ISSN:1058-6407    

DOI:10.1111/j.1430-9134.1995.00001.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1995

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

Royalty payments from a franchisee to a franchisor serve as incentive for the franchisor to provide appropriate levels of quality and brand, name investment. However, since they also distort the service provided by the franchisee, we should expect relatively lower royalty rates in franchises that are primarily service‐oriented. Casual examination of royalty rates across product‐oriented and service‐oriented franchises shows that the opposite is true, with service‐type franchises enjoying higher royalty rates. We resolve this apparent puzzle. The basic argument we put forth is that in product‐type franchises, a franchisor can charge a wholesale price on goods transferred to the franchisee, thus using an alternative instrument that also serves as an incentive for the franchisor. Moreover, in general, a franchisor will use both wholesale price and royalty to minimize distortions in retail price and service at the retail level. We then test the predictions of our model on different industries and find confirmation for

ISSN:1058-6407    

DOI:10.1111/j.1430-9134.1995.00007.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1995

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

The role of product warranty in segmentation of consumer durable product markets is highlighted. I demonstrate that consumer moral hazard and heterogeneity in product usage create variation in the valuation of product warranties by the different segments in the market. In this context, the firm, by offering a self‐selecting menu of base warranty and extended warranties, satisfies the warranty demands of the various segments of the population. The consumer choice behavior prediction of the theory with regard to extended warranty is empirically validated with data from a survey of new car buyer

ISSN:1058-6407    

DOI:10.1111/j.1430-9134.1995.00033.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1995

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

Why are moving sales a successful and widespread phenomenon? How can it be optimal for a seller to disclose her low valuation for the item to be sold? We propose an explanation based on the “lemons problem” in bargaining with asymmetric information about quality. Disclosing a low valuation signals that there are significant gains from trade, so that trade takes place when it wouldn't otherwise, and all agents are made better

ISSN:1058-6407    

DOI:10.1111/j.1430-9134.1995.00055.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1995

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

Research on durable goods has shown that because of a time inconsistency problem, a monopolist manufacturer prefers to rent rather than sell its product. We reexamine the relative profitability of renting versus selling from a marketing perspective. In particular, using a simple linear demand formulation, we assume a durable goods monopolist has to use downstream intermediaries to market its product. In contrast to the case of an integrated monopolist, we find that when the monopolist has to rely on intermediaries, then it prefers to go through an intermediary that sells rather than one that rents its product. Similarly, the intermediary that sells the product is more profitable than the intermediary that rents the product. However, if the monopolist can commit to a set of prices, then the intermediary that rents is more profitable than the intermediary that sells.

ISSN:1058-6407    

DOI:10.1111/j.1430-9134.1995.00069.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1995

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

I present tests of a competitive rationale for price promotions. In a model with a population of informed and uninformed customers, price competition yields a static equilibrium in which each seller draws a price from a specified density function. Price data on coffee and saltine crackers products are used to test whether the sample of prices on each product could have possibly come from the theoretically specified density function. The results suggest that some markets are indeed consistent with the marginal distributions of prices predicted by the model. Furthermore, in the process of testing this rationale for price promotions, estimates are obtained for the marginal cost of each product, the number of competing goods, and the percentage of informed consumers. The resulting excess variability of these estimates across competing brands can also raise questions with respect to the empirical validity of the model.

ISSN:1058-6407    

DOI:10.1111/j.1430-9134.1995.00085.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1995

数据来源: WILEY

摘要:

Empirically validating and testing the specification of game theoretic models has received limited attention in the marketing literature. The authors provide an econometric framework for estimating the parameters of response functions when the observed data in the market place are the Nash equilibrium outcomes of an underlying dynamic duopoly game specification. Specifically, the estimation procedure accounts for the joint endogeneity of market shares and marketing efforts of market rivals using a system of simultaneous equations that included the market response function and the Nash equilibrium conditions. A formal statistical test is used to detect model misspecification. The empirical analysis is carried out using data from four product markets: pharmaceutical, soft drink, beer, and detergent. Comparisons are provided with conventional estimation of the response function parameters in which the equilibrium conditions are ignored in the estimation. Managerial implications of the empirical results are discussed.

ISSN:1058-6407    

DOI:10.1111/j.1430-9134.1995.00109.x

出版商:Blackwell Publishing Ltd    

年代:1995

数据来源: WILEY