.tb00616.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1975

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0019-8676    

DOI:10.1111/j.1468-232X.1975.tb00617.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1975

数据来源: WILEY