ISSN:1058-6407    

DOI:10.1111/j.1430-9134.1992.00001.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1992

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

We augment efficiency‐based theories of ownership by including influence costs. Our principal conclusion is that the prospect of organizational decline and layoffs creates additional influence costs in multiunit organizations that would be absent if there was no prospect of layoffs and would be lessened or eliminated in focused organizations. This helps explain the tendency of firms to divest poorly performing units, as well as the pattern of sales of such units to firms already in businesses related to that of the divested uni

ISSN:1058-6407    

DOI:10.1111/j.1430-9134.1992.00009.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1992

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

This paper reexamines Grossman and Hart's (1980) insight into how the free‐rider problem excludes an external raider from capturing the increase in value it brings to R firm The inability of the raider to capture any of the surplus depends critically on the assumption of equal and indivisible shareholdings–the one‐share‐per‐shareholder model In contrast, we show that once shareholdings are large and potentially unequal, a raider may capture a significant part of the increase in value Specifically, the free‐rider problem does not prevent the takeover process when shareholdings ar

ISSN:1058-6407    

DOI:10.1111/j.1430-9134.1992.00037.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1992

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

For a homogeneous product oligopoly market, possibilities for pure strategy Nash equilibria in prices are studied. Consumers, who each nonstrategically purchase one unit up to a common reservation price, are hypothesized to be more concerned with large price differences (and therefore buy from the cheapest firm) than slightly different prices. For the duopoly case, existence, uniqueness, and characterization results are provided. Linear examples are given with 2 and n firms.

ISSN:1058-6407    

DOI:10.1111/j.1430-9134.1992.00063.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1992

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

This paper analyzes the ongoing transformation of the soft drink distribution of Coca‐Cola and Pepsi‐Cola from systems of independent bottlers to captive bottling subsidiaries, A transaction cost‐based theory is developed to explain this restructuring. It is postulated that changes in the external environment and the resulting changes in the strategies of Coca‐Cola and Pepsi‐Cola raised the costs of transacting between them and their independent bottlers. Two types of empirical tests are presented. One exploits the difference in the distribution of Coca‐Cola and Pepsi‐Cola in the fountain channel. The other consists of statistical analyses of the competitive effects of the move toward captive distribution. Both types of tests support the bas

ISSN:1058-6407    

DOI:10.1111/j.1430-9134.1992.00083.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1992

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:1058-6407    

DOI:10.1111/j.1430-9134.1992.00129.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1992

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

This paper offers a general characterization of the optimal product line prices for a monopolist whose quality of products is initially unknown to consumers. In the focal equilibrium, a monopolist signals a high‐quality product line by pricing as if quality were known to be high, but costs of production were higher than they truly are. In a rich set of environments, this characterization implies that the prices of all products are initially distorted upward, with the price distortion being largest for products with the most inelastic demands and/or quality‐sensitive production costs. These implications yield predictions for the time path of prices flint are broadly consistent with evidence from the marketing literature. The multidimensional signaling problem is made tractable by the satisfaction of a very simple and powerful single crossing prope

ISSN:1058-6407    

DOI:10.1111/j.1430-9134.1992.00151.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1992

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

Managerial behavior that is rational and profit‐maximizing sometimes will seem to be overly conservative. If the valuation of innovations contains white noise and the status quo would be preferred to random innovation, then any innovation that does not appear substantially better than the status quo should be rejected, for reasons arising from regression toward the mean. The more successful the firm, the higher is the optimal acceptance threshold and conservative bias. Other things equal, more successful firms will spend less on research, adopt fewer innovations, and be less likely to advance the industry's best practic

ISSN:1058-6407    

DOI:10.1111/j.1430-9134.1992.00175.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1992

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

This paper analyzes the interaction between a regulator and monopolist in the determination of the price for the monopolist's product, where only the monoplast knowsex anteits true marginal cost of production. The regulator observes the market price proposed by the monopolist and decides whether to hold a rate hearing, where suck a hearing is a costly means of verifying the monopolist's marginal cost. Subsequent to a rate hearing, the regulator can impose a market price for the monopolist's product; in the absence of a rate hearing, the market price is set equal to the monopolist's proposed price. Equilibrium behavior by the monopolist and regulator is characterized, and the degree of regulatory “activism,” as defined by the probability a rate hearing is held, is seen to varyex postwith the monopolist's true marginal c

ISSN:1058-6407    

DOI:10.1111/j.1430-9134.1992.00203.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1992

数据来源: WILEY

ISSN:1058-6407    

DOI:10.1111/j.1430-9134.1992.00234.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1992

数据来源: WILEY