摘要:

SummaryLooking at the Milken case has provided an opportunity to apply a social contracts based set of rule of thumb principles to insider trading and related issues. The actions involved were found to:1always violate the principle of willing compliance with law2in certain instances violate the principle of avoiding actual conflicts of interest3in certain instances violate the principle of honoring confidentiality.

ISSN:0047-2786    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9833.1991.tb00026.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1991

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

Ethical relativism is the thesis that ethical principles or judgments are relative to the individual or culture. When stated so vaguely relativism is embraced by numerous lay persons and a sizeable contingent of philosophers. Other philosophers, however, find the thesis patently false, even wonder how anyone could seriously entertain it.Both factions are on to something, yet both miss something significant as well. Those who whole‐heartedly embrace relativism note salient respects in which ethics is relative, yet erroneously infer that ethical values are noxiously subjective. Those who reject relativism do so because they think ethics is subject to rational scrutiny, that moral views can be correct or incorrect. But in rejecting objectionable features of relativism they overlook significant yet non‐pernicious ways in which ethicsisrelative.In short, each side harps on the opponent's weaknesses while overlooking its own flaws. That is regrettable. We are not forced to choose between relativism and rationality. We can have both. Thereareways in which ethical principles and behavior vary legitimately from culture to culture and individual to individual. That we must recognize. However this in no way suggests we cannot reason about ethics. Rather we should strive for a rational yet relativistic ethic which emphasizes the exercise of cultivated moral judgment rather than the rote application of extant moral rules. Or so I shall ar

ISSN:0047-2786    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9833.1991.tb00027.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1991

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

For more than two millennia the development of philosophy in what is called the West has been the province of men who trace their intellectual heritage to (some) men in ancient Greece. Within “the development of philosophy” I include the training of philosophers as well as publishing and preserving philosophical work in libraries. Thus I regard philosophy as a very material as well as spiritual enterprise. My focus here is on the spiritual impact, actual and potential, of recent changes in the material base of philosophy and the material impact of recent changes in the spiritual focus of philosophers. Before the Twentieth Century, the most significant transitions in the development of Western philosophy were its coming under the domination of Christian religious institutions and then its becoming relatively freed from such domination. Since the advent of the Twentieth Century, the most significant transitions may come from the increasing access to academic institutions of the middle and working classes, of people of color with histories of oppression by white societies, and of women from all classes and ethnic backgrounds—people who do not always or only trace their intellectual heritages to men of ancient Greece. What differences might these changes make to, and call for in, the development of philosophy?What I have thought about most are differences made by women and differences that have drawn in women to academic philosophy in Western democracies, such as the United States. Twentieth Century women in these contexts have published substantial bodies of philosophical inquiry with feminist agendas (both philosophy of feminism and philosophy manifesting feminist perspectives in ethics, epistemology, etc.). I want to comment on two features of such inquiry that often make it attractive to women less readily engaged by the traditions defined by privileged men. These features areholismand what I call“historical particularism.”I begin with “par

ISSN:0047-2786    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9833.1991.tb00028.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1991

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:0047-2786    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9833.1991.tb00029.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1991

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

This paper was written for a panel session, in which I was asked to represent an analytic perspective. On reflection I found that there is no such thing, however, and that what best unifies the analytic traditions is not even a set of questions, much less a set of answers, but only agreement on certain standards of clarity and argumentation, and an interest in dialectic and debate. Certain issueshavelong dominated the analytic agenda, it is true, and I see no better way to represent an analytic perspective than to enter into a bit of dialectic and debate on one of these, in a way that I hope will be clear and cogent.

ISSN:0047-2786    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9833.1991.tb00030.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1991

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

Michael Polanyi is best known for his work in epistemology and the philosophy of science. Less frequently discussed, but still a significant aspect of his work, is his political theory. He is an advocate of a free society which is based on “spontaneous order.” This concept is apparent in an early collection of essays entitledThe Logic of Liberty, and is emphasized again in his last book,Meaning.In the latter work, Polanyi's method of argumentation involves citing three objections to the endorsement of spontaneous order, and then offering a rebuttal to each. His discussion in this regard, while brief, provides an excellent opportunity for insight into a pivotal topic in his politics. In what follows here I will offer first a brief summary of Polanyi's position on spontaneous order and certain related concepts. Then I will examine his responses to the three objections he poses, and point out their deficiencies. Involved are a commonplace logical fallacy, the tendency to underestimate the power of economic interests and egoistic motivations, and, ultimately, an overstated and untenable epistemological position which does not adequately support, but instead undermines, his political posit

ISSN:0047-2786    

DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9833.1991.tb00031.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1991

数据来源: WILEY